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APPRAISAL OF MINIMUM PRICE FIXING UNDER THE
BITUMINOUS COAL ACT OF 1937
THE peacetime regulation of the bituminous coal industry was the
outgrowth of the instability that has long characterized the industry,
more particularly during the years 1924 to 1932. (See Chapter I.)
The fact of this instability is documented in "nineteen investiga-
tions or hearings by Congress or by specially created commissions"
between 1913 and 1935.1
A. Legislative Background
Confronted with falling prices and operating deficits, the opera-
tors turned to the National Recovery Administration even though
its price-fixing code contained labor provisions which required ac-
ceptance of collective bargaining as well as a ceiling on hours and
a floor under wages. When the National Industrial Recovery Act
was invalidated, Congress enacted the Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act. Once again minimum coal prices, wages, and hours of
work were to be established under procedures laid down by the
government, but the Act was declared unconstitutional: its labor
provisions did not fall within the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce and its tax refund provisions were punitive.
To remedy these shortcomings of the 1935 Act, Congress passed
the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.2 In this law the legislators care-
fully omitted all provisions regulating labor's wages and terms of
modified the tax provisions, and concentrated for the
most part on the procedures and problems pertaining to minimum
price fixing and the correlative marketing rules and regulations.
To administer the new Code, the Act created the National Bi-
tuminous Coal Commission and instructed it to establish minimum
prices. It also empowered the Commission to set maximum prices
when conditions necessitated such action, but no maximum price
could be established for any mine which did not "yield a fair re-
turn on the fair value of the property." (Sec. 4-lic.)
'Carter v. Carter Coal Company (1935), 298 U.S. 238.
250U.S. Stat. at L. (1937) 72. The complete text of the Act is presented
in Appendix G.
The declaration of public policy, however, set forth the rights of labor
to organize and bargain collectively free from any interference, restraint,
or coercion on the part of employers. (See Secs. 9a-1, -2, and-3.)
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Most of the remaining duties assigned to the Commission under
this Act which were not directly related to the establishment of
minimum prices were investigatory in nature. The Act specifically
authorized the Commission "to initiate, promote, and conduct re-
search designed to improve standards and methods used in the min-
ing, preparation, conservation, distribution, and utilization of coal
and the discovery of additional uses for coal, and for such purposes
shall have authority to assist educational, governmental, and other
research institutions in conducting research in coal...." (Sec.2a.)
It was also instructed to study and investigate specific problems
confronting the industry as well as the need and possible methods
for the control of the production of The results of its investi-
gations together with its recommendations were to be reported an-
nually to the Secretary of the Interior for transmission by him to
Congress.5
The Act, whièh was to expire in April 1941, was extended for
two years. In 1943 its life was extended for 30 days and then 90
days. On July 5,1943the Ways and Means Committee refused a
further extension because in its opinion the Act (a) established a
system of regulation inimical to free competition, (b) was no longer
4Fora more complete statement of the Commission's duties and respon-
sibilities see Chapter III. Among other things, the Commission was in-
structed to study and investigate (Sec. 14a):
—The matter of increasing the uses of coal and the problems of its im-
portation and exportation.
—The economic operations of mines with the view to the conservation
of the national coal resources.
—The safe operation of mines for the purpose of minimizing working
hazards, for which purpose it was authorized to utilize the services of
the Bureau of Mines.
—The problem of marketing in order to lower distributing costs for the
benefit of consumers.
—The necessity for the control of production of coal and methods of
such control, including allotment of output to districts and producers
within such districts.
5Inthe Third Annual Report under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 [for
the]Fiscal Tear Ended June 30, 1939, the Bituminous Coal Division pointed
out (p. 23) that "no comprehensive studies or investigations were instituted
by the Commission." In the Commission's opinion "it seemed wiser to defer
these activities until the immediate and major responsibility of establishing
minimum prices and marketing rules and regulations had been fulfilled."
Two years later the Director of the Bituminous Coal Division which suc-
ceeded the Commission stated that "definite progress has been made by the
Division on these general research matters, but only on the preliminary
phases of the undertakings contemplated by the Act. Substantial sums for
technical personnel and equipment will be needed to meet• fully the re-
quirements of the Act." (Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior,
Fiscal rear Ended June 30, 1941, p. 214.)
308APPRAISAL
necessary because conditions in the industry had improved, and
(c) had failed to prevent strikes in the industry.
B. Objectives Sought by Congress
Minimum price fixing was introduced presumably to carry out
some objective or objectives. What did Congress have in mind
when it decided to eliminate the practice of selling bituminous coal
at prices below the cost of production as defined in the Act? A
knowledge of the goals sought would seem to be a necessary condi-
tion for an intelligent appraisal of the Act.
1. INTENT OF CONGRESS AS DISCLOSED BY THE ACT
A study of the Act does not throw much light on the intent of
Congress. The statement of purpose contained in the first paragraph
reads in part: "That regulation of the sale and distribution in inter-
state commerce of bituminous coal is imperative for the protection
of such commerce; that there exist practices and methods of distri-
bution and marketing of such coal that waste the coal resources of
the Nation and disorganize, burden, and obstruct interstate com-
merce in bituminous coal, with the result that regulation of the
prices thereof and of unfair methods of competition therein is
necessary to promote interstate commerce in bituminous coal and
to remove burdens and obstructions therefrom."
This statement of purpose was probably intended to establish the
right of Congress to pass such legislation rather than to set forth
the objectives sought. As a result it stresses the need for the removal
of burdens and obstructions to interstate commerce which are oc-
casioned by present methods of distributing and marketing bitumi-
nous coal. Since these methods also "waste the coal resources of the
Nation," we may infer that the conservation of coal resources is an
implied objective of the Act, an inference supported by the specific
instruction of Congress that the Commission investigate "the eco-
nomic operations of mines with the view to the conservation of the
national coal resources." (Sec. 14a-1.)
Since minimum prices were to approximate weighted average
costs, it might be argued that the objective of the price-fixing pro-
cedure was to protect the interests of the investors in this industry.
In fact Eugene V. Rostow° asserts that "the statutory cost stand-
ards are decidedly undesirable in that they include royalties, taxes,
depreciation, and depletion allowances in the cost figure which is
8"BituminousCoal and the Public Interest," The Tale Law Journal,
February 1941, p. 572.
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to be 'the basis for the proposal and establishment of minimum
prices' ";andadds, "the inclusion of these items as 'costs' makes
preservation of the value of the capital invested in the mines, and
payment of royalties for the use of the coal property, an objective
of the minimum price scheme." It should be pointed out that the
Act specifically excluded from the weighted average costs taxes on
income, excess profits, and unassigned acreage. In addition, it ex-
cluded interest on investment and such items as bad debts, demur-
rage charges, the cost of developing new mines as well as the cost
of carrying idle or abandoned mines. It should be noted, as pointed
out by Walton H. Hamilton,7 "that public policy, as expressed in
current legislation generally, does not subsume his [Mr. Rostow's]
disregard for the return to capital. Nor does his presumption accord
with the amenities of business enterprise."
Moreover, a study of the intent of Congress in earlier legislation
would suggest that Congress was less interested in preserving "the
capital invested in the mines and payment of royalties" to the owners
of coal than it was in the establishment of a floor for costs which
it regarded as reasonable in order that the industry could support
a more adequate wage structure developed through collective bar-
gaining.8 This connection may be seen in the NRA Code for bitumi-
nous coal, which not only made provision for minimum price fixing
but established minimum wages and maximum hours and encour-
aged collective bargai.ning, and in the Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act of 1935, the passage of which was demanded by John
L. Lewis and was undoubtedly hastened by a threatened coal strike,
which provided specific machinery for the determination of wages
and hours. The Coal Act of 1937 omitted wage and hour provisions
only because their inclusion had been declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in its invalidation of the 1935 Act.
2. OBJECTIVES AS STATED BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
ADMINISTERING THE ACT
The statements of federal officials responsible for administering
the provisions of the Act may be of help in determining the objec-
"Coal and the Economy—A Demurrer," The Tale Law Journal, Febru-
ary 1941, p. 600, note 7.
8Ofinterest in this connection is the statement of Donald H. Wallace that
"the primary purpose" of the Act "was the establishment of minimum prices
in order to insure sufficient income to the mines to enable them to pay higher
wage schedules negotiated by collective bargaining." ("A Critical Review of
Some Instances of Government Price Control, Economic $tandard of Govern-
ment Price Control, Monograph No. 32 [Temporary National Economic
Committee, 1941], Part iv, p. 461.)
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tives sought by Congress. The Third Annual Report under the
Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 [for thell Fiscal Year Ended June 30,
1939 states:
"The condition of the bituminous-coal industry, as disclosed by
the studies and investigations made by the former Commission and
the present Division, confirmed the necessity for some form of pub-
lic regulation of the industry. It was found that in the period from
April to December 1937, inclusive (the latest period for which
cost and realization records are available), the commercial bitumi-
nous mines were losing money at the weighted average rate of
slightly• over 1 1 cents per ton.
"After 1937 the operating deficit in the bituminous-coal in-
dustry seems to have increased.
"This situation threatened to repeat the grave consequences
which prices below costs have frequently had before in the industry.
The money losses lead to widespread bankruptcy, impoverishment
of workers and of mining communities, and shrinkage in local tax
revenues. Such consequences in one of the Nation's largest in-
dustries tend to spread the retarding effect throughout not only the
food, clothing, and mine-supplying industries, but into the whole
national economy.
"It was to meet such a situation, recurrent throughout the 1920's
and threatening to follow from the collapse of prices at the end of
the National Industrial Recovery program, that Congress enacted
the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 in order to place a flooring under
coal
In a radio address Frederic L. Kirgis, the Director of the Con-
sumers' Counsel Division established by the Act, said:
"In the administration of the Act it is hoped that destructive
competition between producers will be eliminated; that the miners
will receive adequate annual incomes under better working condi-
tions; that consumers will be able to buy coal at reasonable prices
and that the coal resources will be conserved to assure an adequate
supply for future generations, which could not be done so long as
producers were employing the wasteful mining methods brought
about by cutthroat competition."°
Mr. H. A. Gray, Director of the Bituminous Coal Division, in
his annual report in 1940, wrote:.
"Although the circumstances and conditions of the long depres-
sion in the coal industry have many aspects, it can be simply
9Pp.4and5. 10September22, 1939.
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stated that the most significant fundamental condition of the coal
industry which has led to the minimum price legislation is the fact
that the industry's productive capacity has been far in excess of the
demand for bituminous coal."
3. OBJECTIVE AS STATED BY U.S. SUPREME COURT
In the Sunshine Case, upholding the constitutionality of the
Act, Justice Douglas stated that "its aim is the stabilization of
theelimination of un-
fair competition."2 In summarizing the situation which made such
legislation necessary he added:
"For a generation there have been various manifestations of in-
cessant demand for federal intervention in the coal industry. The
investigations preceding the 1935 and 1937 Acts are replete with
an exposition of the conditions which have beset that industry. Of-
ficial and private records give eloquent testimony to the statement
of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Carter Case that free competition
has been 'degraded into anarchy' in the Bituminous coal industry.
Over-production and savage, competitive warfare wasted the in-
dustry. Labor and capital alike were the victims. Financial distress
among operators and acute poverty among miners prevailed even
during periods of general
4. AUTHORS' INTERPRETATION OF CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIVES
The history of legislative investigations conducted by Congress
and those of specially created cofnmissions as well as the statements
of Justices Cardozo and Douglas and the governmental officials
quoted above make it unmistakably clear that Congress was much
disturbed over the impact of severe competition upon this industry
and particularly on the standards of living of those dependent upon
the industry for a livelihood. Undoubtedly the primary purpose
of the Act was to protect the workers, the operators, and mining
communities from the consequences of the rigorous play of eco-
nomic forces. Congress also was concerned with wasteful mining
methods but presumably did not feel competent to deal with the
problem and so instructed the Coal Commission to "initiate, pro-
11AnnualReport of the Secretary of the interior,... June30, 1940,
p. 452.
12Extensionof Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, Hearings on H.J. Res. 101,
Revised, U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 1st sess.,
March 1941, p. 165.
13Ibid.,p. 168.
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mote, and conduct research" designed to improve "the economic
operations of mines with the view to the conservation of the national
coal resources" and to make its recommendations. Similar action
was taken concerning (1) the development of new uses and new
markets for coal, (2) the safe operation of coal mines, (3) more
effective marketing practices to lower distribution costs, and (4)
the problem of production control.
Congress apparently concluded that a floor for prices below
which coal could not be sold would support a wage structure de-
veloped through collective bargaining and (by assuring a more
nearly adequate cost structure) hold in check the inherent tendency
of the industry to engage in drastic price cutting, thereby making
it possible for the producers to pay the negotiated wage scales. In
this way it presumably hoped, as stated by Justice Douglas, to
achieve "the stabilization of the industry." In other words, minimum
price fixing was the immediate objective by which Congress hoped
to attain its long-run goal of stabilization of the industry through
the elimination of excessive competition and the establishment of a
closer relationship between the demand for bituminous coal and
the industry's productive capacity.
C. Other Proposals for Bringing Order into the industry
The objectives sought and the methods selected by Congress to
achieve them have been challenged. Those who were critical of the
Act argued that the objectives were too narrowly conceived. They
asserted that the regulation of coal prices in order to protect those
engaged in the industry from destructive competition and to en-
courage research in the conservation of coal resources and other
problems confronting the industry was too limited an approach to
bring capacity, output, and demand into effective balance and
thereby to bring stability to the industry.
The many proposals which have been submitted for the regula-
tion of this industry cover a wide range of objectives. They include
(1) the more efficient production of coal, to ensure lower costs as
well as conservation of coal resources, (2) the diminution of waste
in distribution by a minimization of crosshauls, (3) the reduction
of waste in consumption by a more effective application of appropri-
ate coals to different uses, (4) the elimination, insofar as possible,
of the waste of human resources and the encouragement of the
rehabilitation of displaced coal-mining labor, and (5) the establish-
ment of a long-range integrated program which would effectively
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regulate all fuel and energy, including coal, oil, natural gas, and
water power, in the interest of the
•The method adopted by Congress in the Bituminous Coal Act
of 1.937 to bring stability to the industry has also been criticized.
It is frequently argued that price fixing without control of produc-
tion or capacity cannot bring capacity and demand into balance, but
on the contrary will only exaggerate the condition. Similarly, it is
asserted that minimum price fixing will hold marginal mines in the
industry and lead to the opening of new mines and, therefore, will
discourage rather than encourage stability of prices, wages, and
profits or, for that matter, of operations.
Many methods or procedures have been recommende4 to bring
stability to the industry. One group of writers advocates govern-
mental ownership and operation. At the close of World War I the
United Mine Workers of America advocated such a program for
the industry.15 A bill introduced in the House in 1939 proposed
the establishment of a National Natural Resources Corporation
"which would buy and operate coal mines, oil wells, water power
plants, natural gas fields, plants for the manufacture or distribution
of the products thereof, and plants for the manufacture of equip-
ment and appliances needed for the use thereof, to meet the domes-
tic needs and supply farm markets."16
A second group recommends extensive governmental regulation
and control of the operation of coal mines whether privately or
governmentally owned. Under this heading fall plans which would
regulate the number of mines and/or their capacity and production
by licensing of mines, control of investments in the industry, regu-
lation of the extension of transportation facilities to new mines or
14 See "Proposals for Stabilization of the Bituminous Coal Industry" by
L. E. Young in the Proceedings of the Third International Conference on
Bittiminous Coal (Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1931), Vol.1, pp.
53..81; the discussion of alternative methods of bituminous coal regulation
by Ellery B. Gordon and William Y. Webb, "Price Fixing in the Bitumi-
Coal Industry," Economic Standards of Government Price Control,
Monograph No. 32 (Temporary National Economic Committee, 1941),
Part iii, pp. 319-32; "A Proposal for Regulation of the Coal Industry" by
John E. Orchard in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1925,
pp. 196-240; "War Time Price Control' by JulesBackman in Contemporary
Law Pamphlets (New York University, 1940), Ser. 4, No. 5; "'Price Fixing'
in the Bituminous Coal Industry—A Legal-Economic Problem," by Stephen
P. l3urke in West Virginia Law Quarterly, April 1935, pp. 225-48; and the
objectives set forth by the Bituminous Coal Producers Committee, United
Mine Workers Journal, June 15, 1944, pp. 8 and 9.
How to Run Coal the "District No. 2" plan (September 20, 1919) (Gor-
don and Webb, op.cit., p. 325, note 18).
Op.cit., p. 225.
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fields, withholding of the coal lands of the public domain, closing
down of marginal mines, and the establishment of production quo-
tas. Other proposals aimed at achieving effective governmental
regulation and control, either in lieu of or to supplement the above
suggestions, are price control, establishment of marketing zones,
regulation of the margins of jobbers and dealers, standardization
of cost accounting methods in use at coal mines, establishment of
compulsory marketing organizations under governmental supervi-
sion to minimize general duplication of selling effort and selling ex-
penses, control of wage rates and related terms of employment to
protect the public against exorbitantly high labor costs and there-
fore prices, rehabilitation or resettlement of mine labor permanently
unemployed, and establishment of collateral regulation of oil and
natural gas.
A third group urges limited or partial regulation and control
within a framework which encourages private initiative and enter-
prise. They advocate measures such as minimum price control
and the coordination of such prices in consuming markets or the
establishment of minimum wage rates for the industry or standard
rates of pay for major occupations.
A fourth group recommends self-regulation by the industry under
governmental supervision by means of voluntary or compulsory
marketing agencies or arrangements.
A fifth group advocates, not regulation and control, but federal
assistance to the industry. Under this heading may be included (1)
financial assistance by the government for the conduct of research
to develop new uses for coal, more effective utilization, and greater
efficiency in coal mining, (2) stimulation of coal exports, (3).
building of storage facilities at major points of consumption, (4)
promotion of year-round consumer buying, and (5) encouragement
of geographic and occupational mobility of coal miners.
A sixth group advocates a "hands off" policy and urges that pri-
vate enterprise be left to function without federal regulation or as-
sistance notwithstanding severe competition and instability of opera-
tions.
An appraisal of the many objectives and measures for achieving
stability in the bituminous coal industry, absorbing as that may be,
does not fall within the task undertaken by those responsible for
this study. They have set as their primary task the analysis and
appraisal of the minimum price-fixing experiment conducted under
the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.
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D. An Appraisal
Earlier it was pointed out that minimum price fixing was the im-
mediate goal by which Congress sought to achieve its long-run ob-
jective of stabilizing the industry. An appraisal of this experiment
in minimum price fixing would seem to require examination of the
three following questions:
Were the provisions of the Act and particularly the criteria and
procedures to be utilized in price fixing such that those who
were assigned the task of administering the Act could attain the
immediate goal of Congress?
Were the policies adopted and the procedures utilized by the
administering agencies the best that could be formulated under
the Act, and how well did these agencies perform their tasks?
Assuming adequate legislation and competent administration,
can minimum price fixing attain the long-run objective of Con-
gress to eliminate the disturbing effects of excessive competition
and, by bringing the industry's productive capacity into closer
relationship with effective demand for bituminous coal, achieve
the stabilization of the industry?
1. APPRAISAL OF THE ACT AS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR
PRICE FIXING
In this section consideration will be given first to the criteria
set forth in the Act for use in price fixing, next to the procedures
by which prices were to be determined, and then to other provisions
of the Act which had a bearing on the price-fixing process.
a. Criteria to be used in price fixing. The immediate objective
of Congress was to set a floor for bituminous coal prices which
would be high enough (1) to support a wage structure developed
through collective bargaining and (2) to eliminate the prevalence
of losses that had led to drastic price cutting. Such an under-
taking could be delegated to the industry or governmental agen-
cies only if Congress were to lay down workable criteria or stand-
ards for the guidance of those to whom the task of administering
the Act was assigned. What were these criteria and were they ade-
quate? A careful reading of the Act discloses that the minimum
prices to be set were to:
—Be "free on board transportation facilities at the mines for kinds,
qualities, and sizes of coal produced" in the several districts, and
316APPRAISAL
coordinated "in common consuming market areas" upon a fair
competitive basis. (Secs. 4-ha and b.)
—"Have due regard to the interests of the consuming public."
(Sec. 4-ha.)
—"Be just and equitable, and not unduly prejudicial or preferen-
tial, as between and among districts." (Sec. 4-lib.)
—"Yield a return per net ton for each district in a minimum price
area, ...equalas nearly as may be to the weighted average of
the total cost, per net ton" minus capital charges "of the tonnage
of such minimum price area." (Sec. 4-ha.)
—"Reflect, as nearly as possible, the relative market values, at
points of delivery in each common consuming market area, of
the various kinds, qualities, and sizes of coal" and take into ac-
count such factors as"valuesas to uses, seasonal demand, trans-
portation methods and charges and their effect upon a reasonable
opportunity to compete on a fair basis, and the competitive rela-
tionships between coal and other forms of fuel and energy."
(Sec. 4-lib.)
—"Preserve as nearly as may be existing fair competitive oppor-
tunities." (Sec. 4-hib.)
—Preclude "dumping" of coal. (Sec. 4-ha.)
It is apparent that Congress intended that the minimum prices
to be established for bituminous coal were to be set at a level that
would approximate the weighted average of the total production,
administration, and "reasonable" selling costs in a given minimum
price area. The price-fixing agency, however, was given some lee-
way in carrying Out its task; minimum prices were not to be estab-
lished which would "reduce or increase the return per net ton" for
any district "by an amount greater than necessary to accomplish
such coordination, to the end that the return per net ton upon the
entire tonnage of the minimum price area shall approximate the
weighted average of the total cost per net ton...ofsuch minimum
price area." (Sec. 4-lib.) Evidently discretion was permitted to
enable the Commission to give consideration to the interests of the
consuming public and to ensure that the resulting minimum prices
would (1) "be just and equitable," (2) "reflect, as nearly as pos-
sible, the relative market values," (3) "preserve as nearly as may
be existing fair competitive opportunities," (4) ensure "a reason-
able opportunity to compete on a fair basis," (5)maintain"corn-
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petitive relationships between coal and other forms of fuel and
energy," 'and, presumably, (6) conserve our coal resources.
Even a casual study of these criteria discloses ambiguities and
conflicts of purposes. As Eleanor Poland pointed out:
"It is implicit in the scheme that prices are to be kept above the
competitive level so long as competitive prices are below costs, yet
'existing fair competitive opportunities' are to be preserved, and
there must be 'due regard to the interest of the consuming public.'
In co-ordinating prices for common consuming markets, it is neces-
sary that the prices fixed for like kind, qualities, and sizes of coal
be uniform at points of delivery, despite the fact that there are wide
variations as between mines and between competing districts, both
in costs of mining and of transportation. Yet the Division is called
upon to see that these prices not only cover the average cost of pro-
duction in each minimum-price area, but that they be 'just and
equitable' both as between producers and between districts, and
at the same time preserve 'existing fair competitive opportuni-
Thelong hearings held by the Coal Division on cost determina-
tion, proposed minimum prices, and coordinated minimum prices
disclose many differences of opinion not only as to interpretations
of the Act's language—particularly the meaning of certain criteria
—but as to the weight to be given to them and the manner in which
they should be applied. A case in point was the controversy over
"values as to uses." The Act provided that "classification of coal
and price variations as to...valuesas to uses ..." wereto be
proposed by each district board for its own district. The attempt to
apply this criterion gave rise to disagreement as to its meaning,
the stage of the price-fixing process at which it should receive
attention, and the manner in which it should be applied. (See the
discussion in Chapter VII.)
The phrase "existing fair competitive opportunities" was espe-
cially subject to conflicting interpretations. What was meant by
"fair," and should the emphasis be placed on "existing" or "fair"?
Should decisions relating to "existing fair competitive opportiini-
ties" be based on short-run or long-run considerations? If existing
competitive opportunities were to be the primary determinant of
coordinated minimum prices, as seems to have been the case, how
could the resulting minimum prices conform to the requirement
LeverettS. Lyon, Victor Abramson, and Associates, Government and
Economic Life (The Institute of Economics of the Brookings Institution,
1940), p. 982.
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that they be "just and equitable" between producers and districts?
Moreover, if "fair" competitive opportunities were to be the major
consideration would not the established minimum prices interfere
with the historic flow of coal and thereby impair existing com-
petitive
Eugene V. Rostow contended that the formula requiring prices
to be set so as to yield a return per ton in each district in a minimum
price area which is equal as nearly as may be to the weighted aver-
age of the total costs (as defined in the Act) of the tonnage in that
minimum price area does not "have due regard to the interests of
the consuming, public." He pointed out18 that a particular mine—
whether for reasons of location, managerial efficiency, or geological
conditions—might have costs which would enable it to sell at prices
below a minimum which would be set in relation to average costs
of all mines in a large area. This would not be permitted under the
Act. Whether minimum prices under these conditions resulted in
a generally higher price for coal or a transfer of business to higher
cost mines by preventing "distant low-cost mines from selling in
certain markets," the public's interest in utilization of resources
would not be served. This interest, he held, "calls for consideration
only of the relation of prices to the internal cost conditions peculiar
to each mine."
No one can gainsay Mr. Rostow's contention concerning the
effect of the cost formula on low-cost mines and the resulting im-
pact on both the prices and movement of their coals. Congress un-
doubtedly felt, however, that social costs as well as cost-price rela-
tionships should be considered. The "consideration only of the re-
lation of prices to the internal cost conditions peculiar to each mine"
was one of the important factors that contributed substantially to
the instability that has characterized this industry throughout so
much of its history and that led Congress to experiment with mini-
mum price fixing.
From the wording in the Act it would seem that Congress in-
tended weighted average costs, as defined, to be the primary de-
terminant of minimum prices. The cost standards made it possible
for the regulatory agency to establish minimum prices which
would pass on to the consumers the cost of increased wage rates and
other improved conditions of employment established under collec-
tive bargaining. The noncost criteria permitted deviations from the
cost structure that were necessary to preserve existing competitive
relationships in the industry so long as other conditions protected
18Op.cit.,pp. 571-72.
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by these criteria were met, that is, a minimum price structure that
(1) was "just and equitable," (2) maintained "competitive rela-
tionships between coal and other forms of fuel and energy," etc.
Because labor costs constitute approximately 60 per cent of the
total costs, the cost standard was especially important in this in-
dustry.
Undoubtedly the task of those who had to administer the terms
of the Act would have been much easier if Congress had set forth
more clearly the meaning of the criteria or standards to be utilized
in price fixing, the manner and particularly the stage of the price-
determination process in which they should be used, and, to the
extent that it was possible, had given some indication of their rela-
tive importance. Such action would not only have eliminated much
of the controversy over the Act's criteria but would have focused
attention on the overlapping of standards and the conflicts of pur-
pose contained therein.
The question with which we are principally concerned, however,
is this—Could this cost standard supplemented by ambiguous
conflicting noncost criteria actually have achieved the objectives of
the Act and would it have resulted in minimum prices that would
have ensured maximum economic consumption?
Donald H. Wallace examined this question at some length.
Since the authors find themselves in agreement with his analysis,
this presentation will closely follow
Since the cost standard of the Act was designed to equate sales
revenue and total costs (as defined) in each minimum price area,
and at the same time to preserve equitable competitive relationships,
and since costs included the prevailing negotiated wages and other
vital costs, this standard would appear to promote the immediate
objectives of the Act and lead to maximum economic consumption.
As Mr. Wallace noted, however, this conclusion becomes less
certain when the question is raised: "Whose costs, what mines are
to produce, and how is total production to be divided between high-
and low-cost mines?"
Any scheme of price fixing will tend to allocate production,
profits, employment, and wages. In its deliberations, therefore, a
price-fixing agency is making decisions with respect to which mines
will be permitted to operate, how they will share in the available
business, whether fluctuations in production over time will be
shared among those mines in operation or whether the number of
mines in operation will change.
Op.cit.,pp. 463-66.
320APPRAISAL
But the Act did not provide any precise standards for handling
these problems of economic efficiency. It will be remembered that
the price-fixing agency was to be guided by requirements that prices
be "just and equitable" and "not unduly prejudicial or preferential,"
and that they "preserve as nearly as may be existing fair competi-
tive opportunities." These terms, however, were not defined.
It might be possible for the regulatory agency under such an
Act to define fairness in terms of relative efficiency of the various
mines, Mr. Wallace pointed out, but this would be unlikely. Where
such standards have been developed in interpretation of laws deal-
ing with unfair competition and regulation of public utility rates,
the process has been slow, and such standards have generally been
modified by considerations of past relationships. Relative efficiency
has usually not been considered by commissions and courts to be
the major indicator of fair relationships.
It was to be expected, therefore, that reliance would be placed
primarily on preservation of past relationships. This standard,
however, presents certain problems. The price-fixing agency would
have to decide whether to interpret it to mean past price relation-
ships or past proportion of sales, except of course where such prices
or proportion of sales reflected dumping or "unfair" competitive
opportunities. Mr. Wallace pointed out that "with variations in
total sales as, for example, between depression and recovery, it
might be impossible to achieve the latter objective without altering
past price relationships. The former interpretation would render
equation of average price and average cost easier to obtain and
would enable a closer approach to maximum economic consump-
tion." Either interpretation would be difficult to apply in view of a
lack of adequate records of such relationships and their tendency to
fluctuate in the past, and surely in the future, as a result of changes
in cost elements and shifts in demand.
We may conclude, then, with Mr. Wallace, that the Act did not
require the price-fixing agency to consider what effects prices
would have on consumption, utilization, and capacity, and so on
costs, which in turn would affect future minimum prices. No cri-
teria were "provided for the levels of consumption, production,
operating capacity, and prices" at which total revenue and total
costs were to be equalized.
It was not possible to ascertain the reasons which led the framers
of the Act to choose the stated criteria for setting minimum prices.
'Whatever the reasons were, it seems clear that these criteria added
to the difficulties of administering the Act. They were vague, over-
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lapped one another, and in certain instances were contradictory.
They disregarded the impact of minimum price fixing on consump-
tion, utilization, and capacity. Taken together, they reveal that not
enough consideration had been given by Congress to the complex
problems confronting those who must establish minimum price
schedules or to the long-run implications of the policies which
their application involved.
b. Price-fixing process. The determination of minimum prices
started with the computation of average costs of production, which
was followed by the establishment of classification of coals and
uncoordinated prices and then by the coordination of proposed mini-
mum prices.
1) Cost provisions of the Act. Only the cost provisions of the
Act bearing on the establishment of minimum price schedules are
dealt with in this section. Those pertaining to the revision of such
schedules will be taken up under the section on Revision of Mini-
mum Price Schedules and the application of the cost standard in
the determination of minimum prices will be considered under the
Appraisal of the Policies and Procedures Utilized to Effectuate
the Act.
Since minimum prices must yield a return per net ton approxi-
mating the weighted average cost per ton of each minimum price
area, the Act's provisions with respect to costs were of considerable
importance.
The Act provided that: "As soon as possible after its creation,
each district board shall determine, from cost data submitted by
the proper statistical bureau of the Commission, the weighted
average of the total costs of the ascertainable tonnage produced in
the district in the calendar year 1936. The district board shall ad-
just the average costs so determined, as may be necessary to give
effect to any changes in wage rates, hours of employment, or other
factors substantially affecting costs, exclusive of seasonal changes,
so as to reflect as accurately as possible any change or changes
which may have been established since January 1, 1936. [Was
January 1, 1937 meant?] Such determination and the computations
upon which it is based shall be promptly submitted to the Com-
mission by each district board in the respective minimum-price
area." (Sec. 4-ha.)
The computation of "the weighted average of the total costs of
the tonnage for each minimum-price area in the calendar year 1936,
adjusted as aforesaid" was a task assigned to the Commission. (Sec.
4-ha.)
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a) Stages involved in cost computations. The computation of
average costs involved three stages. First the operators submitted
data on costs and sales realization to the statistical bureau within
their district. Next the statistical bureaus, which were agencies of
the Commission, sent compilations of average district costs to their
respective district boards which determined the weighted average of
the total costs of the ascertainable tonnage produced in the district
in the calendar year 1936 and adjusted it in accordance with the
Act's provisions. Finally, the Commission brought together the cost
data for the districts comprising a minimum price area and estab-
lished a weighted average for the area. The resulting costs were
used in determining both the proposed minimum prices and the co-
ordinated minimum prices.
b) Criticisms of the cost concept. Criticisms have been leveled
at the definition of costs specified in the Act for the purpose of price
fixing. The Act required the Commission to include in its cost com-
pilation "the cost of labor, supplies, power, taxes, insurance, work-
men's compensation, royalties, depreciation and depletion (as de-
termined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in the computation
of the Federal income tax) and all other direct expenses of pro-
duction, coal operators' association dues, district board assessments
for Board operating expenses only levied under the code, and rea-
sonable costs of selling and the cost of administration." (Sec. 4-
ha.) The costs not included were bad debts, demurrage charges,
cost of developing new mines and carrying idle or abandoned mines,
taxes on unassigned acreage, taxes on income, taxes on excess
profits, and interest on investment.20
It is apparent that the concept of costs as defined by Congress for
the purpose of the Act did not conform either to that of business-
men or to that of economists. It did not satisfy the coal operator be-
cause it failed to cover his total expenses (plus his profits) which,
in his opinion, should equal his selling price. It fell short of the
requirements of economists in that it eliminated certain expenses
of production, particularly interest due to bondholders, and normal
profits, which must be covered in the long run if a business is to
survive 21
20 For an analysis of the cost data and a description of the procedure used
in collecting and computing them see Chapter VI.
21 Normal profits are usually conceived of as comprising the following:
a. Interest at the current rate on the total investment beyond that
covered by bonds.
b. Wages of management beyond those included in salaries.
c. Business risks beyond those covered by insurance.
(See Raymond T. Bye, Principles of Economics, Fourth Edition, A Restate-
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Eugene V. Rostow asserted that Congress was too generous to
the operators when it included royalties, certain taxes, and deprecia-
tion and depletion allowances.22 H. N. Eavenson believed along
with others that the Act should have included all costs, pointing
out that the omitted costs probably amounted to $.05aton.25
Thomas J. Michie, on the other hand, called attention to an off-
setting gain. A substantial proportion of coal mining companies,
he pointed out, receive profits—estimated at something under $.05
a ton for the industry as a whole—from company-owned miners'
dwellings and company stores. Neither of these sources of income
was taken into consideration in the fixing of prices under the Coal
Act 24
Still others were of the opinion that the methods for determining
depletion and depreciation permitted under the Act in accordance
with the rules of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for reporting these
items for income tax purposes (1) enabled operators to charge
more depletion in any one year than proper accounting methods
would permit and (2) resulted in the reporting of costs which were
higher or lower than usual in the case of operations whose output
was decidedly above or below their customary rates of production.
Messrs. Gordon and Webb25 thought that it was a mistake to
use the income tax basis for computing depletion and depreciation
for the purpose of determining the costs to be utilized in minimum
price fixing. In the case of depletion, they argued that "in view of
the long record of losses in this industry" the "only true cost of
depletion in any one year" should be the tonnage basis.26
c) Criticism of minimum price areas as a cost basis for coordina-
tion. There is also criticism of the designation of the minimum
price area as the cost basis for the coordination of minimum prices.
ment [Crofts, 1945], pp. 332-33 and Raymond T. Bowman, A Statistical
Study of Profits [University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934], pp. 4-8.)
22 For quotation and comments see section Bi of this chapter.
23 In a letter dated July 28, 1947.
24 "The Guffey Act—Can It Work?" Addresses and Committee Reports,
Philadelphia Meeting, September 9-13, 1940, American Bar Association,
Section of Mineral Law, p. 24.
25 Op.cit.,pp. 288-89.
According to the rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue depletion
could be charged for income tax purposes either on the basis of
"(1) 5 per cent of gross income but not exceeding 50 per cent of the
net income.
(2) tonnage produced; a per ton rate being agreed upon, based on
valuation of the coal owned and/or lease.hold as of March 1,
1913, if acquired before that time, or cost if acquired since that
time." (Loc.cit.)
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Robert L. Ireland, an operator, believes that "the minimum price
area idea as adopted could be applied in principle to an individual
district" and that under such an arrangement the consumer of coal
from a low cost district would be able to buy .at lower minimum
prices than would otherwise be in effect.27 Eugene V. Rostow is
especially caustic in his criticism. Starting with the assumption that
the satisfaction of the public interest "calls for consideration only
of the relation of prices to the internal cost conditions peculiar to
each mine" he objects to the practice of relating prices to cost aver-
ages for large groupings of districts.28
As pointed out earlier, Congress was concerned with social costs
as well as cost-price relationships. It apparently believed that a
system of prices based upon the internal costs of each mine was
one of the factors that created the instability which has characterized
this industry over long periods of time.
To appraise Mr. Rostow's assertion, the reader should under-
stand that the bituminous coal industry has been bequeathed an
extraordinary share of perplexing problems. Here are found not
only the factors that commonly determine costs in manufacturing
industries but also the special conditions under which minerals are
extracted.
Important among the natural conditions is the thickness or height
of the seam. Coal is mined in seams that range from "less than 2
feet to more than 50 feet." In 1950, the average seam thickness for
all bituminous coal mines was 63 inches. It should be noted, how-
ever, that 35 per cent of bituminous coal and lignite was mined
from seams less than 4 feet high, another 35 per cent from seams
4 to 6 feet, 22 per cent from seams 6 to 8 feet, and 8 per cent from
seams over 8 feet high.2° Needless to say the cost of mining in thin
seams, other things being equal, is considerably higher than that
in thick seams. Messrs. Young and Anderson stated that this factor
"is probably the most important single item that determines whether
the output per man per day shall be high or
Other physical conditions also affect productivity and therefore
mining costs. Important among these are the character of the roof
and bottom of the coal seam, the presence of impurities in the coal
(such as bone, clay, slate and sometimes free sulphur), the dip
27 In a letter dated September 26, 1947. 28 Op.cit., p. 572.
29 W. H. Young and R. L. Anderson, Thickness of Bituminous-Coal and
Lignite Seams at all Mines and Thickness of Overburden at Strip Mines in




or pitch of the seam, depth of cover, and the presence of water or
gas in the mine. Each of these factors has a direct bearing on the
work of mining coal and, as a result, upon the amount that can be
produced in a given period of time. If the roof is friable or if it is
burdened with an immense weight of overhung rock, it must be
supported with props or cribs. If the floor of the seam is composed
of clay that "heaves," the mine car tracks in the rooms and the
haulage ways must be frequently repaired. Where impurities exist
in the coal, and they are found in varying degrees in many mines,
they must be removed. The dip or pitch of the seam complicates
the mining of coal. In surface mining, the depth of the overburden
to be removed is a major cost item.
Still other factors, economic in character, have a marked in-
fluence upon costs. The factor of location determines accessibility
to desirable markets. The more distant mine must offset this short-
coming with a coal of high quality, or a lower ton-mile rate for the
coal it hauls, or lower wages or some other compensating advantage.
If none of these is present, the owners must be content with a rela-
tively iow net return on the investment or even no return at all.
In this industry money invested in coal mines is "frozen." The
equipment cannot be used for other purposes, the cost of develop-
ment cannot be recovered except by producing coal, and overhead
and maintenance costs go on when the mine is closed. As a result
the operator continues to mine coal as long as the bare operating
costs are forthcoming. Other complicating factors are the size of
the mine, the character of the management, wide annual fluctua-
tions in the demand for coal, and its relatively inelastic demand.
It must be apparent, therefore, that costs vary not only from
field to field and seam to seam but from mine to mine. These dif-
ferences have always prevailed. A study of Table .81 will show
the variations in costs for 21 producing districts for the years 1937
through 1940. In 1937, the average cost per ton was $2.07 and
the range in costs, $1.48 to $4.01. In 10 districts the costs were
above and in 13 districts below the average cost of all fields.
Prior to 1934 the problem of price maintenance was further com-
plicated by the division of the industry into union and nonunion
areas. The unionized northern mines were compelled to operate
with inflexible labor costs which constituted as much as 65 per cent
of the total costs. For these operators, the opportunity to cut wages
and therefore prices was practically nil. The nonunion operators,
on the other hand, were free to and did cut wages and prices when-
ever marketing conditions made that desirable. In an unstable in-
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dustry such as bituminous coal, these conditions were not uncom-
mon. As a result, the competition between northern and southern
fields was exceedingly severe. Over the years, particularly from
1912 to 1933, the nonunion mines made heavy encroachments in
the markets of the union
Now that the United Mine Workers of America have organized
most of the industry, labor costs have been taken out of competi-
tion. The struggle for markets, however, has not been eliminated.
As the demand for bituminous coal drops, the operators find it in-
creasingly difficult to produce at a profit. The efficient, well-located
companies know that mine costs decline as days worked by the
month increase (see Chart 14 and discussion on pages 361-63 in
this chapter). They may be tempted, therefore, to reduce prices in
order to gain a larger share of the shrinking market. The less ef-
ficient operators in order to hold their customers must also reduce
prices as long as sales income exceeds out-of-pocket costs. When
prices fall too low, bankruptcy or reorganization takes place. As a
result some of the mines are closed; others continue to operate on
a lower capital investment.
If the mines and districts with relatively low costs could supply
the country's needs for bituminous coal, then costs could perhaps
be determined on a mine basis. Under these conditions prices would
seek a level which would eliminate many of the high-cost mines
and the high-cost districts. Unfortunately, the seasonal needs of
consumers, wide annual fluctuations in demand, the pronounced
proclivity of high-cost mines to stay in business (as suggested by
Table 78), and the large number of owners of untouched deposits
waiting for a propitious opportunity to begin production make such
an arrangement unworkable, particularly in an industry which is
operating in 30-odd states and which can bring effective pressure
on political officeholders.
Under conditions such as those outlined above, any system of
price fixing likely to be introduced will not be related to the costs
of individual mines but will set a price floor which will protect a
substantial number of high-cost
minecosts cannot be used, then an average cost figure for
some geographic area becomes necessary. The framers of the Act
—having decided to relate the minimum prices to the average costs
of production—had two alternatives: (1) to base the prices of a
given district on the average cost of the district or (2) to relate
WaldoE. Fisher, Bargaining in the Bituminous Coal In-
dustry: An Appraisal (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948), pp. 15-17.
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the prices in each district to the cost level of some larger area. The
first possibility was not practicable under the criteria which Con-
gress established for minimum price fixing. Since coordinated mini-
mum prices had to "preserve as nearly as may be existing fair
competitive opportunities" and reflect as nearly as possible "the
TABLE 78
Corporations Engaged in Bituminous Coal Mining Reporting No Net






Tear (number) (number) of total)
1925 3,650 2,585 71
1928 2,705 1,842 68
1929 2,469 1,535 62 •
1930 2,239 1,458 65
1931 2,095 1,513 72
1932 1,864 . 1,575 84
1933 1,851 1,455 79
1934 2,017 1,357 67
1935 1,975 1,384 70
1936 1,945 1,355 70
1937 1,815 1,276 70
1938 1,887 1,524 81
1939 1,820 1,315 72
1940 1,756 ' 1,080 62
1941 1,722 863 50
1942 1,737 831 48
1943 1,623 648 40
1944 1,584 652 41
1945 1,544 . 629 41
1946 1,640 627 38
1947 1,837 466 25
1948k 2,163 729 34
1949k 2,070 1,037 50
1950a 1,988 884 44
a Preliminary.
Source: of Income, Part 2, U.S. Bureau of Internal Revenue.
1925-47 reprinted in 1950 Bituminous Goal Annual, Bituminous Coal Insti-
tute, p. 188; subsequent years in annual reports of the Bureau.
relative market values" of the various kinds, qualities, and sizes of
coal, the geographic area had to be large enough to embrace the
coal fields competing in common markets.
A casual study of Tables 79 and 80 will show that many dis-
tricts did not sell their coals at prices commensurate with their re-
spective average costs. In 1936, costs per ton exceeded sales reali-
zation per ton in the eight districts comprising Minimum Price
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TABLE 79
Reported Costs and Sales Realization of Bituminous Coal, by Producing District,
Minimum Price Area 1, Selected Years
(dollars per net ton, f.o.b. mine)
1936 1938 1940
AverageSales AverageSales AverageSales
Producing District CostsIncome CostsIncome CostsIncome
1Eastern Pennsylvania 2.09 1.96 2.31 2.14 2.14 2.09
2Western Pennsylvania 1.96 1.92 2.26 2.05 1.98 2.01
3Northern West Virginia 1.63 1.51 1.78 1.62 1.65 1.63
4Ohio 1.72 1.66 1.90 1.77 1.71 1.71
5Michigan 3.59 3.44 3.90 3.73 3.90 3.88
6Panhandle (West Virginia)1.75 1.74 1.86 1.79 1.64 1.66
7Southern Numbered 1 1.95 1.87 2.23 2.05 2.04 1.99
8Southern Numbered 2 1.81 1.75 2.04 1.90 1.90 1.92
Source: As shown in Tables 11 and 13 of Chapter VI.
TABLE 80
Operators' Margins, by Producing District, Minimum Price Area 1,
Selected Years
(dollars per net ton, f.o.b. mine)
Producing District 1936 1938 1940
1Eastern Pennsylvania —.13 — .17 —.05
2Western Pennsylvania —.04 —.21 +.03
3Northern West Virginia —.12 —.16 —.02
4Ohio —.06 —.13 .00
5Michigan —.15 —.17 —.02
6Panhandle (West Virginia) —.01 —.07 +.02
7Southern Numbered 1 —.08 —.18 —.05
8Southern Numbered 2 —.06 —.14 +.02
Source: Computed from Table 79. Operators' margins are sales realization
minus reported costs.
Area No. 1 by amounts which ranged from one cent to $.15 and in
1938 by amounts which ranged from $.07-.21 a ton. In 1940,
however, three districts reported that their sales income per ton
exceeded their costs per ton by $.02 or $.03, four districts that
their costs still were higher than their sales income by amounts
varying from $.02-.05 a ton, and one district that its costs just
equalled its sales income. It is apparent, therefore, that had mini-
mum prices been fixed to approximate weighted average costs
within individual districts, the operators in certain districts would
have lost much of their business to neighboring districts because
they would not have been able to maintain a competitive position
by selling their coal at less than their average costs. If the failure
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to meet costs had been due to managerial inefficiencies alone, and
if these mines had not been needed in the industry, it might be
argued that this result would have been desirable. As we have seen,
however, neither of these conditions prevailed.
In other words, if any significant volume of coal from one dis-
trict competes in a given market with coal from another district,
the average cost of each district cannot be used as the basis for
setting coordinated minimum prices unless the average costs in the
two districts are approximately equal. Thus in 1940 the average
cost of coal in District 2 (Western Pennsylvania) was $1.98 and
that of District 4 (Ohio) was $1.71. If minimum prices had been
set for Western Pennsylvania to return $1.98 and for Ohio to re-
turn $1.71, more business than usual would have gone to Ohio
producers. As a result the "existing fair competitive relationships"
between the coals of these two districts would have been destroyed.
The second possibility, that of relating each district's minimum
prices to the level of cost prevailing in some larger area, overcomes
the difficulty arising under the first alternative. Under this arrange-
ment, the price realizations of a given district could deviate both
from its own average cost and that of the whole area and, because
of offsetting variations in other districts, still permit the average
realization of all districts to approximate the over-all average costs.
In this manner the flexibility necessary to coordinate prices could
be attained without sacrificing the use of a cost base.
It would have been possible to take all coal districts in the United
States as the basic area. Under such an arrangement, however, the
districts in the Far West would have had their prices related to a
national average cost determined to a very large degree by the ton-
nage produced by eastern districts with which they have little or
no competition. The same situation would prevail with respect to
the minimum price areas in the East, since there is normally little
competition between them. There was apparently no advantage to
be gained by using the industry as a whole as a cost area.
Congress evidently decided that an area larger than the district
but smaller than the industry was necessary to achieve coordina-
tion. The factors considered by the legislators are not known. Roger
N. Quirk pointed out that testimony before Congress indicated that
the provision of the Act which related district price levels to mini-
mum price area costs "was somewhat of an afterthought. The bill
was originally silent as to district levels and these vital words were
apparently only put in in order to give the districts a lead as to
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the levels which they were to 'propose.' "32 A study of the minimum
price areas suggests that the legislators sought to bring into a
single area those fields which were actively competing with each
other for common markets.
Mr. Rostow contended that the average costs as computed for
minimum price areas have "played little or no part in the establish-
ment of minimum prices" and that "the cost averages for a mini-
mum price area include so many thousands of items that their pres-
ence in the background of the price-fixing process has not inter-
fered in the least with the indefinite revision of the prices for each
mine subject to competitive pressure; if the cost criterion were of
any practical importance in price making, one would expect it to
limit the possibility of subsequent changes in prices, each of which
woñld affect the supposed equivalence between costs and returns.
Actually, the Division has felt free, in its lengthy price proceeding,
to revise prices and price relationships at will, and without ref-
erence to the impact of such changes on the averages of return.
While the cost determination might have been significant in justify-
ing an increase in the general average of realizations, it had no
concrete place in the haggling which fixed the level of individual
In support of his contention Mr. Rostow disclosed that the Di-
rector of the Coal Division in justifying the use of interim cost
figures in determining minimum prices recognized that a variation
of as much as $.25pernet ton in the cost average, would have had
"no effect on the proposal and coordination of minimum
Granted that some adjustments were inevitable to bring about
coordination, was it necessary to establish price areas, as in Mini-
mum Price Area No. 1, that embraced districts whose costs ranged
from $1.84 to $3.65perton? The Chief of the Economic Division
of the Consumers' Counsel and his assistant economist stated35 that
"a return per ton in minimum price area 1 within five, six, or seven
cents of the weighted average cost, on the basis of past distribu-
tion" in their opinion "might be considered an approximation of
cost, under all the difficulties incident to setting up a schedule of
hundreds of thousands of prices."
32 "Regulation of the Bituminous Coal Industry in the United States"
(preliminary edition, mimeographed, June 1939), Historical Appendix,
p. 90.
Op.cit., p. 573.
Ibid., page 573, note 73.
Gordon and Webb, op.cit., p. 280.
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In commenting on the charge that the realization of several of
the districts differs from the cost of the price area, the Director of
the Coal Division pointed out:
"But Congress did not contemplate that finally the realization for
each district would really correspond to the cost of the price area.
The districts differ markedly in weighted average costs both from
each other and from the price area. In providing that the 4-ha
prices [uncoordinated prices], which were important primarily as
setting up relationships between coals, should have a realization to
each district corresponding to the cost of the price area, Congress
was merely outlining a mechanics of initiating the coordination
process, with its considerable changes from the 4-ha prices, at
such a level as to facilitate consummation of coordination with the
realization of each minimum price area approximating the cost
of the price area."36
The authors are of the opinion that the use of district costs for
establishing minimum prices would have given the low-cost dis-
tricts a competitive advantage and wouM have negated one of the
Act's major objectives—"to preserve as nearly as may be existing
fair competitive opportunities." It is, however, hard to justify the
wide latitude allowed the price-fixing agencies in making changes
in the minimum price structure based on average costs for some
of the minimum price areas designated in the Act. It may be that
active competition in common markets should not be the sole basis
for the determination of such areas,37
2) Determination of uncoordinated minimum prices. The Act
assigned to each district board the tasks of classifying the various
kinds, qualities, arid sizes of coal produced in its district and of
determining minimum prices f.o.b. mine for both kinds and quali-
ties of coal and sizes of coal which were to be used later in co-
ordinating the coals of those districts serving common markets.
Each board, except for one labor member, consisted of operator
representatives. The board's responsibility was to establish for its
district a price structure which would bring the prices of the dif-
ferent grades and sizes of coal into proper alignment in terms of
inherent qualities, general market considerations, and types of
consumers. The proposed schedule stated a single price for each
36 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Director of the
Bituminous Coal Division Establishing Effective Minimum Prices and Mar-
keting Rules and Regulations under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 (Gen-
eral Docket No. 15), Bituminous Coal Division, August 1940, p. 42.
87 Incidentally, the term "Minimum Price Area" is not indicative of its
function—not as good as "Basic Cost Area," for example, would be.
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grade and size regardless of where it was produced in the district
or the market to which it was to be shipped. These proposed sched-
ules for each district were then transmitted to the Coal Division,
which modified them when necessary and then approved them. This
process of fixing price differentials which reflected quality, size,
and use is frequently called "classification"—a term that, strictly
speaking, should be applied only to the initial grouping of like
coals irrespective of their size and use.
Unfortunately the Act was silent on the procedure to be fol-
lowed in classifying coals. Moreover, its lack of clear-cut criteria
left the impression that the resulting minimum price structure was
to preserve the status quo. The importance attached in the Act to
existing relative price relationships would suggest that Congress
intended that minimum price schedules should be arrived at on an
empirical basis. For these reasons and because of the great com-
plexity of the problem—the many factors involved in price de-
termination, the great diversity of coals and mining conditions as
well as the important role which judgment and an intimate knowl-
edge of coals and markets played in the process—it was probably
a wise decision on the part of Congress to turn this phase of the
price-fixing procedure over to the industry. However, the fact that
judgment played such an important part in price determination
and that difFerences in judgments necessitated negotiation and com-
promise of conflicting interests of competing coal producers38 would
seem to have made it advisable to include one or two government
observers on each of these boards. It also points to the need for a
statement on the classifying procedure to be used and especially
for standards and criteria whose meaning and use in that procedure
are clearly understood.
3) Establishment of coordinated minimum prices. The proposed
uncoordinated price schedules submitted by each of the 22 districts
38Thenatuje of this conflict has been forthrightly stated by George B.
Harrington, President of the Chicago, Wilmington and Franklin Coal Com-
pany: "I think it can be fairly said that the tendency of each individual
operator as he approaches the coordination proceedings will be to want to
hold the business he has, at a higher price, of course, and at the same time
to try to put himself into a position to get at least part of someone else's
business." ("Merits and Demerits of Federal Regulation of the Coal In-
dustry," Mining Congress Journal, June 1939, p. 21.)
To the operator putting "himself into a position to get... someoneelse's
business" presumably involved the assignment to his coal, in the appropriate
minimum price schedule, of a price which relative to the prices of his com-
petitors' coals was lower than had formerly been received. He might even
be willing to take a price absolutely lower if he thought the increased busi-
ness going to him would be great enough.
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were formulated primarily to show value relationships within the
district itself and to establish a single price for each grade and size
of coal irrespective of where it was produced in the district or the
market in which it was to be sold.
In the establishment of coordinated minimum prices, on the other
hand, the boards and federal agencies were primarily concerned
with the markets to which coal was to be shipped. To ensure that
the coals of any district would continue to sell on a fair competitive
basis in any market in which it was ordinarily sold, the prices
of all competing coals from every district had to be coordinated in
common consuming markets. This involved consideration of other
factors and criteria, among which transportation charges upon
coal were especially important. It was through freight absorption
and market area schedules that coals of the same quality were to
be delivered at the same price in any given market—a process that
was, for practical purposes, forced upon the Commission by what
it believed to be the Act's requirement that the minimum price
schedules must preserve existing "relative market values" in com-
mon consuming markets.
'We may question the advisability of "freezing" the existing rela-
tive economic position of the many producers in this industry, but
since this was a major objective of the Act then the use of freight
absorption and numerous market areas was inevitable.
The Act, it will be recalled, specified that the task of coordinat-
ing the proposed price schedules was to be undertaken by the dis-
trict boards, but provided that should they fail to do so the function
was to be taken over by the government. The conflict of interests
between operators in all but six districts and the absence of any
procedure for reconciling them made it necessary for the Coal Di-
vision to assume the coordinating function. 'When the tentative
coordinated minimum price schedules were formulated, the Divi-
sion published them, held hearings, made necessary revisions, and
recommended their installation to the Secretary of the Interior.
The delegation of the initial responsibility for the coordination
of minimum prices to the district board was, on the whole, a sensible
arrangement. Even though the district boards in the majority of
instances were unable to develop coordinated price schedules, much
of the actual work performed by them was helpful to the Coal
Division, and their deliberations called attention to and helped to
clarify the conflicting issues. Undoubtedly this arrangement speeded
up the coordinating processes and resulted in more realistic mini-
mum prices.
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4) Adjustment of inequitable minimum prices. Under the Act,
minimum prices were to be subjected to modification by the Coal
Division upon its own motion or upon complaint by any operator,
producers' board, or the Consumers' Counsel. Operators dissatis-
fied with the price schedules or any part of them were entitled to
a public hearing.
Experience under the first price determination, revoked in Febru-
ary 1938, disclosed that this arrangement imposed "a quite unman-
ageable burden of hearings" on the Commission. In fact, the protests
of coal producers and consumers "literally overwhelmed" the Com-
mission with A heavy volume of protests, however, was
to be expected inasmuch as the Commission established those mini-
mum price schedules without holding final hearings as required
by the Act.
The adjustment procedure seemed adequate to deal with re-
quests for modification under the second price determination. An
operator who had a reasonably good case for a modification of his
minimum prices was granted a temporary modification while the
Commission examined the case more closely with a view to making
the modification permanent, discontinuing it, or further modifying
the prices. Operators dissatisfied with the Division's final ruling
could always appeal to a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for re-
dress.
5) Revision of minimum price schedules. The Act provided
that the administrative agency "from time to time, upon complaint
or upon its own motion, review and revise the effective minimum
prices" in accordance with the standards prescribed for the original
establishment of minimum prices. Thus the Division, upon presenta-
tion of satisfactory proof by a district board that a change in excess
of $.02 a ton had occurred in the weighted average cost of a price
area exclusive of seasonal changes, was under legal compulsion to
effectuate a corresponding increase or decrease in minimum prices.
In other words, adjustments in minimum prices seemed to be man-
datory only after it had been demonstrated that actual average
costs of a nonseasonal nature had changed or when an increase in
any cost item, such as a higher federal employment tax, could be
predicted.
Donald H. Wallace warned against revisions in prices on the
basis of "past recorded costs" and of preserving "past competitive
relationships, without regard for future changes that will ensue as
a direct result of such adjustments, to say nothing of adjustment
Quirk, oP.cit., p.154.
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to developing trends and probable future conditions."4° He pointed
out that "in a dynamic, changing situation standards are to be
regarded as a goal toward which things should move. The endeavor
must be to prevent movement away from the standard and to ap-
proximate it as closely as possible." He added, "in an industry sub-
ject to as many changing influences as coal ...thisdesirable re-
sult cannot be attained unless adjustments in prices are based, not
solely upon the past, but upon the best possible estimate of probable
future results." The truth of this observation is borne out by his
analysis of the relation of determined cost to actual costs.4'
Messrs. Gordon and Webb held that the procedural provisions
of the Act to keep minimum price schedules in line with actual
average costs of production were cumbersome and would not pre-
vent an "unresponsive lag between changes in market conditions
and the adjustment of prices to meet them"— a con.dition which they
believed to be "the most serious defect in the act." They stated
that "in a case of increased demand and higher production levels,
•..thislag might cost the consumer several millions of dollars
before new cost levels could be determined and a lower price sched-
ule established."42 Mr. 'Wallace, however, pointed out that "it seems
probable...thatonly a small proportion of the total costs specified
in the act would remain constant with marked increase in produc-
tion over a few years and that the saving on overhead might be
offset by higher unit labor expense and other costs."43
As a practical matter, the lag between cost and prices in periods
of increased demand and higher production would seldom create a
problem for the regulating agency. We would expect the mine
workers' union to continue the practice it followed in the late thir-
ties and early forties of making demands on the operators of a mag-
nitude which would absorb any average net operating margins that
might be considered excessive."
Gordon and Webb observed that when, on the other hand, costs
increase "due to a definite slump in consumption and production,
no adequate means seem available, under the act, for the industry
to cut prices promptly to hold business. In fact, any change in price
4° Op.cit.,p. 465. 41 Ibid.,pp. 465-70.
42 Op.cit., pp. 316-17. Op.cit., p. 467.
"In 1939 there was a negative margin of $.05 a ton; in 1940 the margin
amounted to $.0a ton or about .5 per cent of average per ton realization,
in 1941 to $.07 or 3.2 per cent, and in 1942 to $.08 or 3.4 per cent. These
margins were not net incomes since interest on investment, taxes on income,
excess profit taxes, and certain miscellaneous expenses had not been de-
ducted. (See section Dlb of this chapter for items included in average
costs.)
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would probably have to follow costs upward, thus intensifying the
slump in demand and production."45
They added that should the Division increase the price level
when the demand for coal and working time fell sharply for reasons
other than seasonal changes, "such increases in price" would "dis-
courage sales of coal, while opening the door to incursions of un-
regulated, competing fuels." In other words, the Act required that
prices be raised at a time when "sound business policy would dic-
tate reduced prices to encourage all possible sales and hold the con-
sumers for the coal industry." Such action, they added, would "not
give promise of attaining the act's objective of 'promoting interstate
commerce in bituminous coal' or 'to promote the use of coal and its
derivatives.'
DonaldH. Wallace's comments on the impact of the revision
procedure on cost levels when a slump in consumption and produc-
tion occurs are pertinent. He pointed out that the effects of the
"bootstrapping process" of increasing prices might tend to go un-
detected for a time because total sales revenue of mine operators
might at first increase as prices are raised. This is made possible
by the fact that the mine price of coal is substantially less than the
delivered price, enabling the mine price to change considerably with
only a relatively small percentage change in the delivered price.
Thus, he wrote: "...ifan increase in mine prices of 5 per cent
and in consumer prices of 2 per cent were attended by a 3 per cent
decline in consumption the total revenue received by operators
would be about 2 per cent larger, although the total amount spent
on coal by consumers was 1 per cent smaller. In these circum-
stances the total losses of operators would be reduced by the price
increase even if their total expenses remained the same, with the
3 per cent decline in production. In proportion as expenses con-
tracted, the reduction of losses would be greater."47
We see then that even though consumption declines, returns to
operators could be higher than formerly. This situation, particularly
if expected by operators and consumers to continue, would tend to
slow the rate of abandonment of high-cost mines and hasten the
rate of decline in coal consumption. Over the long run there might
be a permanent contraction of the market for coal.
p. 317. Donald H. Wallace points out that such cost increases
are "not unlikely, for if cost of production were $2 a ton, and overhead rep-
resented 10 per cent of the total, a drop of 10 per cent in production would
increase costs by 2 cents a ton. (In 1938 there was a drop of 20 per cent
in output)." (Op.cit., p. 467.)
Op.cit., pp. 317-18. Op.cit.,p. 468.
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This bootstrapping process,itisargued, tends away from,
rather than toward, the achievement of maximum economic con-
sumption. In the face of declining consumption, the principle of
consumption maximization may well call for revision of prices, but
not upward. Lower minimum prices are indicated if the decline in
consumption is due to an inérease in coal prices or reductions in
the prices of competing fuels, and perhaps if the decline results
from improvements in fuel economy. In the two latter eventuali-
ties, hastened retirement of high-cost mines is important.
In order to move toward maximum economic consumption,
Mr. Wallace suggested, the price-fixing agency would have to be
directed to consider the impact of prices on consumption and "to
adjust minimum prices so as to bring as soon as possible in the
future an approximation of average price to average cost at the
lowest average price which would equate production and consump-
tiolt The standard for minimum prices should be in terms of proba-
ble future costs rather than past recorded costs."48 We might point
out, however, that basing minimum prices on future costs would
involve the making of many judgments which would give rise to
fundamental differences of opinion and lead to challenge in the
courts.
To overcome the present procedural limitations in the revision
of minimum price schedules, especially during periods of declining
demand, legislators might well have considered the advisability of
creating a policy board (representing operators, miners, consumers,
government agencies, and the general public) whose recommenda-
tion would supersede the more rigid provisions of the Act, as writ-
ten, when such emergencies occurred. Messrs. Gordon and Webb
suggested that such regulating agency "be entrusted with authority
to act upon its judgment without the necessity for going through
such a long, time-consuming legal procedure. The authority might
take the form of a declaration of belief and provision that the mini-
mum price schedule might be changed tentatively, subject to the
full proper procedure and final findings."49
c. Other provisions of the Act. There were many provisions re-
lating to the determination or administration of minimum price
schedules. For purposes of appraisal many of them have no special
significance. Discussion is limited to those that were subject to





1) areas used in price determination. A grouping of
coal operations into producing and selling areas was necessary in
order to deal with the many geological, mining, and marketing
problems which confronted the price-fixing agencies. That this
fact was recognized by the framers of the Act is evidenced by the
provision for districts, cothmon consuming market areas, and
minimum price, areas.
The districting prescribed in the Act followed the pattern de-
veloped under the National Recovery Administration and the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. In general, this ar-
rangement of districts was satisfactory. It would have been helpful
if Districts 7 and 8 had been constituted so as to include only low-
volatile mines in District 7 and only high-volatile mines in District
8. The failure to effect such a separation made it necessary for all
statistical data in these two districts to be compiled separately for
low- and high-volatile mines.
The district boards and the Coal Division found it expedient to
regroup coal producers into subdistricts, freight-origin districts,
and their component freight-origin groups. These groupings were
based upon the recommendations of the district boards or their rep-
resentatives. In general, they followed logical lines, conformed to
traditional practice, and served a useful purpose. Without them,
particularly the freight-origin groups, the establishment of coordi-
nated minimum prices would have been an impossible task.5°
Inasmuch as the Act did not define or set up "common consum-
ing market areas" and the operators in some districts were unable
to agree upon such areas, the task of delineating them was taken
over by the Coal Commission. These areas were based in large
measure on those established under the NRA Coal Codes and the
1935 Act. The controlling factors intheir determination were com-
petition, type of transportation used, and especially the complicated
structure of freight rates which governs in large part the shipment
of coal by rail to consuming markets.51 Such market areas are
essential to the pricing procedure.
Important also were the minimum price areas, which were cre-
ated by the Act to provide the cost basis for the coordination of
minimum prices. The use of these areas was examined early in this
chapter and needs no further consideration.
2) Administrative agency established to effectuate the Act. The
Act established a National Bituminous Coal Commission of seven
members, of whom two were required to have had experience as
Seethe discussion in Chapter V. Loc.cit.
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producers and two had to be experienced coal mine workers. This
arrangement, which gave the representatives of the operators and
of the miners' union a majority voice on the Commission, has been
objected to on the grounds that representatives of the beneficiaries
of the Act should not be granted a controlling vote on the regula-
tory body.
Under the Act members of the Washington staff were to be
appointed under civil service regulations except for "the secretary,
a clerk to each commissioner, the attorneys, the managers and em-
ployees of the statistical bureaus ..andsuch special agents, tech-
nical experts, and examiners as the Commissioners" might require.
(Sec. 2a.) Numerous instances of appointments of a "political"
character have been called to the attention of the authors. That the
exceptions were substantial is supported by the steps taken by the
Commission in 1938 to bring virtually its entire Washington staff
under civil service.
This Commission was abolished on July 1, 1939 by the Presi-
dent's second reorganization order and its functions transferred to
the Secretary of the Interior, who established a Bituminous Coal
Division and placed a director in charge to administer the Act.52
With the exception of certain spokesmen for the miners' union,
there is general agreement that, on the basis of their respective
records, the Coal Division was the more businesslike administrative
agency. One of the severest critics of the Act and this experiment
in minimum price fixing wrote, "the new Coal Division has been a
tremendous improvement over the old Commission in efficiency and
effectiveness, and dilatory tactics may be expected to disappear, if
the Act becomes
3) Consumers' counsel. It will be recalled that the Act provided
for a Consumers' Counsel to represent the interest of the consum-
ing public. He was authorized to appear on behalf of domestic and
industrial consumers in proceedings before the Commission, to
52Neitherthe reorganization order nor the subsequent Act of Congress
granted the Secretary authority to transfer these functions to some other
person or agency. There is a difference of opinion as to the legality of the
Secretary's action in creating a Coal Division and assigning to it functions
—notably, that of establishing minimum prices—which the Act specifically
delegated to him. The Director of the Coal Division apparently recognized
the legal problem involved and presumably attempted to meet it as far as
the determination of minimum prices was concerned by providing that com-
plaints relative to established prices could be appealed to the Secretary him-
self. There is considerable doubt as to the propriety of this procedure, since
the minimum prices were established, not by the Secretary as provided in
the Act, but by the Coal Division. (Michie, op.cit., pp. 30-31.)
Rostow, op.cit., p. 577.
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conduct independent investigations of matters pertaining to the in-
dustry and the administration of the Act, to require the Commis-
sion to furnish him needed information, and to appear before the
Interstate Commerce Commission when freight rates affecting bi-
tuminous coal consumers were under consideration. The Counsel
was independent of the Commission and later the Coal Division.
The establishment of an agency which granted statutory rep-
resentation to consumers in the process of regulating an industry
seems to have been a wise decision. It was especially important
under the commission form of administration since the controlling
vote rested with the representatives of labor and industry. It was
necessary that some competent arm of government should safeguard
the interest of consumers, particularly the small consumers who
often had neither the knowledge nor the funds to intervene in their
own behalf.
During the initial price-fixing process in the winter of 1937-
1938, the Commission refused, contrary to the clear requirement
of the Act, to furnish cost information requested by the Counsel.
This action as well as the Counsel's opposition to the manner in
which the initial minimum prices were established impaired the
working relations between the two agencies, which at best were
difficult to maintain on a harmonious level because of the role as-
signed to the Counsel. It required a nice balancing of values for
him to determine how far to push the claims of consumers, particu-
larly commercial consumers, without impairing the efforts of the
Commission to bring stability into the industry. The absence of
clearly stated criteria to govern the determination of minimum
prices and of bench marks for ascertaining what constituted "dis-
crimination" or "unfair" prices added to the Counsel's
The information necessary to make an accurate appraisal of the
accomplishments of the Office of the Consumers' Counsel is not
available. That this agency served a useful purpose is shown by
some of the functions and activities it performed:
It represented the interests of both large and small consumers
at cost hearings.
It made studies of
—Prices paid for locomotive fuel in 1937
—The evidence presented at cost hearings
—The boundaries of market areas proposed by the Coal Com-
mission
Quirk, op.cit., pp. 82-84.
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—The problem of ascertaining what items should be included
in reasonable costs of selling
It cooperated with the Commission
—In developing rules and regulations for reporting costs
—In checking the computation of total costs for all districts
—In making spot checks of individual mines to ascertain the
degree of accuracy and representativeness of the cost data
It compiled and distributed information of use to the consum-
ers of coal and published the "Coal Consumers' Digest" and "Con-
sumers' Notices."
It followed the work of the Commission and Division and
registered protests when in its opinion (a) the requirements of
the Act were not followed, or (b) the procedures utilized by
these agencies did not conform with what was deemed in the
best interest of the consumers; and it prodded these agencies
to take action, when for example, as in 1941, it urged the Coal
Commission to hold hearings to determine whether maximum
prices should be established.
The Counsel estimated that the activities carried out by his office
saved the consumers of coal at least $33 million between October 1,
1940, and December 31,
4) Hearings under the Act. One of the reasons for the long delay
in price determination was, the number of hearings that the price-
fixing agency was required to hold. Hearings were necessary (1)
to ascertain whether the coals of North and South Dakota were hg-
nitic, (2) to determine in which states bituminous coal, produced
and consumed within the state, affected interstate commerce in
coal, (3) on production costs, and (4) on the tentative coordinated
minimum price schedules. Once the price schedules had been an-
nounced, the claims and protests of aggrieved producers and con-
sumers became the occasion for more hearings, and subsequently
additional hearings were necessary to determine the need for a
general revision of the minimum price schedules and for establish-
ing maximum prices. These hearings were not only time-consum-
ing but added a great deal of work to the price-fixing agency, since
they required much planning, careful preparation, and a written
decision setting forth the facts of the case together with a carefully
reasoned statement supporting the conclusions reached.
The practice of permitting those affected by an action of a gov-
ernment agency to demand a hearing, first by the agency and later
Annual Report, United States Office of the Bituminous Coal Consumers'
Counsel for the Period November 1, 1941-December 31, 1942, p. 2.
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in the courts, is deeply rooted in American constitutional law and
as Roger Quirk pointed out "may probably be considered to flow
from the Constitutional provisions that 'no person' may be deprived
of life, liberty or property 'without due process of law'. Un-
fortunately, the verbatim written "record" of the proceedings at the
hearing and the written "findings of fact" became "the basis on
which any higher appeal court makes its decision. Hence, the great
importance attached by the parties appearing at the various pro-
ceedings before the Commission to getting their extensive argu-
ments included in the 'record.' It will readily be seen that proceed-
ings on such a basis can be neither informal nor expeditious."57
Eugene V. Rostow called attention to a preliminary monograph
presented to the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure which contended "that some improvement might be
achieved in the administrative procedure of the Coal Division by
substituting 'conferences' for 'hearings' and thus reducing both the
time and the bitterness of the price fixing process." The thought
of those recommending the procedure was "that the conference
should be used as a pre-hearing device to narrow the issues before
a final, more or less formal public hearing." Mr. Rostow stated
that "the recommendation seems to offer no real hope for speed."
He added that those advocating it concede "that the bitterness of the
competitive struggle in the coal industry may make the development
of pre-hearing procedure a rather empty reform, adding one more
occasion for violent controversy to the proceeding....Butthe
basic reason for the lengthiness of the procedure is the scope of the
job imposed on the Division by the Act. There is no way of fixing
thousands of coal prices in a hurry, if all the standards of the Act
are to be served. Nor can hearings and the right of participation in
them be generally denied; each operator has too big a stake in seeing
that the standards of the Act are complied
In our zeal to ensure justice, we have perhaps excessively for-
malized the hearing procedure in the United States. We seem to
have leaned over backward in our effort to avoid injustices to
individual coal producers and in doing so placed the Commission
(Division) in the position of defending itself on a great variety of
minor matters. This procedure played into the hands of the irrecon-
cilable producers who did not like the Act and who, therefore, seized
upon every legal technicality that would postpone the promulgation
of minimum prices. How to protect the essential interests of the coal
56Op.cit.,General Appendix, p. 22.
Ibid., pp. 29-30. 58Op.cit.,p. 577.
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producers and consumers without providing opportunities for legal
obstruction is an exceedingly difficult problem. The authors have
no solution to offer. The practice of granting temporary relief in
claimed hardship cases while an agency investigation is undertaken
may serve as a useful device.
5) Enforcement pro-visions. Experience with price fixing under
the NRA code for this industry indicates that the enforcement of
minimum price schedules is one of the most difficult problems of
control. Under both the NRA code and the Bituminous Coal Act of
1937 the function of selling was left in the hands of individual
producers and distributors. Under such an arrangement there must
be a high degree of voluntary compliance on the part of producers
and wide consumer acceptance. These conditions are hard to achieve
in a highly competitive market subject to drastic changes in sales
volume. An alternative arrangement which would greatly simplify
the enforcement problem is the use of central marketing agencies
supervised by a government agency, but this possibility was not
considered by Congress and probably would have been regarded as
a departure from private enterprise.
There are many ways of evading minimum prices. The practice
of substituting a higher priced coal on lower priced contracts will
be discussed under the heading of distressed coal. The Act enu-
merated thirteen unfair methods of competition which were declared
to constitute violations of the Coal Code. Congress sought to pre-
clude the payment of various kinds of rebates, assumption of freight
charges, granting of adjustments, discounts, brokerage commis-
sions and other discriminatory allowances, the extension of special
services or privileges to selected buyers and similar unfair market-
ing practices. (Sec. 4-hi.) The Act also made it unlawful to sell
coal below the established minimum prices. (Sec. 4-lie.)
The nub of the enforcement problem is the detection of evasion.
One device for achieving this purpose is the checking of sales in-
voices to contracts and spot orders which the Act required be sent
•to the Commission's statistical bureaus. (Sec. 4-ha.) This device,
however, had limited value, since substitution, delivery of more
coal than billed, and certain other practices could not be revealed
• in this manner. Detection was also made possible by means of com-
plaints passed on by individual producers, district boards, or the
Office of the Consumers' Counsel. Another method was a system of
unannounced inspection of sales records at the offices of producers
or distributors, but this method was of little value in the case of
small operators who keep inadequate records and ship by truck.
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Enforcement under the Act was to be attained by means of cease-
and-desist orders enforceable in the courts (Sec. 5b and Sec. 6c) or
by revocation of Code membership (Sec. 5b). Any producer who
failed to become a Code member had to pay a 19½ per cent tax
on all coal sold by him (Sec. Sb), and any Code member who
violated the provisions of the Act had to pay twice that tax on coal
sold in violation of the Act as a condition to reinstatement as a Code
member. (Sec. 5c.) Wholesalers guilty of evasion were suspended
from the register made up of all distributors who had agreed, be-
fore registering, not to engage in evasive practices.59 A later modifi-
cation of Marketing Rules and Regulations (Order of May 2,
1942) authorized the Compliance Coordinator, after hearings, to
issue cease-and-desist orders and to suspend, cancel, or revoke reg-
istration.
The effectiveness of these enforcement measures will be dis-
cussed in the section on appraisal of the policies and procedures used
by the Coal Division to effectuate the Act.
6) Determination of maximum prices. The Act authorized the
Commission to establish maximum prices when conditions made it
necessary "to protect the consumer of coal against unreasonably
high prices." Such maximum prices had to "be established at a
uniform increase above the minimum prices in effect within the
district at the time, so that in the aggregate the maximum prices
shall yield a reasonable return above the weighted average total
cost of the district: Provided, That no maximum price shall be es-
tablished for any mine which shall not yield a fair return on the
fair value of the property." Donald H. Wallace remarked that
"the proviso seems to be controlling and it may conflict with the
reasonable return standard. For the standard the district is the
unit; for the proviso, the mine is the unit. If the whole section
should be taken to mean that no level of maximum prices could be
fixed in a district which would make it impossible to fix maximtim
prices for any one operating mine in that district that would yield
a fair return on the fair value of the property of that mine, then the
fixing of maximum prices so as to give in the aggregate merely a
reasonable return above the weighted average cost of the district
might be rendered impossible."°°
This provision also fails to make it clear whether a uniform
increase refers to an increase in cents per ton or a percentage in-
Marketing Rules and Regulations issued by the Commission, March
24, 1939. (Third Annual Report under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937,
June 30, 1939, pp. 19 and 20.)
GOOp.cit.,p. 472.
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crease. Messrs. Gordon and Webb called attention to the fact that
"a uniform increase in cents per ton over whatever minimum prices
might be in effect would have little, if any, effect upon the coordi-
nated relationships already established. A percentage increase
would definitely affect price relationships and would also be more
difficult to execute and use."Gl
During World War II, the Administration, when confronted
with the choice of setting a ceiling on prices either under the Coal
Act of 1937 or the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, chose
to utilize the OPA machinery.
It is generally believed that the OPA policy of setting maximum
prices in relation to actual prices that had prevailed in a suitable
base period was preferable to the method, outlined in the Coal Act,
of setting maximum prices at uniform distances above the minimum
prices in the schedules. A number of reasons support this position.
First, the OPA gave the government greater freedom in setting
prices and permitted quicker action.
Second, as actual prices rise above the minima there develops
a lack of uniformity in the spreads. Maximum prices at a uniform
level above the minima are therefore unrealistic.
Third, the provision in the Coal Act of 1937 that "no maximum
price shall be established for any mine which shall not yield a fair
return on the fair value of the property" was generally thought to
be a serious limitation. The determination of a fair valuation of all
coal mines would be a herculean task involving years of work. If
the Coal Division had established maximum prices under this sec-
tion of the Act and had granted each coal operator the right to
protest the prices set for his mine, it would have been hopelessly
entangled in endless litigation. Such an arrangement might well
have encouraged speculative entrepreneurs to open mines with very
high costs in expectation of obtaining profits on marginal operations
during an emergency. It is quite possible, also, that a price high
enough to yield a fair return on the fair value of the property in
the case of high-cost mines might be one at which no coal could be
sold. In any event, any maximum price which would permit high-
cost mines a "fair return on the fair value of the property" would
01Op.cit.,p. 309. It should be pointed out that persons associated with
this industry think of both price and wage differentials in terms of cents per
ton which must be maintained over time. The differentials in the prices of
coal in the various size groups are commonly expressed in multiples of five
cents per ton. Thus, an addition of $.20 to all minimum prices in a given
economic area would change the levels but retain the old differentials. Per-
centage increases would change the levels and distort the old differentials.
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give rise to very handsome profits to the owners of low-cost mines.
We must assume that the framers of the Act believed that a coal
shortage was a remote possibility and therefore did not bother to
deal realistically with the problem. Certainly the provisions in the
Act were unworkable unless producers and consumers were willing
to accept the maximum prices established thereunder. Messrs.
Gordon and Webb are of the opinion that "a cost-plus-a-reasonable-
profit basis would certainly be a great deal more expedient and prac-
ticable" basis for setting maximum prices, especially so if such
prices were "based upon the weighted average cost of each pro-
ducing district."02
In concluding this appraisal of the Coal Act as an effective in-
strument for price fixing, it may be said that the criteria as set
forth in the law and some of the procedures established for de-
termining minimum prfce schedules and for dealing with related
problems were inadequate in important respects and added ma-
terially to the difficulties of administration.
Certainly the noncost criteria were conflicting and their meaning
ambiguous. No attempt was made in the Act to weight their rela-
tive importance; nor was the stage of the price-fixing process at
which each was to apply or the manner of application specified.
Clarification of the meaning of these standards plus further guides
in applying them would have eliminated much of the controversy
over interpretation, would have revealed the conflicts in purpose,
and would have greatly simplified the work of the administering
agencies. There is considerable doubt whether the application of the
criteria could have achieved the objectives of the Act and would
have resultedmaximum economic consumption. The framers of
the Act did not (1) establish standards or guides on the levels of
consumption, production, and capacity at which current revenue
and current expenses were to be equated or (2) make provision
for consideration of the effect of the price level on consumption,
rate of utilization, and capacity and consequently on costs. As a
result of these omissions, further changes in minimum price levels
were required.
No account was taken of profits from company-owned miners'
dwellings and company stores in establishing minimum prices.
Moreover, the income tax bases for computing depletion and de-
preciation permitted operators in certain years to charge excessive
depletion and enabled operators whose output deviated substantially
62Ibid.,p.310.
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from their customary production to report costs out of line with
usual costs.
It is the authors' opinion that certain of the minimum price
areas created by the Act, notably Minimum Price Area 1, em-
braced districts of such widely divergent costs that the price-fixing
agencies were given too much latitude in making changes in the
minimum price structure based on average costs. It is also believed
that the Act was deficient in failing to specify a procedure for clas-
sifying coals and in not including government observers on the
district boards assigned the task of establishing uncoordinated
district prices and of developing later coordinated price schedules
for various consuming market areas.
The lack of a clear understanding of the emphasis to be placed
upon the preservation of existing relative market values in common
consuming market areas led the Coal Division to make use of
freight absorption and market area schedules in order to achieve
coordination, with the result that past relative economic relation-
ships tended to be frozen. It was also unfortunate that the Act re-
lated changes in minimum prices to actual changes in costs, thereby
disregarding estimates of the impact of other factors and condi-
tions which would affect future costs. Obviously, there are dangers
in a dynamic industry in adjusting minimum prices to past costs
and in establishing them in such a way as to preserve past rela-
tionships. The procedure for price revision was cumbersome and
unsuited for dealing with a period of falling demand and produc-
tion. Of real concern is the fact that in such periods decreasing
production might well raise costs and occasion a rise in price sched-
ules, thereby exaggerating the industry's depression, defeating the
objective of maximum economic consumption, and pointing up the
importance of adjustment of prices in the light of their effects on
future consumption.
Experience under the Act has proven that the administration by
a Coal Division under the general direction of the Secretary of the
Interior was far more effective than under the seven-member Coal
Commission. The writers question the wisdom of placing the con-
trolling votes of a commission in the hands of persons who were
representatives of the chief beneficiaries of the Act.
The procedural requirements for numerous hearings by the price-
fixing agency delayed the process considerably, added greatly to
the work of the agency, forced it to defend itself in many minor mat-
ters, and enabled operators who opposed the Act to delay final price
setting through legal obstruction.
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The provisions in the Act for the setting of maximum prices
when necessary to protect the consumer are of a nature as to sug-
gest that Congress felt the need for such regulation too remote to
require realistic treatment. The requirement that maximum prices
be set at a uniform increase above the minimum prices in effect
so that the maximum prices would yield a reasonable return above
average costs for the district was unworkable, as was the provision
that the price set for any mine had to yield a fair return on property
value. Determination under this proviso would require years of
work and endless litigation, provide great profits to low-cost mines,
and encourage the opening of very high-cost mines. Maximum
prices at a uniform level above minimum prices are unrealistic
because of the lack of uniformity in the spread which develops as
prices rise above minima.
Any appraisal of this Act should recognize that its framers did
write a law that enabled its agencies to establish minimum prices
in an industry perplexed by many problems. Here are found not
only the factors which commonly determine prices in manufacturing
industries but also the special conditions under which minerals are
extracted. The writing of such a law was a real achievement.
Because the task was exceedingly difficult, the framers could
hardly have foreseen all the problems that arose or have developed
the most suitable formulae for their solution. Many of the limita-
tions set forth above are those that became apparent as a result of
the application of the criteria and procedures of the Act to the con-
struction of minimum price schedules.
2. APPRAISAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES UTILIZED TO
EFFECTUATE THE ACT
Having completed our analysis of the Act as an instrument for
price fixing, we are now ready to examine the policies and proce-
dures used by the administrative agencies assigned the task of
executing its provisions.
Any evaluation of policies and procedures should be made in the
light of (1) the shortcomings of the Act, (2) the .delaying tactics
of producers and consumers who felt that their interests were not
served by this legislation, (3) the enormous difficulties confronting
those assigned the responsibility of administering the Act, and
(4) the limited supply of personnel competent to deal with price-
fixing problems in this industry.
a. Immensity of task. It is important for the reader to have some
understanding of the magnitude of the task confronting the ad-
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ministrative agencies. This experiment in minimum price fixing
encompassed not just a few large corporations but "12,000 code
members, shipping annually from 350 to 400 million tons of bi-
tuminous coal from more than 30 States...." Theprices to be
established were to apply "to coals moving by every conceivable
manner of transportation and for any widespread use; coal moving
to its destinations by rail, truck, river, lake, tidewater, or a com-
bination of these methods; ..shipmentsfor use as railroad loco-
motive fuel, in byproduct coke ovens and other coke-producing
plants, for bunker or vessel fuel, and for general industrial, com-
mercial, and domestic use."63 These 12,000 code members sold
their product to 90,000 carload lot buyers and directly or indirectly
to millions of retail consumers.
Bituminous coal is not a standardized commodity. There is "an
infinite variation in burning characteristics, coking qualities, sul-
phur and ash content and other characteristics....Thereare also
a great multiplicity of sizes."84 Moreover, the character of coal is
not fixed solely by its physical properties. The equipment in use
must also be considered. As Walton H. Hamilton pointed out:
"Large industrial consumers run boiler tests on fuel before they
enter into annual contracts; the chemical analysis may show one
thing and the practical test quite another. Thus a coal may be rated
as superior in one plant; where another type of equipment is used,
it may be mediocre or poor. Ordinarily, in a particular consuming
area, equipment is developed to suit the coals which have entered
in the past. If new coals can penetrate the market, they may be
at a price disadvantage irrespective of their quality. Not only
are they unfamiliar and lack 'consumer acceptance'; the character
of the burning equipment may not permit a full utilization of their
qualities. Thus the engine, boiler, furnace through which coal is
converted is an aspect of its identity."65
It is apparent, therefore, that those who administered the Act
had to determine costs and fix prices for a product whose value
varied with its intrinsic qualities, its size, the use to which it was
put, and often the equipment in which it was burned. The task was
further complicated by the large number of producing units, the
decentralization of the industry, wide variations in geological and
mining conditions, pronounced differences in markets served, as
Third Annual Report under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937,.
June30, 1939, p. 17.




well as an extremely complicated system of freight rates under
which the rate per car-mile varies depending upon the length of
the haul, the territory served, and other considerations. In addition,
the price-fixing responsibilities had to be carried out in accordance
with criteria generally acknowledged to be ambiguous and con-
flicting. Finally, all interested parties could demand full and fair
hearings during any of the major processes of administration.
b. Preliminary education of producers and consumers. We would
have expected the Commission, given a task of such magnitude
and complexity, to begin its work with a program of preliminary
education of producers and consumers. Such a program could well
have included a statement setting forth the fundamental require-
ments of the Act concerning the structure of coal prices to be estab-
lished and the steps to be followed in determining minimum prices.
It could have set forth standard terminology and presented an in-
formed discussion of the criteria to be used, their lack of clarity
and consistency, the Commission's opinion as to their meaning and
relative importance as well as the manner and the stage of the price-
determination process in which they were to be used. It could have
recommended to advantage the procedures to be followed in pre-
paring coal classifications, uncoordinated prices, and coordinated
minimum prices. The recommended procedures should have in-
formed the district boards of the action to be taken with respect to
size groups, quality classifications, value as to uses, and other
related matters.
It may be argued that the very complexity of the task assigned
the Commission, lack of experience with minimum price fixing,
and the ambiguity of the Act's provisions made such a program of
education unwise, since it would lay the Commission open to chal-
lenge before the courts over its interpretation of the Act's intent
and procedures. In answer it may be pointed out that the Com-
mission included in its membership representatives of producers
and employees and that it was in a position to obtain the assistance
of highly competent constitutional lawyers, technical consultants
in coal, and price economists. Conferences with representatives of
the industry, even if they could not have obtained agreement on
price-fixing policies and procedures, could have explored the rela-
tive merits of the possible courses of action to be followed in price
determination and the factors and problems to be dealt with in each
of the basic steps involved in the process. Besides their educational
value, such conferences undoubtedly would have influenced the
policies and methods used by the district boards. Certainly the fail-
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ure to undertake such a program did not protect the Commission
against legal action by producers and consumers opposed to federal
regulation.
c. Application of price-fixing criteria or standards. It will be re-
called that the criteria set forth in the Act were expressed in vague
and general terms. It was not clear which factors were to be used
in classifying coals or the weight to be assigned to them. Even the
controlling purpose of price determination was subject to dispute.
Some argued that the Act required the Commission to preserve
each operator's existing markets and business; others maintained
that the minimum prices to be established should provide "a fair
field and no favor." The phrase "existing fair competitive oppor-
tunities" could be used to support both contentions, depending upon
whether the emphasis was placed upon the qualifying term "exist-
ing" or "fair." Under these circumstances, the application of the
Act's criteria by the price-fixing agencies is of especial interest.
In the initial price determination (set aside by the Commission
as the result of court rulings suspending the established minimum
prices of large groups of consumers), the Commission's instruc-
tion for the classification of coal stated that the district boards in
grouping their coals should give "due consideration" to proximate
analyses, physical characteristics, and characteristics of perform-
ance, but not to the use of coal for any particular purpose or any
particular types of equipment. It also refused to admit market
history and sales experience as factors in classification. There was
no statement of the procedure to be followed or definition of the
terms "characteristics of performance" and "physical characteris-
tics." Moreover, there was no discussion of the Act's criteria or the
weight to be attached to them.6°
In its second attempt to fix prices, the Commission was more
cautious. It published a "General Outline of the Procedure to be
Followed in the Re-establishment of Prices and Marketing Rules
and Regulations." This outline set forth the basic steps to be fol-
lowed in the price-fixing process. The Commission then released
certain general rules and regulations to be followed in classifying
coals and determining uncoordinated prices, most of which, how-
ever, had no bearing on the basic procedure to be utilized in carry-
ing out these tasks. Instead of listing the factors to be considered
in the classification of coals as did the initial order in 1937, the
Commission merely recapitulated the price-fixing provisions of the
Act and supplied a sample schedule showing the desired type and
66Seethe discussion in Chapter VII.
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arrangement of the data.67 The individual boards, in the absence
of specific instructions from the Commission, were given a rela-
tively free hand to develop an appropriate method for arranging
their coals in accordance with their own interpretation of the Act's
provisions.
As the task of developing minimum price schedules progressed,
the price-fixing agencies found it necessary "for practical purposes
and to simplify consideration of their meaning," to classify the Act's
standards into the following three groups:
—"Standards relating to realization" which served "the ultimate
end that the minimum prices yield a return per net ton approxi-
mating the weighted average cost per ton of each minimum price
area."
—"General and basic standards of fairness and reasonableness
against which the minimum prices must be judged." Under this
designation were included the criteria that were to be utilizecj in
developing coordinated minimum prices which would (a) be de-
termined "upon a fair competitive basis," (b) "be fair and
equitable as among producers and districts," (c) "not permit
dumping," (d) "have due regard for the interests of the con-
suming public," (e) "preserve, as nearly as may be, existing
fair competitive opportunities," and (f) "reflect, as nearly as pos-
sible, the relative market value of the various kinds, qualities and
sizes of coal."
—"Specific factors" which were to be "weighed in fixing mini-
mum prices conforming to the general standards." These factors
which were set out by Congress, without limitation, included
"the requirement that there be taken into account values as to
uses; seasonal demand; transportation methods and charges 'and
their effect upon a reasonable opportunity to compete on a fair
basis'; and competitive relationships between coal and other
forms of fuel and energy."68
The Director of the Bituminous Coal Division recognized that
"all of the standards set out above" had to "be applied" and that
"they must be construed as a whole" but evidently concluded that
in applying these standards, which were obviously overlapping,
some fundamental principle must be employed. He concluded that
"in the last analysis the judgments which must be made turn upon
the statute itself,...andits direction that the prices must be fair
67 See the discussion in Chapter VII.
68 Findings of Fact .. andOrder of the Director ..., pp.13-14.
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and just; that they must, so far as possible, maintain and reflect
existing relationships among the various coals unless those rela-
tionships are not 'fair.'" The established prices were "effected
upon the basis of methods" which carried out "this dominant, fun-
damental direction."69
The Coal Division was severely criticized for the emphasis it
placed upon existing cOmpetitive relationships. Eugene V. Rostow
contended that the Coal Division "construed the phrase 'existing
fair competitive opportunities' as if it were written 'existing com-
petitive opportunities.'" He pointed out that this criterion was but
"one of a dozen standards enumerated in the statute with equal em-
phasis," yet the Division "made it the touchstone of propriety in
every phase of its control, overriding all others in case of conflict.
."Usingthe distribution of coal that existed in 1937 as a guide,
the Division, he claimed, "has proved anxious, over and over again,
not to deny a producer access to any market in which he has been
selling coal; conversely," it was "reluctant to allow a producer to
increase his share of any market, if competing producers" pro-
tested. He added:
"This emphasis is the more remarkable in view of one of the
few changes in the 1935 Act made at the time the 1937 Act was
enacted. Section 4-JIb of the 1935 Act provided that minimum
prices should be coordinated with reference to the several standards
now included in the subsection—the kind, quality and size of coal,
the relative market values of coal at points of delivery, the absence
of prejudice or preference among districts—'to the end of affording
the producers in the several districts substantially the same op-
portunity to dispose of their coals upon a fair competitive basis as
has heretofore existed.' 49 Stat. 991,997 (1935). In the 1937
Act, this language was abandoned for the formula: 'and shall pre-
serve as nearly as may be existing fair competitive opportunities.'
Section 4-JIb."70
Undoubtedly, the Coal Division did attach considerable impor-
• tance to the "existing fair competitive opportunities" standard. In
his testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives concerning the extension of the Act, H.
A. Gray, Director of the Division, admitted that "the historic flow
of coal has not been disturbed" and pointed out: "...Idid not
think that I had a mandate from Congress to tear the coal business
into 15,000 pieces and then try to put it together again upon some
69Ibid.,pp. 13 and 15.
7°Op.cit.,,p. 578, text andnote88.
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theory which had never been tried before. I figured that we had a
mandate from Congress to raise the level of prices in the coal busi-
ness to its average cost, an average cost with no profit ...andto
maintain the flow of coal so that the various price areas and the
various districts got that cost back in money realization. They
could not get back the money realization if we disturbed the amount
of coal that they sold."7'
In his Findings of Fact, ...andOrder, the Director was more
precise in his statement of the policy of the Division in the
application of the Act's standards. There he stated:
"Congress was interested in preserving for producers their ex-
isting fair competitive opportunities. However, it did not intend
to perpetuate exactly the same state of affairs which existed under
free and open competition. The administrative agency was not in-
structed, and it has not attempted, to remake the industry anew,
or to set prices upon its conception of industry efficiency or the
advantages of a planned economy. Certain large inequalities in
prices have characterized the industry under free competition as a
general and fairly constant matter—distinctions in f.o.b. mine
prices according to use; seasonal demand; remoteness of markets
and meeting of additional competition therein; etc—and likewise
characterize the pattern of the established minimum prices.'"2
The role of clearly stated objectives and definite criteria in mini-
mum price, legislation is not agreed upon by all students of the
Bituminous Coal Act of 1937. Roger Quirk expressed the view
that "it might be wiser to lay down much less specific criteria,"
and also stated that "it is obviously impossible to frame all-embrac-
ing and completely unambiguous words which will give a com-
pletely clear lead to a central price-fixing authority. The most prac-
tical course is surely to frame somewhat general words, perhaps
more general than those in the Act, and leave it to the Commission
to interpret them wisely."73
The writer.s, on the other hand, believe that because the objec-
tives and standards set forth in the Act were neither clear nor con-
sistent the administering agencies were reluctant to lay down pric-
ing policies and standard procedures or to make changes in the
existing price structure. In our opinion, the history of minimum
price fixing under the Act of 1937 shows that the goals were not
clearly stated and the criteria set forth were decidedly inadequate.
Extension of Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, Hearings on H. J. Res. 101,
Revised, U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 1st sess.,
March 1941, p. 599.
72 P. 15. Op.cit.,p. 162 and Historical Appendix, p. 98.
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d. Determination of costs. Since minimum prices were to be
related to costs, it is pertinent to ask—How valid were the "de-
termined costs" used by the Commission and its successor? The
Act provided that these prices were to be based on cost data for
1936 adjusted "as may be necessary to give effect to any changes
in wage rates, hours of employment, or other factors substantially
affecting costs, exclusive of seasonal changes, so as to reflect as
accurately as possible any change" subsequent to January 1, 1937.
(Sec. 4-ha..) Did the adjustments that were made take into account
all factors "substantially affecting costs," that is, the forces that
operated to reduce as well as those working to increase costs? Here
we are concerned only with the second cost determination begun
in the spring of 1938—the costs used in the determination of the
minimum prices that were made effective on October 1, 1940.
1) Collection, and compilation of cost data. The determined costs
were based on data secured from coal operators concerning the
costs of production, preparation, sale, and distribution of bitumi-
nous coal for 1936, which were adjusted by the district boards for
subsequent changes—primarily basic adjustments in 1937. The
cost data for 1936 (and later years also) were reported to the
statistical bureaus of the Commission on forms and in accordance
with instructions prescribed by the Commission. The Bureau of
Research and Statistics, a department of the Commission, checked
the 1936 cost data for mathematical errors; it then reviewed the
costs of particular producers, comparing them with those of other
producers whose mining operations in the same districts were sim-
ilar. The 1936 cost data were then returned, together with cost
data for the last nine months of 1937, to the district boards. The
Commission made a test audit of all cost items, and ordered incon-
sistencies and inadmissible entries to be removed. The data were
made available to the Consumers' Counsel for critical examination.
After further revisions, the costs were sent to the district boards
to replace the tentative data that had been sent earlier. The Com-
mission computed—independently of the work of the various boards
—weighted average costs of the ascertainable tonnage of coal pro-
duced in each district. The district-adjusted costs, later revised
following the cost hearings, were used by the Commission to com-
pute the "determined" weighted costs for the nine mini-
mum-price areas.
2) Comparison of reported and determined costs. The Commis-
sion was in a very good position to see that reported costs were
accurate and its "determined costs" reasonably reliable. It prescribed
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the forms and prepared the accompanying instructions. It had at
its disposal cost data for the last nine months of 1937, showing the
actual changes that had occurred in that year. Finally, the year
1938 was free of basic changes in wages, hours, and conditions
of employment, but not, as we shall see, of changes in volume of
production, mechanization, and mining methods.
Table 81 presents the reported costs for 1937, 1938, 1939, and
1940, and the determined costs announced in July and August
1938 and those announced in May and June 1939. The 1939 de-
termined costs were used in the establishment of minimum prices.
The determined costs are the revised adjusted district costs ar-
rived at by the district boards and modified on the basis of evidence
submitted at cost hearings. The reported costs are those compiled
by the district boards from cost data submitted to them by the
Commission and used by them to compute the adjusted costs. It
was the determined costs, and not the reported costs, that were
used in establishing minimum price schedules.
As instructed by the Commission, the district boards submitted
their adjusted costs in late April of 1938. The Commission held
cost hearings in July and August and, on the basis of evidence
submitted at the hearings, ordered disallowances and made revi-
sions. A legal dispute over the right of the Commission to disclose
the cost data of individual producers prevented these costs from
being used in this phase of minimum price determination.
After the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's right, within
limits, to publish individual cost records, new hearings were held
in February, March, and April 1939; at that time the July-August
determined costs were reviewed in the light of new evidence pre-
sented at these hearings. The revised determined costs published
in May and June 1939 were somewhat lower than those published
in July-August 1938, primarily because of a shift in the basis used
in computation. In determining its costs in 1938, the Commission
had divided the production and administrative costs by the total
ascertainable tonnage and the selling costs by the tonnage produced
by commercial mines only. In 1939, for reasons to be discussed
later, it divided all costs—selling as well as production and ad-
ministrative costs—by the total ascertainable tonnage, that is, for
captive as well as commercial tonnage.
It will be noted (Table 82) that for the country as a whole the
May-June 1939 determined costs were $.026 a ton below the July-
August 1938 determined costs. The greatest change occurred in
Minimum Price Area 9 where costs were reduced $.105a ton.
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TABLE 81
Reported Costs and Determined Costs of Bituminous Coal, by Producing
District and Minimum Price Area, 1937-1940




July and May and
1939 1940August1928June1939 1937a 1938
District
1 2.34 2.31 2.20 2.14 2.3921 2.3887
2 2.17 2.26 2.08 1.98 2.2619 2.2140
3 1.82 1.78 1.72 1.65 1.8546 1.8366
4 1.92 1.90 1.76 1.71 1.9473 1.9356
5 4.01 3.90 3.84 3.90 3.6605 3.6543
6 1.96 1.86 1.66 1.64 1.9989 1.9775
7 2.17 2.23 2.08 2.04 2.2103 2.1940
8 2.01 2.04 1.95 1.90 2.0517 2.0301
MINIMUM PRICE
AREA 1 2.10 2.13 2.00 1.94 2.1574 2.1284
District
9 1.57 1.48 1.41 1.42 1.5830 1.5805
10 1.74 1.72 1.62 1.59 1.7707 1.7561
11 1.63 1.58 1.44 1.44 1.6544 1.6525
12 2.79 2.63 2.47 2.42 2.7734 2.7636
MINIMUM PRICE
AREA 2 1.74 1.70 1.58 1.57 1.7723 1.7622
MPA S (District 12)2.48 2.42 2.35 2.31 2.4740 2.4382
MPA 4 (District 14)3.73 3.41 3.33 3.26 3.6166 3.6080
MPA 5 (District 15)2.03 1.94 1.86 1.89 2.0489 2.0392
District
16 2.61 2.54 2.54 2.36 2.5647 2.5559
17 2.74 2.76 2.60 2.50 2.7937 2.7664
18 3.14 3.13 3.29 3.32 3.1608 3.1519
MINIMUM PRICE
AREA 6 2.75 2.72 2.63 2.51 2.7579 2.738 9
District
19 2.05 1.90 1.87 1.82 2.0660 1.9917
20 2.44 2.20 1.98 2.02 2.4940 2.4691
MINIMUM PRICE
AREA 7 2.19 2.01 1.91 1.90 2.2347 2.1691
MPA 9 (District 22)1.48 1.49 1.36 1.37 1.5899 1.485 1
MPA1O(District23)3.21 3.17 3.05 3.07 3.2656 3.2247
TOTAL UNITED STATES 2.07 2.06 1.94 1.90 2.1142 2.0884
aAprilthrough September.
Source: The reported costs were published in Extension of Bituminous Coal Act of 1937,
Hearings on H.R. 356, H.R. 1454, and H.R. 2296, U.S. House Committee on Ways and
Means, 78th Cong., 1st sess., June-July 1943, p. 21. The determined costs for July and
August, 1938 were obtained from the SecondAnnual Reportof the National Bituminous
Coal Commission, Fiscal Tear Ended June 30, 1938, with additional activities to November
15, 1938, p. 28, and those for May and June 1939, from the Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Interior, Fiscal Tear Ended June 30, 1941, pp. 205-6.
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The only other adjustment exceeding $.050 a ton occurred in
Minimum Price Area 7, and there costs were reduced, on the aver-
age, $.066.
A comparison of the 1939 determined costs with the 1938 re-
ported costs (see Table 82) shows that, taking the country as a
TABLE 82
Differences between Determined and Reported Costs of Bituminous Coal,
by Producing District and Minimum Price Area, 1937-1940
(dollars per net ton, f.o.b. mine)
1939 1938 1939 1940
Determined Determined Determined Reported
Costs over Costs over Costs over Costs over
1938 1937 1938 1939
Determined Reported Reported Determined
Costs Costs Costs Costs
District
1 —.003 +.052 +.079 —.249
2 —.048 +.092 —.046 —.234
3 —.018 +.035 +.057 —.187
4 —.012 +.027 +.036 —.226
5 —.006 —.350 —.246 +.246
6 —.021 +.118 —.338
7 —.016 +.040 —.036 —.154
8 —.022 +.042 —.010 —.130
MINIMUMPRICE AREA 1 —.029 +.057 —.002 —.188
District
9 —.003 +.013 +.101 —.161
10 —.015 +.031 +.036 —.166
1]. —.002 +.024 +.073 —.213
12 —.010 —.017 +.134 —.344
MINIMUMPRICE AREA2 —.010 +.032. +.062 —.192
MPA3(District 13) —.036 —.006 +.018 —.128
MPA 4 (District 14) —.009 —.113 +.198 —.348
MPA5(District15) —.010 +.019 +.099 —.149
District
16 —.009 —.045 +.016 —.196
17 —.027 +.006 —.266
18 —.009 +.021 +.022 +.168
MINIMUMPRICE AREA 6 —.019 +.O08 +.019 —.229
District
19 —.074 +.016 +.092 —.172
20 —.025 +.054 +.269 —.449
MINIMUMPRICE AREA 7 —.066 +.045 +.159 —.269
MPA 9 (District 22') —.105 +.110 —005 —.115
MPA 10 (District 23) —.041 +.056 +.055 --.155
TOTAL UNITED STATES —.026 +.044 +.028 —.188
Source:Computed from Table 81.
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whole, "determined costs" were $.028 a ton higher than the re-
ported costs. This figure, however, conceals important differences.
There was a spread in costs amounting to $.198a ton in Minimum
Price Area 4, and another of $.159 in Minimum Price Area 7. A
study of the cost adjustments in the districts also shows substantial
differences, notably in districts 5, 6, 9, 12, and 20.
Of particular interest are differences between the May-June 1939
determined costs and the reported costs for 1940, which was the
year in which minimum price schedules were made effective (Oc-
tober 1, 1940). The determined costs for the United States as a
whole were almost $.19 a ton above the 1940 reported costs. In
certain minimum price areas the spread in costs was even greater.
Thus, the determined costs were approximately $.35 a ton higher
than the reported costs in Minimum Price Area 4, $.27 higher in
Area 7, and $.23 higher in Area 6.
A differential of $.19 a ton between determined and reported
costs is a very substantial one for an industry in which, for the
period 1933 to 1940 inclusive, the operators reported that income
exceeded cost in only one year. Even that "plus margin" was not a
net income, because interest on investment, certain taxes, and mis-
cellaneous expenses had not been included in the costs.
It should not be assumed that the coal operators actually re-
ceived margins which averaged $.19 a ton. As a matter of fact,
strong competitive forces were at work throughout much of 1940,
which drove sales income per ton to lower levels. Moreover mini-
mum prices did not go into effect until October 1 of that year.
Actually, the Appalachian Region reported that costs per ton ex-
ceeded sales realization per ton by only $.02. For the industry as a
whole realization exceeded cost by only $.O1 per ton. The compari-
son of 1939 determined costs with 1940 actual costs has been made
in Table 82 to show what would have happened if price schedules
based on determined costs had been in effect throughout that year.
3) Basic factors affecting costs. How may such a marked dif-
ference between the 1939 determined costs and the 1940 actual
costs be explained? The determined costs were based in very large
part on the known 1937 actual costs which, for the country as a
whole, were fairly comparable to those reported by operators in
1938. The differences between the 1939 determined costs and the
1940 costs must be explained by the fact that the determined costs
did not take—and could not take—cognizance of the fundamental
changes that had occurred, during 1939 and 1940, in the cost
structure of the coal industry. As the Director of the Bituminous
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Coal Division has pointed out, "operating and competitive condi-
tions within this industry are constantly changing. New develop-
ments of both scientific and economic nature are frequent."74 The
Coal Division had no choice but to disregard these basic changes
in the industry, and to establish minimum price schedules on its
1939 determined costs, recognizing that revision might have to be
undertaken shortly after their establishment. Any other procedure
would have led to extensive revisIons and further prolonged the cost
hearings, which in turn would have again postponed the already
much-delayed final determination of prices.
This experience with price fixing, however, should make it clear
that, in cost determination, the use of a base year plus adjustments
has definite limitations. It is particularly important to recognize
that cost changes are not confined to adjustments in wages, hours,
and other terms of the collective bargaining contract. A glance at
Table 81 discloses a drop in the reported costs for the United States
as a whole of $.12 in 1939 and $.04 in 1940. The total decrease
of $.16 was not due to changes in the wage contract—there were
none—but was due primarily to technological developments. The
percentage of underground production loaded by machine increased
from 20.2 in 1937 to 35.4 in 1940—an increase of over 75 per
cent. Substantial increases were also made in the proportion of coal
produced by strip or surface mining which, primarily because of
gigantic mechanical shovels and dragline excavators, also reduced
production costs.
There is another factor which materially affects production costs,
namely, the number of tipple starts or days worked by the mine.
Chart 14 has been constructed to show how changes in the number
of days worked by mines affect the cost of producing bituminous
coal. Thus 709 underground, commercial mines of Division
operated 17.3 days76 in May 1934 and in that month produced
12,982,000 net tons of coal at a cost of $1.70 per ton. It is esti-
mated that the cost would have fallen to $1.65 if the mines had
operated for 20 days; but if only 10 days had been worked, the
cost would have risen to $1.93 per ton.
It should be noted that this projection of cost is hypothetical
since it reduces the actual reported costs of these mines for 17.3
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior,... June30, 1941,
p. 199.
75Underthe NRA Bituminous Coal Code, Division I embraced all soft
coal fields to the north of central Tennessee; and included Michigan, Ohio,
and Kentucky, and all fields to the east thereof.
76Themines were idle 9.2 weekdays and 4.5 Sundays and holidays in
that month.
361APPRAiSAL
days to a one-day basis and then projects the various cost items
to the basis of assumed number of days that the mine tipples may
have started in a given month. It is believed that this hypothetical
basis approximates what would happen under actual operating
conditions.77 A more accurate estimate would have resulted if it
had not been necessary to assume constant returns to labor.
CHART 14
Producing Costs of Bituminous Coal Mines Projected for
Various Rates of Operation
Millions of net tons
oCharges usually on a fixed-lump-sum bOsis.
bCharges usually on a per-ton basis.
Source: Based on costs reported for May 1934 for underground commercial mtnes in Division I,
National Recovery Administration. See Appendix D for the method of Calculation.
" The projected costs were computed by the authors from basic data on
page 14 (column 1) of the volume entitled "Bituminous Coal Code Statistics
for the period April, May, and June 1934," prepared in the Division of Re-
search and Planning of the National Recovery Administration. A brief ex-
planation of the method used in compiling these data is set forth in Ap.
pendix D.
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It is evident that the per ton producing costs of coal rise at a
steadily increasing rate as the number of tipple starts (number of
days worked by the mine) approaches zero. It follows, therefore,
that the years in which the average number of days worked is rela-
tively low, unit production costs—other factors remaining constant
—would be much higher than in years characterized by approxi-
mately full-time production. The following data are pertinent to
this discussion:78
Per Cent of Net TonsPer Cent
Reported Average Coal Loadedper Man perof Coal
Cost Per Ton forDays WorkedMechanically byDay—AllMined by
Tear All Mines by Mines Underground MinesMines Stripping
1927 $2.07a 193 20.2 4.69 7.1
1938 2.06 162 26.7 4.89 8.7
1939 1.94 178 31.0 5.25 9.6
1940 1.90 202 35.4 5.19 9.4
April through September 1937.
We would expect the costs to have risen sharply in 1938
days worked dropped to 162. A substantial increase in mechaniza-
tion and surface mining seems to have offset most of the expected
increase. In the. following year, increases in days worked, mechani-
cal loading, and surface mining brought about a very substantial
decline in costs. In 1940, the appreciable increase in days worked,
as well as a 4.4 point rise in the percentage of coal mechanically
loaded, should have resulted in a marked decrease in cost. The
actual decline was only four cents a ton. This relatively small de-
crease may be explained in part by a drop, instead of an increase,
in output per man-day, and no further gains in surface mining.
4) Criticisms of cost data. The adequacy and accuracy of the
cost data have both been challenged. At the cost hearings, the
Carter Coal Company "contended that the cost form questionnaires
were inadequately prepared, and improperly checked and veri-
fied...Itshould be noted, however, that the cost schedules
"were an outgrowth of earlier cost forms, and closely resemble
those prepared by the first Coal Commission under the 1935 Act,
which in turn were very much like the forms in use by the Na-
tional Recovery Administration, 1933 to 1935."80 These forms
78Costdata are those published in Extension of Bituminous Coal Act of
1937, Hearings on H.R. 356, H.R. 1454, and H.R. 2296, U.S. House Corn.
mittee on Ways and Means, 78th Cong., 1st sess., June-July 1943,p. 21.
Other data are taken from the annual reports of the U.S. Bureau of Mines.
Rostow, op.cit., note 73, p. 573.
8OGordonand Webb, op.cit., p. 281.
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were the product of the expert knowledge and judgment of cost
accountants and operators from the industry and the cost experts
and other representatives of the government.
As pointed out earlier, the cost information supplied by the
operators was rendered under oath on forms and in accordance with
instructions prescribed by the Commission. The cost data were
compiled by the Commission's statistical bureaus and then checked
for mathematical accuracy and reviewed for consistency with the
experience of other producers operating like mines in the district
under consideration by the Commission's Bureau of Research and
Statistics. The data were rechecked in a limited "test audit" and
subjected to further revision. Moreover, the Office of the Consum-
ers' Counsel, on the initial investigation, made spot checks "to satisfy
itself on behalf of the consumers that the weighted average costs
as computed" were "statistically accurate and fairly represented
average costs. The Consumers' Counsel found that the posting and
mathematical work of the statistical bureaus was generally accurate.
Such errors in posting or computations as were found were com-
paratively few and of no consequence in their effect on the district
totals."8'
It has been charged that the "test audits" were too few and that
as a result the reported costs in many cases were probably the actual
expenditures as shown on the books of the company and not the
costs as defined in the Act. It was contended that many
might have inadvertently reported improper costs, particularly for
such items as selling commissions, depletion, depreciation, royal-
ties, and salaries of officers.
A member of the staff of the Consumers' Counsel with the as-
sistance of two accountants undertook an investigation in the fall of
1938 which throws light on the validity of this claim. In a bank
examination type of audit, typical cost reports of a number of
producers for early months of 1938 were checked to their books
and reports. This investigation revealed "...that the audit did not,
in these cases, disclose careless inaccuracies in transcription from
the books, deliberate inclusion of inadmissible items, or attempts
to misrepresent. On the contrary, there was every evidence of sin-
cere effort to fill out the report accurately- according to instructions,
and in the case of these examinations the reports did agree with the
books in all substantial particulars. There were enough transposi-
tions of items into the wrong cost form item; inadvertent inclusion
of certain expenses, sometimes taxes or insurance on company
81 Quoted by Gordon andWebb,op.cit., p. 283.
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houses or stores or other property, not properly chargeable to pro-
ducing costs; andenoughinstances of other minor errors to point
to the necessity for a definite standard classification of
The cost provisions of the Act obviously could have been
strengthened by requiring that cost reports be audited back to the
books and records of companies by a systematic and adequate spot
checking procedure. Such a practice would materially have assisted
the price-fixing agency in the detection of possible "hidden costs,"
particularly sales commissions of operators selling to financially
affiliated companies, royalties paid to affiliated land-owning com-
panies, salaries of officers, and inflated depletion and depreciation.
It would also have helped to detect the inadvertent inclusion of
items not chargeable to costs under the Act as well as the insertion
of expenses in the wrong classification.
5) inclusion of wholesalers' discounts in cost. The ruling of the
Commission that discounts to wholesalers should be included in the
costs has been criticized on the ground that such discounts are a re-
duction of income rather than a cost. The Commission stated that
"a large part of the national supply is sold through independent
wholesalers or jobbers" and pointed out that "if expenses attached
to this method of selling are excluded from consideration ... the
costs will be fragmentary and incomplete. ...Suchcompensation
to the wholesaler is a legitimate charge to the producer's cost, ac-
companied by a corresponding credit to his realization. The Com-
mission, therefore, finds that discounts allowed by producers to
wholesalers should be included in the cost wherever known."83
Messrs. Gordon and Webb stated that "to do otherwise would
produce selling cost averages including the sales expenses of direct-
selling producers and the commissions paid by producers who sell
through sales agents, but inconsistently excluding allowances or
discounts made by producers to wholesale distributors who perform
the sales function and act as a sales department for
6) Method used to calculate selling cost per ton. The Commission
found the calculation of selling cost per ton a troublesome problem.
It was confronted with the question—should the tonnage of captive
mines (which have no selling costs and merely charge their affiliated
companies a book value) be included in the "tonnage divisor" to be
used in computing "selling costs per ton," or should the divisor
be restricted to the output of commercial mines only. In the 1938
cost determination the Commission used commercial tonnage only,
82 Ibid., p. 290.
83 Quoted by Gordon and Webb, op.cit.,p. 286.
84 Loc.cit.
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and this method was vigorously attacked by the Consumers' Coun-
sel. In the cost determination of 1939 the Commission substituted
total ascertainable tonnage as the divisor. This solution eliminated
the fictitious selling cost of the captive mines, but it understated the
actual selling costs of commercial mines. The Commission's dif-
ficulty arose out of the requirement in the Act that the average
cost to be used in price fixing was the "weighted average of the
total costs of the ascertainable tonnage produced." The Commission
held that the divisor for total dollar cost must in all instances be
the "total ascertainable tonnage." It is unfortunate that the Act itself
did not eliminate the captive tonnage from the divisor for the pur-
pose of determining selling cost, since its inclusion necessarily re-
sulted in prices based On a per ton selling cost which was too low
and was, therefore, unfair to the commercial producers.
7) Determination of selling costs. Considerable criticism was
leveled at the Commission for its acceptance of "the judgment of
marketing experts that the actual costs of selling, as reported, are
the best indication of the reasonable costs of Selling
costs were the only costs specified in the Act that were qualified
by the adjective "reasonable." Since the Commission was authorized
to scrutinize these costs, the Consumers' Counsel urged that it
establish criteria of reasonableness for the purpose of enabling the
Commission to reject selling costs which were unwarranted. This
suggestion was rejected on the grounds that the factors which af-
fected selling costs were too numerous to permit the successful use
of such criteria. The Commission, however, held that items not
properly chargeable to selling costs should be disallowed, and such
disallowances were in fact made in several districts.86
It was pointed out at the cost hearings that selling costs should
be carefully scrutinized. Attention was called to the fact that com-
missions reported paid by operators selling through financially af-
filiated agencies or distributors would include an unknown element
of profit. In this connection Messrs. Gordon and Webb wrote: "Af-
filiations between producers and their selling companies are com-
mon. In many instances, the selling company is a child of the pro-
ducer's membership in a 'marketing agency,' which requires the
subagent to do the actual selling; while the marketing agency acts
more as a price-and-market-stabilizing and promoting agency for
85HearingRe Determination of Weighted Average of
theTonnage Produced Within Minimum Price Area 1 (General Docket No.
15), National Bituminous Coal Commission, 1938, p. 16.
Ibid. For a list of possible criteria for judging the probable validity of
reported selling costs, see Chapter VI.
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the coals of its members. Undoubtedly, the commissions paid to
affiliated selling companies often represent an element of profit."87
These writers also pointed out that "many expenses have crept
into selling cost through the years, some of which are taken for
granted as necessary, but many of which are not really necessary—
and others have not been proper 'costs' at all." In this category they
place such charges as contributions and donations to charity and
entertainment.88
The Consumers' Counsel stated that he "has opposed" the ac-
ceptance by the Commission of the "actual cost of selling" and "will
continue to oppose it." He added that: "The office has submitted
testimony to show that the 'cost of selling' as reported by many
producers exceeded the costs reported by and recommended by
most efficient producers. Also the office has recommended to the
Commission that distributors affiliated with producers shall be re-
quired to make a report in greater detail to the Commission so
that if there is any hidden 'profit' included in the 'cost' it will be
exposed. Further study will be necessary before a decision can be
made as to how the problem can be attacked most
We must conclude that the use of actual selling costs is a ques-
tionable practice unless such costs are carefully scrutinized in detail
to ensure that only items properly chargeable to such costs are in-
cluded. To assist the operators, criteria of reasonableness might
well have been set. The use of actual selling costs would seem to
be an invitation to increase selling expenditures which in turn
would be reflected in average costs and ultimately in higher prices.
8) Disclosure of cost data of individual producers. The Com-
mission has also been severely criticized for having included on
the cost form the statement—"This report is required under the
provisions of the Bituminous Coal Act and is therefore copfidential,"
inasmuch as the data of individual producers were later submitted
as evidence in subsequent cost hearings. It was unfortunate that
the promise not to disclose individual cost data was made. The
coordination of specific prices depended upon such individual data
and of necessity had to be made public if the Commission's policy
was to be understood and accepted by those affected by its rulings.
9) Changes in cost structure of bituminous coal. It is not pos-
sible to measure the effect of the promulgated minimum prices upon
the cost structure of the industry. In the first place, there is no
Op.cie., p. 286. 88 Loc.cit.
89 Annual Report, Fiscal Tear 1938, Consumers' Counsel, National Bi-
tuminous Coal Commission, pp. 12-13.
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"normal" structure of costs for bituminous coal. The structure is
continually undergoing change because of the impact of a great
number of factors, most of which have been discussed in earlier
sections of this appraisal. Secondly, World War II had materially
affected the domestic demand for and the exports of bituminous
coal in both 1940, the year minimum price schedules were made
effective, and 1941, the first full year in which such prices were in
effect. Finally, because detailed cost data were available only on an
annual basis and minimum prices were established on October 1,
the immediate impact could not be measured.
It may be useful, however, to examine the structure of costs in
1936, the base for computing "determined costs," and in 1941,
when minimum prices first were in full effect. Chart 15 presents
the total reported costs for producing districts east of the Mississippi
Riverexcept for District 5, Michigan, for which complete data were
lacking. All of the districts fall in Minimum Price Areas 1, 2, and
3. Unfortunately data for areas smaller than producing districts
were not made available to the public.
It will be noted that reported costs were higher in 1941 in all
districts, notwithstanding an increase of 178.7 per cent in the
coal loaded by machine in underground mines and an increase of
95.8 per cent in the coal produced by strip or surface mines. In
addition, the number of days worked rose from 199 to 216 or 8.5
per cent. During this period sales realization per ton for the in-
dustry as a whole increased 19.7 per cent.
Chart 15 discloses that the increases in total reported costs were
small ($.05-.12 a ton) in the three Districts 9, 10, and 11 of Mini-
mum Price Area 2; that they were moderate ($.19-.30 a ton) in
the first five districts of Minimum Price Area 1, and more sub-
stantial ($.38-.58 a ton) in Districts 7, 8, and 13. It is clear that
the cost structure of 1941 was decidedly different from that which
existed in
°°It.will be noticed that the weighted average total reported costs pre-
sented in Chart 15 are not identical with comparable data shown in Tables
79 and 81 of this chapter and similar tables in Chapter VI. The differences
are caused by different methods of computation. The costs shown in Chart
15 were taken from the original tabulations which excluded the tonnage of
"captive" mines from the calculation of selling costs. The costs shown in
Tables 79 and 81 and in Chapter VI are slightly lower than those in this
chart because they were derived from later tabulations in which the Bi-
tuminous Coal Division had divided all costs by the "total ascertainable
tonnage." It was necessary to use the original cost data in this analysis be-
cause later data did not provide the necessary breakdown of costs.
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CHART
Total Reported CostsinEleven ProducingDistricts by Minimum





Source; See note 90.
0




The proportions of total reported costs that went for labor in
the two years are shown in Table 83. It was to be expected that the
marked increase in mechanization which characterized these years
would occur at different rates in the various producing districts, as
Table 83 clearly shows. The percentage importance of labor costs
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Eastern Pennsylvania (1)
Western Pennsylvania (2)
Northern West Virginia (3)
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Panhandle (West Va.) (6)
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from about 2 to 5pointsin Districts 2, 8, and 10 and decreased
from 5toabout 10 points in Districts 3, 4, 6, 9, and 11.
Because interest on investment was not a reported cost, it is im-
possible to measure accurately the offsetting cost increases that
were due to mechanization. It is obvious from Table 84, however,
that the percentage which the cost of supplies comprised of the
total reported costs increased in all but one district and that the
TABLE 83
Labor Costs in Commercial and Captive Mines in Eleven
Producing Districts East of the Mississippi River, 1936 and 1941
(per cent of total reported cost)
Minimum Price Area and
Producing District 1936a 1941b Difference
MINIMUM PRICE AREA 1
1 Eastern Pennsylvania 65.6 65.9 +0.3
2 Western Pennsylvania 63.5 61.8 —1.7
S Northern West Virginia 64.5 57.6 —6.9
4 Ohio 67.6 57.4 —10.2
6 Panhandle (West Virginia) 68.4 62.1 —6.3
7 Southern Numbered 1 62.1 61.7 —0.4
8 Southern Numbered 2 62.4 60.7 —1.7
MINIMUM PRICE AREA 2
9 West Kentuckyc 63.6 54.7 —8.9
10 Illinois 54.9 50.1 —4.8
11 Indiana 48.6 42.8 —5.8
MINIMUM PRICE AREA S
13 Southeastern 63.2 62.9 —0.3
a Returnson cost form 1 of the National Bituminous Coal Commission.
b "Preliminary Survey, Producing, Administrative, and Selling Costs,"
Bituminous Coal Division, 1942.
Not including "captive mines."
increases were more pronounced in those districts in which the
percentage importance of labor costs was, substantially reduced.
Table 84 also shows what happened to the percentages for the
cost-group designated as "other operating charges."91 The percent-
age importance of the combined items in this cost group all rose,
but the increases varied from .7 points in Alabama, Southern Ten-
Ol Under this designation are included taxes on mine property and equip-
ment; corporate privilege and severance taxes and sales taxes not paid by
consumers; social security, old age benefit tax; unemployment tax; tax levied
under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937; compensation insurance; vocational
disease insurance; insurance (other); royalties; depletion (income-tax basis);
depreciation (income-tax basis); Operators' Association dues and assess-
ments; and District Board expense—including assessments.
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nessee, and Georgia (District 13) to 3.4 points in Ohio (District
4). It will be observed that the districts in which the percentage
cost rose most are the same districts that reported the greatest drop
in the percentage importance of their labor costs.
Data on royalties, depreciation, and depletion are not available
for 1941. Some idea of what happened to these cost items in com-
mercial mines during these years may be ascertained from a corn-
TABLE 84
Supplies Cost and "Other Operating Charges" in Commercial and Captive Mines
in Eleven Producing Districts East of the Mississippi River, 1936 and 1941








MINIMUM PRICE AREA 1
1 Eastern Pennsylvania
2 Western Pennsylvania
3 Northern West Virginia
4 Ohio
6 Panhandle (West Virginia)
7 Southern Numbered 1












































MINIMUM PRICE AREA 3
13 Southeastern 16.2 17.2 +1.0,11.8 12.5 +0.7
a Forcontents, see note 91 of the text.
b Returns on cost form 1 of the National Bituminous Coal Commission.
"Preliminary Survey, Producing, Administrative, and Selling Costs," Bituminous Coal
Division, 1942.
d Not including "captive mines."
parison of 1936 and 1940. (See Table 85.) Royalties ranged from
$.032-.089 a ton in 1936 and $.031-.075 in 1940. Seven of the
eleven districts in 1936 and three in 1940 paid less than $.05 a
ton. As percentages of total reported costs, royalties ranged from
1.9 to about 4.0 per cent in both 1936 and 1940. In four districts
royalties as percentages of total costs were lower in 1940 than in
1936; in one district the percentage remained the same, in five
districts the increases amounted to less than 1 point, and in one



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Depreciation charges in dollars per ton were somewhat higher
than royalties, ranging from $.05-.10 a ton in 1936 and $.04-.11
a ton in 1940. In seven of the eleven fields the 1940 depreciation
was somewhat lower than in 1936. The decreases varied from a
low of $.005 to a high of $.016 a ton and the increases from $.003-
.019. Depreciation in 1940 constituted from 2.5 to 6.8 per cent
of the total reported costs, and in no instance did the upward or
downward adjustments in these years amount to more than 1.2
points.
Depletion charges as a rule were not as high as either royalties
or depreciation. In 1936 they ranged from $.012-.086 per ton and
in 1940 from $.018-.083. In the latter year, six districts reported
less than $.03 a ton, one district between $.03 and $.04, and four
districts $.04 or more. The adjustments in these years did not ex-
ceed $.01 a ton, and in eight of the eleven districts were $.005 a
ton or less. Eight of the districts reported decreases. In 1940, de-
pletion constituted from .9 per cent to 4.3 per cent of the total
reported cost. In all but two of the districts the depletion reported
amounted to less than 2.6 per cent of the total reported costs.
This comparison of cost items for the years 1936 and 1941
(1940 for royalties, depreciation, and depletion) discloses sub-
stantial changes in the cost structure. The increases in total costs
in the eleven districts showed wide variations, ranging from $.05
a ton in Illinois and Indiana to $.58 a ton in Alabama, Southern
Tennessee, and Georgia. In three fields the percentage that labor
costs constituted of the total reported costs remained virtually un-
changed, in three fields it dropped from 2 to. 5 points, and in five
fields from 5 to 10 points. The percentage of supply costs increased
in all but one district, but by varying amounts which ranged from
.4 to 4.4 points. "Other operating charges" all showed increases,
but not at the same rate. Royalties, depreciation, and depletion
showed diverse trends which added to the changing pattern of costs.
An analysis of the cost data of 1940 and 1941 shows the same
behavior pattern but on a more limited scale. Total reported costs
for the industry as a whole increased $.22 a ton. In the eleven
districts east of the Mississippi River, the increases ranged from
$.07-.42. Three districts reported increases of less than $.10 a
ton, two districts of between $.15 and $.20, three districts be-
tween $.25 and $.30, two districts between $.30 and $.35, and
one district of $.42 a ton. These increases ranged between a low
of 5 per cent and a high of 20 per cent.92
92 The cost data for 1940 are presented in Appendix E.
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The increases in labor costs also varied widely. In Indiana they
amounted to only 1 cent a ton and in Alabama, Southern Ten-
nessee, and Georgia to $.28 a ton. Three districts showed increases
of less than $.1O,anotherthree districts of $.1O-.15, two districts
of $.15-.20, two districts of $.20-.25, and one of $.28 a ton. Ex-
pressed in percentages these increases in labor costs ranged from
1.6 per cent to 22.8 per cent. In seven districts they increased the
percentage that labor costs constituted of the total costs by .2 to
1.3 points, and in four districts they reduced this percentage by
.5 to 1.6 points.
Supply costs increased between $.02 and$.1Oa ton, but the
general pattern was between $.03 and $.04. "Other operating
charges" also increased in all but one district; for the most part
they amounted to $.02 or $.03 a ton. The effects of these increases
in supply costs and "other operating costs" were to raise the per-
centage of these costs to total reported costs in some districts and
lower them in others. Such changes seldom amounted to more
than one percentage point.
As noted earlier, the changing pattern of costs in the years under
consideration reflected the many forces at work in the period. There
is no way to isolate the impact of minimum price schedules from
that of the total field of forces.
e. Determination of coal classificatIons and uncoordinated prices.
Since neither the Act nor the administrative agencies had specified
guiding principles or a standard procedure for classifying and pric-
ing district coals, the boards were left to perform these functions in
accordance with their own interpretations of the Act.
Four types of procedures were advocated.93 These may be briefly
described as follows:
Over-all Ranking, which groups coals into broad classes by com-
paring coals with each, other without separate, formal analysis
of the essential qualities (the physical, chemical, and market
characteristics) of each coal.
Factor Ranking Based on Gal-to-Coal Comparisons, with re-
spect to each of certain selected characteristics, such as heat
content, ash content, consumer acceptance, market history,
The ranking would be made separately for each factor—one fac-
tor at a time. The resulting categories for each of the factors
would then be used by the boards to formulate their proposed
coal classifications and uncoordinated prices.
"Fora fuller description of these procedures see Chapter VII.
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Factor Ranking in. Terms of Predetermined Grades and Stand-.
ards, pertaining to heat content, ash content, sulphur content,
Btu., etc., such as those prepared by the American Society for
Testing Materials.
Rating in Terms of Definite Units of Measurement, which clas-
sifies coals by (1) assigning weights to each of the factors used
in the evaluation and (2) giving numerical values to each of a
number of gradations for each factor. For example, the values
assigned for various gradations in sulphur content might be:
—No allowance up to and including 1.6 per cent of sulphur
content.
—One per cent per ton for each 0.3 per cent of sulphur above
1.6 per cent up to 4 per cent.
—No additional allowance for sulphur content above 4 per
cent.
The sum of the point values assigned to a given coal for each
of the characteristics used in the evaluation would then be trans-
lated into a price. The end result would provide a structure of
relative prices for each district.
Each of these systems has its advocates. Only one district, II-
linois, adopted a rating procedure. All of the remaining districts
used a factor ranking method. However, in three districts the
treatment of the individual factors apparently was so casual that
the authors considered including these districts under the over-all
ranking method instead of the factor-ranking method.
Many operators, and especially sales executives, contend that it
was impossible to apply uniform "yardsticks" of value to the many
intrinsic qualities and market characteristics of coal. Theyargue
that the significance of most factors in a coal analysis as well as the
importance and accuracy of sizing vary with the use which is to be
made of the coal, and, therefore, that the suitability of a coal fora
given establishment should be regarded as an individual matter.
They insisted that any pricing procedure must, in a large measure,
reflect the judgment of those who have had a long experience in
the industry and an intimate knowledge of the coals produced and
of the price relationships prevailing in the district.
The Consumers' Counsel, at the hearings on the classification
of coal, recommended that the Commission adopt the standard
specifications for coal developed by the American Society for Test-
ing Materials and require code members to describe their coals
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(1) by rank and its position in the scale of rank, (2) by grade
(calorific value, ash content, etc.), (3) by tolerance and size con-
sist, and (4) by sizes. He argued that such specifications should
be used "for the purpose of protecting both producers and con-
sumers by assuring the utilization of a uniform and standard de-
scription of coal in the valuation of coals (and, at some future date,
in standards for the classification of coals)
TheCoal Division recognized that proximate analyses and re-
ports of physical characteristics of coal as well as formulae (such
as the Bement formula for the mathematical measurement of the
relative efficiency of different coals based on Btu content and proxi-
mate analyses) were "extremely useful in making general judg-
ments as to the relative values of different coals" but held that
mathematical formulae could not "serve as a simple rule for de-
termining exact price relationships between coals." It took the
position that the determination of quality "depends upon a judg-
ment as to all the factors which make coals desirable to consumers"
and that such judgment must be based on "analyses and reports of
physical attributes... andthe judgments of experts," including
those of "the Division's experts; of consumers actually buying coals;
and of persons producing and selling coals, including particularly
the judgments of the district boards..
.
Anexamination of the coal classifications submitted by the 22
district boards shows wide variations. All of the districts established
size specification. Nine of these specifications, however, included
special size groups for coals when sold to certain users, five for coals
subjected to additional treatment or preparation, and one for coals
shot off the solid. Some of the remaining districts used various
other devices to attain the same ends. The size specifications varied
greatly in number and content. For example, two districts reported
fewer than eight size groups, seven districts between 8 and 14, ten
between 15 and 21, and three 22 and over. It is said that some of
the size groups did not reflect real variations in commercial utility
but served as a selling device to increase the district's volume of
sales at the expense of competitors. A similar lack of standardiza-
tion characterized the content of the size groups reported to the
Commission, notwithstanding the fact that such standardization
would be more easily understood and would facilitate price com-
parisons. For example, the 8" x 3" size was classified as "egg" in
HowMuch Heat in Bituminous Coal, Consumer Ideas No. 1, Consumers'
Counsel of the National Bituminous Coal Commission, 1937, p.24.
Findings of Fact, ... andOrder of the Director, ... p.22.
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one district, "grate" in a second, "stove" in a third, and "furnace"
in a fourth district. An examination of price schedules submitted to
the Commission shows that they not only classified sizes differently
from district to district, but even classified "them differently within
the same district, depending upon the consuming market, or the
use classification, or the transportation method, or the preparation
given at the mine (whether raw, washed, cleaned, etc.)
Thedistrict classifications of coals for kind and quality also
showed marked differences. Eleven different factors or characteris-
tics were used in evaluating coals. Of the 19 districts reporting
quality classifications, only 13 made use of coal analyses.97 Fifteen
of the 22 districts took into account physical factors, and 11, char-
acteristics of performance. All districts made use of market con-
siderations (in one form or another) and special treatment of coal
(primarily to establish special price differentials). Nineteen dis-
tricts took "values as to uses" into account. Seasonal demand and
competitive fuel and energy were used by three districts. Three of
the 22 district boards utilized two factors in evaluating their coals,
three boards required four factors, seven boards used either five
or six factors, five needed seven or eight factors, and four re-
quired nine factors.
An analysis of the classifications of coal submitted by the various
boards discloses little uniformity in the terminology used, the size
groups proposed, the factors considered in appraising coals, the
quality classes recommended, or even the letters used to indicate
the various grades of coals to be included in interdistrict compari-
sons.
Much as we should like to have seen a structure of minimum
prices based upon some scientific formula or formulae, we must
conclude that rating in terms of definite units of measurement or
even factor ranking in terms of predetermined grades and stand-
ards was not possible under the conditions which confronted the
Commission. The value of coal to consumers is the resultant of a
large number of factors of which only a limited number can be
measured accurately. Unfortunately for price-fixing purposes, the
different factors as wellthe importance of size vary with dif-
Brieffor Consumers' Counsel Division, In the Matter of the Establish-
ment of Minimum Prices for the Coals Produced in Districts l'Jos. 1 to 20,
inclusive, 22 and 23 (General Docket No. 15), Bituminous Coal Division,
February 14, 1940, p. 164.
Four districts reported that they did not use quality classifications;
three because their coals showed little or no. variations and one because its
coals were lignitic.
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ferent uses of coal. As long as combustion engineers and salesmen
cannot agree upon the weights to be given to the basic characteris-
tics which determine the kind and quality of coal, general accept-
ance of yardsticks for price-fixing purposes is unlikely. Scientific
classification of coal was also precluded by the Act, in that the
Commission was required to relate its minimum. price schedules
to the level of specified costs of production in a manner which
would preserve the "relative market values" of the different kinds
of coal as well as "existing fair competitive opportunities."
Granted that scientific classification of bituminous coals was
not possible at the time, it does not follow that the various district
boards should have been left to develop their own procedures for
classifying the coals falling within their jurisdiction. The Com-
mission could have specified and defined the factors to be considered
and insisted that the boards (1) obtain proximate analyses and
reports of physical characteristics and (2) use, to the extent pos-
sible, the grades and standards prepared by the American Society
for Testing Material and known mathematical formulae such as
the Bement Formula. These data and formulae would have greatly
increased the likelihood that the establishment of coal classifica-
tions would have been based upon an analysis of all applicable fac-
tors and available information and would have minimized the
sphere of empirical judgment. Moreover, the supporting data
would have been of considerable value to the administrative agen-
cies in coordinating the minimum prices of coals in common con-
suming markets.
f. Coordination of district prices in common consuming markets.
The thirdmajor task in the determination of minimum prices was
thecoordination of the proposed district minimum prices in com-
mon consuming markets in a manner which would reflect the cri-
teria prescribed by Congress. This function was assigned to the
district boards, but when most of them were unable to complete the
task, the Commission, pursuant to the Act's provisions, took over
the assignment.
The mechanics of coordination are illustrated by the procedure
used in the case of all-rail coal.°8 The Commission found itneces-
sary:
—To determine the sizeand location of the common consuming
market areas (determined in large part by the system of freight
rates governing the shipments of coal).
98 See Chapter VIII for explanation of coordination procedure.
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—To ascertain for each size, kind and quality, and use class (1)
the tonnage of competing coals entering each market area and
(2) the amounts carried by each of the various forms of trans-
portation (obtained by means of a survey of distribution for the
year 1937).
—To select a representative destination, i.e., one typical of the
competitive situation in the market area involved.
—To select a base coal—one that was well known, widely dis-
tributed, and shipped in large tonnages.
—To ascertain a destination minimum price for the base coal
of the district shipping the largest tonnage to the market area.
—To coordinate the various coals on a destination minimum
price basis taking into account the factors and criteria specified
in the Act.
—To ascertain coordinated minimum prices, f.o.b. mine, by
subtracting the applicable freight rates from the destination
prices.
—To check and adjust where necessary the estimated realization
against the weighted average costs of the minimum price area
involved.
—To hold public hearings, review, and revise prices when con-
ditions necessitated adjustments.
The process was "essentially one of selecting f.o.b. mine prices
for each coal which, when added to the transportation charges ap-
plicable to that coal," would "yield such delivered prices that the
various base coals" competing in a particular market "were properly
related, size for size and class for class" and reflected "fair existing
competitive opportunities...." Afterthe base coals were satis-
factorily related, the other coals of each competing district were
then "tied in" with the prices of the base coals. The prices thus
obtained were "weighed and modified as necessary to take proper
account of competition from competitive fuels, special uses, the
interests of the consuming public, This procedure made it
necessary to set minimum mine prices in all cases in which two or
more coals produced at different points competed in a particular
market.
Findingsof Fact, ... andOrder of the Director,...p.14.
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The magnitude of the task is revealed by available statistics
bearing on the process of coordination. In preparation for the ac-
tual coordination of minimum prices, the Commission or its
cessor found it necessary to compile, classify, and index for im-
mediate reference more than 1,000,000 individual "freight rates
for coal moving from every origin rate group to all destinations
served by rail in the United States or in the Canadian Provinces
served by American coal." To ensure "that the new proposed
prices" would "meet the requirement of yielding a realization equal
to the weighted average cost for each minimum price area," it "had
to ascertain the total tonnage of each grade and size of coal which
moves into each market." The data made available for the year
1937 by every producer for "each kind, quality and size shipped
to each destination" were "transferred to 400,000 machine tabula-
tion cards, each of which" represented "the movement of a particu-
lar grade and size of coal into a particular
The hearing on the proposed coordinated minimum prices es-
tablished by the Division was "probably one of the most extensive
administrative proceedings ever undertaken by any governmental
agency."°' The record of these proceedings contained "over 26,000
pages of testimony and oral argument, about 2,000 exhibits, about
700 written protests and 112 briefs." It is estimated that "more
than 300 producers, consumers, and other interested persons were
represented at the hearing."b02 In addition to the attorneys of the
Coal Division and the Office of the Consumers' Counsel there were
"80 attorneys representing district boards, individual producers and
consumers. ..." Thecomplexity of the testimony is evidenced by
the varied subject matter dealt with at the hearing. An incomplete
listing includes:
—The geographical boundaries of market areas
—Transportation methods and charges
—Location of rail-connected mines by origin groups
—Analytical study to determine the average analytical value of
coals produced in the respective districts on a seam, quality,
and size basis
—Analytical study of the chemical and physical characteristics
100SecondAnnual Report of the National Bituminous Coal Commission,
Fiscal Tear Ended June 30, 1938, with additional activities to November 15,
1938, p. 14.
101ThirdAnnual Report under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ..
June30, 1939, p. 17.
102Annual of the Secretary of the interior,... June30, 1940,
p. 462.
380APPRAISAL
on a conversion basis of coals produced in the several districts
—The history and movement of the price of railroad locomotive
fuel
—Distribution of coal through tidewater ports and the purpose
for which such coal is used
—History and movement of coal by river from origin to destina-
tion
—Study of the distribution of coal moving all-rail into all com-
mon consuming markets for all uses
—Distribution of coal from mine to destination by truck or
wagon, and the competitive factors involved
of the base coals of the several districts and the relative
market values of such coals at points of delivery in common
consuming markets1°3
In carrying out the basic steps involved in coordination, the
price-fixing agencies did not make use of any formulae or yard-
sticks. The minimum price schedules were based largely on judg-
ment in which negotiation and compromise played an important
role. Given the criteria set forth in the Act, the many variable fac-
tors affecting the price of coal, and the rigorous competition prevail-
ing within the industry, this approach seems to have been inevitable.
A schedule of prices acceptable to one mine or district was al-
most certain to be unsatisfactory to some other mine or district,
since the goal of all producers was to get a minimum price, for
each of their coals which would be just low enough to permit them
to undersell their competitors. The many fundamental conflicts of
interests among competing producers and between producers and
large consumers precluded the use of formulae for the coordination
of coals competing in common markets. Moreover, their use would
have resulted in a minimum price structure that would have dis-
turbed existing economic relationships and would have been chal-
lenged by producers.
g. Relation of estimated realization to determined costs. Inas-
much as minimum prices were to be fixed so that the average price
per ton in each designated minimum price area would approximate
the. weighted average "determined costs," it may be of interest to
see what relationship actually did prevail between determined
costs and the' estimated realization based on the minimum price
schedules established by the Coal Division. Chart 16 presents these
ThirdAnnual Report under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, .
June30,1939,pp.17and 18.
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data for Minimum Price Area 1 and the eight districts thatcom-
pose it.
It will be noted that for the Minimum Price Areaas a whole
the spread between average "determined cost" andestimatedsales
realization per ton was $.04. An examination of thetwo sets of data
in each of the districts shows that only in District6 (Panhandle,
CHART16
Determined Cost and Estimated Sales Realizationin Minimum
Price AreaIarid Producing Districts
fttUl1li Determined cost Estimated soles realization
Minimum Price Area I
__________________________
2.39 Eastern Pennsylvania (1) 2.17
Western Pennsylvania (2)
Northern West Virginia (3) ... .................... i








0 1 2 3 4
Dollars per net Ion
Source; See Chart IC and Table 12.
WestVa.) did average costs equal estimated sales income. In Dis-
tricts 3 and7the spread between per ton cost and sales income did
not exceed $.03; in District 8 it amounted to $.06; in District 4
to $.09; in District 2 to $.15; in District 5 to $.17; and in District
1 to $.22. It is apparent that in certain districts estimated sales
realization did deviate substantially from the cost. standard.
A comparison of district estimated realization with the weighted
average "determined costs" of the Minimum Price Area as a whole
also shows considerable variation. In five districts, sales realization
stood below and in three districts above theaverage "determined
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costs" of the Minimum Price Area. In Districts 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8
the average "determined cost" of the Area exceeded sales income by
$.07, $.26, $..1O,$.15, and$.04 respectively, and in Districts
1, 5, and 7 sales income surpassed average costs by $.04, $1.69,
and $.04 respectively. Even if District 5 (Michigan) is eliminated,
the difference between the highest and lowest sales realization per
ton was
The departures of district costs from that of the minimum price
area appear to reflect an historical economic pattern which the Bi-
tuminous Coal Division did not see fit to modify. Consequently
the setting of minimum prices on the basis of costs for the whole
minimum price area carried out a major requirement of the Act
regarding costs and at the same time permitted districts whose
costs were far from uniform to compete with one another. The Trial
Examiners have pointed out that "the Act nowhere establishes the
standard that return per net ton for each district must equal its
weighted average
h. Impact of minimum price determination on price structure.
The multiplicity of prices paid at any one time by the many con-
sumers of coal creates an amazingly intricate pattern of prices. We
have seen that the price-fixing experiment applied to 12,000 code
members producing bituminous coal in more than 30 states and to
tens of thousands of car-lot buyers and to millions of retail con-
sumers. Moreover, the many kinds of coals have values that vary
with their intrinsic and physical characteristics, with the sizes
produced, the uses to which they are put, and often the equipment
in which they are burned. Under these conditions differential pric-
ing becomes a necessity.
The pricing process was hemmed in (1) by a wage structure ar-
rived at through collective bargaining and held constant during the
life of the wage contract, and (2) by an intricate freight rate struc-
ture under which the rate per car mile varies with the length of
the haul, the territory served, and other considerations. Price fixing
was further complicated by the transportation methods utilized in
moving these coals from the mines to the market, including rail,
104 It should be noted that the production of coal in District 5 (Michigan)
is relatively small, and that, consequently, the high cost assigned to the dis-
trict does not greatly affect the general level of cost for Minimum Price
Area 1.
105 Report, Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Recommendations
of Trial Examiners, as revised (General Docket No. 15), Bituminous Coal
Division, April 1940, p. R-59.
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truck, and water-shipments, and the competition of different forms
of energy. Because "most mines sell several sizes and several quali-
ties, and often more than one kind of coal, and each mine sells each
of its products in several, perhaps many, markets, it is readily
appreciated that altogether several hundred thousand prices must
be fixed."°°
But the price structure of bituminous coal is not only intricate;
it is dynamic. As the Director of the Bituminous Coal Division
pointed out, the industry "is a relatively chaotic, fluctuating in-
dustry, which is characterized not by settled, standard conditions,
but at most by general trends, including diverse and even contra-
dictory specific trends."107 In this industry, then, we find nothing
that can be described as a normal or typical price structure. At any
one time there is a pattern of price relationships, but it is obscure,
fluid, and apparently irrational.
It would be interesting to know what impact the determination
of minimum prices did have upon the existing pattern of prices,
particularly in the light of the statement of the Director of the Coal
Division that in establishing minimum price schedules "the historic
flow of coal has not been disturbed."108 Data on mine prices and
production (needed for weighting purposes) prior to price regula-
tion are not available for comparison with the minimum prices
established by the Coal Division. Even if such data were available,
the immensity of the task would have precluded such an analysis.
Although a comparative study of hundreds of thousands of coal
prices cannot be undertaken, it is possible to contrast the realiza-
tion based on the minimum price schedules established by the Bi-
tuminous Coal Division and the actual sales realization in 1940 and
in the first quarter of 1941. Such a comparison has limited value,
since the available data on actual sales realization for 1940 were on
an annual basis and minimum price schedules were established in
October 1 of that year. Their usefulness is further impaired by the
very substantial increase in the demand for bituminous coal occa-
sioned by World War
106 Wallace, op.cit., p. 488.
107Findingsof Fact, ... andOrder of the Director ..., p.11.
108 Extension of Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, Hearings on H.J. Res. 101,
Revised, U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 1st sess.,
March 1941, p. 599.
109 The impact of World War II is shown by data on the production of
bituminous coal in the United States. In 1939 total production amounted to
395 million tons, in 1940 to 461 million, and in 1941 to 514 million tons.
(Minerals Yearbook, 1942, U.s. Bureau of Mines, p. 848.)
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Chart 17 compares the estimated realization based on minimum
prices with the actual sales realization for 1940 and the first quar-
ter of 1941. A study of the 1940 actual realization (hatched bars)
CHART17
Estimated Sales Realization Based on Minimum Price Schedules and Actual
Soles Realization in Eight Producing Districts of Minimum Price
Area 1, 1940 and First Quarter of 1941
Actual realization, 1940
Estimated
Actual realization, first quarter 1941 realization
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Source: Table 13 and data supplied by the Bituminous Coal Division.
withthe estimated realization (vertical broken lines) discloses that
in all districts except Michigan (No. 5)the1940 sales realization
figures were below their respective estimated realizations based on
the minimum price schedules. For Minimum Price Area 1 the dif-
ference amounted to $.17 a ton. In District 5actualrealization was
$06 a ton above estimated realization. Of the remaining seven
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districts, estimated sales realization exceeded actual realization by
$.05 in District 2, by $.08 in District 1, by $.18 in District 7, be-
tween $.20 and $.25 in Districts 3 and 8, and by $.32 in Districts
4 and 6.
During the first quarter of 1941 the spread between the actual
and estimated sales realizations was greatly reduced as compared
with the 1940 pattern and the impact upon the several districts
was more diverse than that in 1940. For Minimum Price Area 1
as a whole the actual and estimated sales realizations were the
same. This was also true of District 3. The estimated realizations
of three districts, 8, 4, and 6, were as much as $.03, $.07, and $.11
higher respectively while those of four districts, 2, 1, 7, and 5,
were below the actual realizations by a range of $.02-.20.
These comparisons of sales realization data would suggest that
the minimum price schedules did materially affect the pattern of
prices that prevailed prior to October 1, 1940. The behavior of
prices and therefore actual sales realization, however, was un-
doubtedly influenced by the impact of World War II on the de-
mand for bituminous coal. The importance of this factor in the
changing pattern of sales realization cannot be measured.
i. Problems growing out of price determination. The attempt to
establish price schedules gave rise to four additional problems, two
of which had not been anticipated by the framers ofAct. In
this group fall distressed coal, distributors' discounts, averaging
of strip and deep mine costs, and price fixing for coal shipped and
sold on company-owned facilities.
1) Distress coal. When coal is screened into a variety of sizes,
such as stove, nut, egg, etc., a resultant, known as slack or screen-
ings, remains. Unfortunately, the demand for the larger sizes used
by domestic consumers and that for slack coal used by industrial
buyers do not always occur at the same time and are subject to
wide variations. As a result, when large sizes are in strong demand
the operators may have a surplus of slack coal, and when slack
coal is temporarily in strong demand, the supply of domestic sizes
may be excessive. Under a competitive price structure, the opera-
tors try to move their surpluses by cutting prices. This practice,
which had long been a disrupting factor in the industry, could no
longer be permitted under minimum price schedules.
Some relief was afforded by the substitution rule which, under
certain circumstances, allowed operators to fill contracts for coal
at a given price with coal that would ordinarily have to be sold at
a higher price in conformity with the published schedules. 'Where
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this kind of substitution was possible, there was no need for the
operators to get permission to sell the coal at a higher price. Sub-
stitution, however, did not always provide an answer to the problem
of distress coal especially when small sizes were to be substituted
for large. Householders did not ordinarily have the burning equip-
ment to permit them to use small sizes in place of the larger ones.
In addition, operators were able to deal with a surplus of large sizes
by crushing them into cheaper smaller sizes, but this practice re-
quired expensive equipment which gave the larger companies a
competitive advantage.
Section 4-lId of the Act permitted the Coal Division to make
specific modifications of minimum prices where adjustments were
necessary. Such modifications, however, could only be granted after
notice and hearings and the filing of an examiner's report and find-
ings of fact—all of which were time-consuming. Meanwhile the un-
balanced demand for coal caused railroad sidings to be filled with
carloads of unsold coal.
VJhether the procedure established by the Act could have dealt
with this problem cannot be known. In his Annual Report for the
fiscal year ending in June 1941 the Director intimated that the prob-
lem was under control and stated that such coal was "now being
eased into the market under such conditions that its effect upon mar-
ket prices is
2) Distributors' discounts. The Act requires the Commission to
"prescribe due and reasonable maximum discounts or price allow-
ances that may be made by code members to ...'distributors,'who
purchase coal for resale and resell it in not less than cargo or railroad
carload lots"; and to "require the maintenance and observance by
110 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior,... June30, 1941,
p. 189. Roger N. Quirk in commenting upon experience with "substitution"
and crushing under the first price-fixing effort wider the Act said: "As re-
gards the former, the original price schedules forbade the substitution on
any order of a grade or size taking a higher minimum price than that to
•which the order referred. (See, for instance, Order 89). There were im-
mediate protests from the operators and within a very short time the Com-
mission had to waive this rule and permit substitution 'where reasonably nec-
essary as an emergency measure in order to continue operation of the mine'
and only after obtaining a permit from the Commission (i.e. the local statis-
tical bureau) (Order 127, Dec. 14, 1937). As regards crushing under the
original price orders, crushed coal was to be charged for at 5 cents per ton
above the minimum price of the original size, which would in effect make
the practice of crushing prohibitive. Again the Commission had to back
down and in the revised price orders this crushing rule was deleted (see
Order 126)." (Op.cit., p. 147, n;1. See also his General Appendix, pp.
60-62.)
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such persons,...ofthe prices and marketing rules and regulations
established under this section." (Sec. 4-IIh.)
Differences of opinion developed as to the meaning of this provi-
sion. For example, was the Commission justified in interpreting
the Act to mean that price discounts were to be established for whole-
salers and not retailers? What was the status of "sales agents," that
is, persons or organizations that handle all or most of the coal of a
given producer, and what action should be taken to preclude price
evasion by these agents? How should "farmers' cooperatives" be
regulated when they perform both the function of wholesaler and
that of retailer? Obviously they would hold a competitive advantage
over private distributors if allowed both the wholesaler's discount
and the retailer's margin. How should intermediaries (forwarders
and transshippers) engaged in transferring coal to tidewater and
the lake trade by rail and boat be compensated? Lastly, how should
discounts be computed—as a percentage of the mine price as re-
quested by wholesalers, in cents per ton as recommended by many
operators, or on some other basis?'11
The Coal Division undertook research to determine prevailing
wholesale discounts, sales agency commissions, selling costs and
related items; conducted hearings; and finally prescribed maximum
discounts as well as rules and regulations for distributors it be-
lieved to be subject to the Act. Experience under the Act, however,
clearly indicates that Section 4-IIh stood in need of revision.
3) Averaging of strip and deep mine costs. Messrs. Gordon and
Webb pointed out that "the averaging of deep mine costs with the
relatively low costs of strip mines" was "one of the most perplexing
price problems" that confronted the Commission."2 Because strip or
surface mining is limited to coal veins lying near the surface, its
use can be expected to vary from district to district. That this is so
is substantiated by the statistics on surface mining for the year
1940. (See Table 86.) Southern No. 1 and Southern No. 2 (Dis-
tricts 7 and 8) produced no coal by this method. In Eastern Penn-
sylvania, Western Pennsylvania, Northern West Virginia and in
Alabama, Tennessee, and Georgia, surface mining contributed less
than 2.5 per cent of the total production of bituminous coal. In
Panhandle (West Virginia) the strip mines produced 9.7 per cent,
in Western Kentucky 11.3, in Ohio 19.5, in Illinois 26.5, and in
Indiana 53.6 per cent.
Because the producing costs of strip mines are much lower than
those of deep mines, the averaging of these two sets of costs in
111 See discussion by Quirk, op.cie., pp. 139-44.
112 Op.cit., p. 305.
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districts which produce a substantial tonnage of strip coal gives
an average cost figure which is in fact representative of neither
type of mining. Table 86 shows in addition to the percentage of
coal mined by stripping, the producing costs of strip and deep
mines, and the producing costs of all commercial and captive
mines in the districts, other than District 5(Michigan),east of the
Mississippi River. It will be seen that the districts which used
TABLE 86
Per Cent of Bituminous Coal Produced by Strip Mining, and Producing Costs
of Deep and Strip Mines in Eleven Producing Districts
East of the Mississippi River, 1940
Output of Producing Costsb





(dollars per net ton)
Deep Strip All Minesc
MINIMUM PRICE AREA 1
1 Eastern Pennsylvania 1.6 2.0422 1.1133 2.0278
2 Western Pennsylvania 2.2 1.9243 1.3440 1.9115




6 Panhandle (West Virginia) 1.6 143 .9385 1.5490
7 Southern Numbered 1 0.0 1.8919 1.8919
8 Southern Numbered 2 0.0 1.7511 1.7511
MINIMUM PRICE AREA 2
9 West Kentucky 11.3 1.2911 .9841 1.2564.
10 Illinois 26.5 1.5245 1.2104 1.4411
11 Indiana 53.6 1.4484 1.1421 1.2842
MINIMUM PRICE AREA 3
2.1354 13 Southeastern 0.2 2.2069 2.2067
a "Bituminousand Lignite Coal Tables, 1939, 1940, and 1941," Bituminous Coal Divi-
sion, 1943.
b "Revised Detail of Producing, Administrative, and Selling Costs for the Calendar Year
1940," Bituminous Coal Division, 1941.
CThedata are for both captive and commercial mines.
surface mining extensively reported considerably lower average
producing costs for all mines combined than did the districts with
small proportions of surface mining. It might be argued that these
differences in costs should prevail and be passed on to consumers.
In the event, however, that a system of minimum prices is to be
introduced, particularly one embodying the criteria established in
the 1937 Act, the authors believe that substantial differences in
costs growing out of methods of production will have to be taken
into account. Failure to do so will give the owners of surface mines
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a competitive advantage that will enable them to encroach on the
markets of deep-mine operators and thereby add to the instability
of the industry.
4) Failure to provide for coal shipped and sold on corn pan y-
owned facilities. The price-fixing procedure was inadequate in that
it permitted the determination only of mine prices. Where coal
shipped by rail to a given market was sold on a delivered basis,
any violation of the established minimum price could be determined
by subtracting the published freight rate from the delivered price.
This procedure was not applicable to those companies which
shipped coal on their own barges and received it and sold it from
their own docks in New England or the lake ports. These com-
panies could evade the Act by selling on a delivered basis, and as
a result some of them were able to obtain a competitive advantage
over producers who did not have such facilities.
Since the Act failed to provide for such operations, the Coal
Division fell back on Section 4-hg which prohibited evasion or
violation of the price provision "by or through the use of docks or
other storage facilities or transportation facilities, or by or through
the use of subsidiaries ... orother...instrumentalities...." On
the basis of these prohibitions, the Coal Division issued price in-
structions to each district which required each producer selling "on
a delivered basis to add to the applicable f.o.b. mine price the actual
transportation and delivery costs incident to the delivery of the
This literal application of Section 4-JIg to the situation
has been characterized as "one of the most amazing rules ever
promulgated by a governmental body."14 The comments of the
Coal Committee of the American Bar Association with respect to
this problem are The Committee felt that the literal
application of this provision of the Act "would probably be uncon-
stitutional and certainly economically unfair" unless delivery costs
of the companies involved were identical. If these costs varied for
two firms selling in the same market and they were required to
add these different costs to the same f.o.b. mine price, the com-
pany with higher costs would be forced out of business. The Com-
mittee noted two procedures which had been suggested for meeting
this problem. Under the first of these, the Commission would set
"different f.o.b. mine prices for similar coals, depending on the
means of delivery adopted in reaching the market." The other
suggested solution would be to establish as the minimum price one
obtained by adding to the f.o.b. mine price the lowest delivery
113Michie,op.cit., p. 33. 114 Loc.cit. 115Ibid.,pp. 33-34.
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costs reported by any company owning its own shipping and dock
facilities. The Committee pointed out, however, that this practice
might force independent wholesalers out of business unless their
costs were about as low as the lowest-cost producer that owned its
own delivery facilities.
It is obvious that the Act of 1937 failed to make. adequate provi-
sion for the pricing of coals shipped on company barges and sold
from company-owned docks.
j. Enforcement of minimum prices. It will be recalled that the
Act provided for the issuance of cease-and-desist orders which were
enforceable in the courts and for the revocation of code member-
ship of willful viblators of the coal code or regulations prescribed
under it. (Secs. 5b and 6c.) A violating producer, moreover, was
subject to a 19½ per cent tax on all coal sold by him as a non-
member (Sec. 3b) and was required to pay twice the tax on coal
sold in violation of the Act as a condition of reinstatement as a code
member. (Sec. 5c.) In addition, the Coal Commission was em-
powered to withdraw approval of a marketing agency should it fail
to comply with the Commission's regulations. (Sec. 12.) Finally,
the Coal Commission was authorized to take action against distribu-
tors who violated the marketing rules and regulations or resold coal
at a price lower than the established minimum. In such instances it
could, after notice and suspend or revoke the certificate
of registration of the distributor, thus depriving him of his dis-
count when purchasing coal from producers.h18
To ascertain the extent to which producers and distributors were
complying with the prices and marketing rules, the Coal Commis-
sion instructed Code members to file copies of (1) all contracts and
spot orders beginning June 1937, and (2) invoices and credit
memoranda beginning January 1938. In addition, wholesalers were
required to file copies of their invoices.
The magnitude of the task of checking compliance was pointed
out by the Commission in its Second Annual Report to Congress:
"The number of spot orders received annually runs into the
hundreds of thousands. The number of invoices runs into the mu-.
lions....Thetotal number of these documents of sale to be re-
ceived, checked against the price schedules, and analyzed runs
between 4,000,000 and 5,000,000 a year.
"The only feasible way to handle so large a mass of detail is to
utilize modern tabulating machinery. The original invoices (or spot
orders) are abstracted and coded in the district statistical bureaus.
FederalRegister, March 28, 1939, pp. 1348-49.
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The data are then transferred to punch cards, which are mailed
to the Commission's central machine tabulating unit in Washing-
ton....
"It has...beennecessary to develop entirely new manuals for
the coding of destinations by market areas. The Commission's city
code manual now provides numerical codes for every railroad sta-
tion and every other town or village listed in the United States or
Canada, in all over 150,000 destination points."117
The largest percentage of violation cases involved the sale of
coal by producers at prices below the effective minimum. Data com-
piled by the authors from Orders published in the Federal Register,
since no official tabulation is available, indicate that the Coal Di-
vision issued 198 separate cease-and-desist orders and 139 mem-
bership revocations, some of which included cease-and-desist orders
issued simultaneously with revocation orders. Altogether 337
cease-and-desist or revocation orders were issued during the three-
year period in which minimum prices were in effect. The total num-
ber of complaints was greater because some complaints were dis-
missed and some were never acted upon prior to the expiration of
the Coal Act in August 1943.
Of the 139 producers whose membership in the Code had been
revoked, 69 were restored to membership upon the payment of fines
which amounted to $107,990.44. No information is available as
to what happened to the 70 producers who failed to pay fines total-
ing $43,775.87. Many undoubtedly went out of business; some
may have paid the 19½ per cent tax as the cost of operating.
In the case of distributors, the Coal Division was empowered to
make complaints on its own initiative. During the three years of
minimum price regulation, it took action against 57 distributors.
The violators constituted 2.9 per cent of the total number of dis-
tributors handling coal on June 30, 1941. The action taken by the
Division included three cease-and-desist orders and 54 suspensions,
revocations, or cancellations, of which 28, or 52 per cent were re-
instated. 118
It is important to note that the 394 penalties referred to above
do not indicate the extent of the enforcement problem. At the end
of 1941, 15 months after the enforcement machinery had been
installed, 1,840 violation cases had been filed with the Coal Divi-
sion. Of this number, 642, or about one-third, had been "termi-
"PPp.15 and 16.
118 For a more complete discussion of action taken against violators of
the Coal Code and of enforcement procedures, see Chapter IX.
392APPRAiSAL
nated" by the Compliance Coordinator; 562hadbeen referred to
the General Counsel's Office, 449 were being investigated, and
187 were awaiting action by district boards.119 At the end of 1940,
the percentage of the total number of compliance cases filed with
the Division which had been terminated by the Compliance Co-
ordinator was 20 and the figure at the close of 1941 was 35per
cent.12° Part of this improvement must be accounted for by the de-
creasing rate of new cases undoubtedly reflecting the higher prices
occasioned by World War II. The above data are confined to the
evasions which came to the attention of the Coal Division. The
extent of noncompliance cannot be determined.
It is the belief of the authors that the compliance machinery
established by the Coal Division, notwithstanding much overtime
work on the part of the staff responsible for its operation, was not
very effective in dealing with the known violations of producers
and distributors. The Director of the Division, D. H. Wheeler, was
more optimistic. It was his opinion that:
"A review of the numerous checks leads to the conclusion that
the pledges of compliance have been kept faithfully by the prepon-
derance of the industry and that the disastrous marketing condi-
tions and practices which the Congress desired to prevent have been
eliminated.
"The general conclusion, that for the most part, compliance
pledges were kept faithfully is not meant to indicate a condition
approaching total absence of violations. Despite the upward trend
of prices generally, great quantities of bituminous coal have com-
peted on the market at prices approximating the minimum. As
might be expected, this has been particularly true of low grade
coals. Such competition also results from the inability of the mine
operator to produce particular sizes of coal in a volume proportionate
to the market demand for those sizes without also producing resid-
ual sizes for which at times there is no corresponding demand. The
compliance staff, with the cooperation of the District Boards, has
uncovered many instances of violation as a result of these condi-
tions and the sanctions provided in the Act and the regulations have
been imposed on the
11.9 The interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1943, Hearings before
U.S. House subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., 1942, Part r, p. 829.
120 Loc.cit.
121 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior,... June30,
p. 114.
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At the Hearings on the Interior Appropriation Bill for 1943, he
stated that "the noncompliance was greater during the early period
of the act. I think that it can be said now that compliance with the
provisions of the act is generally considered very good."22
At the same Hearings, the Division pointed out, however, that:
"There is a particular need for special emphasis to be given to
violations of the Marketing Rules and Regulations, including the
unfair methods of competition established by Section 4-hi of the
act. In large measure, proper enforcement of these regulations has
had to be deferred to date because of the necessity of employing all
available personnel for the enforcement of price schedules. Even
the enforcement of price schedules has been maintained at less than
a desirable level since compliance agents who have conducted in-
vestigations must appear as witnesses in the prosecutions of those
cases, thereby being unavailable for further investigations of re-
ported violations or for independent investigations on their own
It would seem that the compliance division was definitely handi-
capped by the small staff assigned to it, by delays that resulted
from the fact that the Coal Division itself could not make formal
complaints against producers on its own initiative, and by lack of
authority to obtain all the evidence because Congress did not give
it the power to get evidence other than through the records it com-
piled, e.g. sales invoices, contracts, and spot orders.
As the reader will appreciate, the enforcement task was greatly
simplified by a strong demand for coal in the early forties which
sent average prices above the established minimum prices. As a re-
sult the temptation to violate the minimum price schedules was in
large part removed. Whether the Coal Division could have main-
tained its minimum price schedules in a highly competitive market
such as prevailed in the 1930's in the face of strong opposition
from large, powerful buyers and the general consuming public is
problematical. Unquestionably, persons whose livelihood is depend-
ent upon the production and sale of coal have a greater incentive
to cut prices, directly or indirectly, and undersell their competitors
when coal markets are shrinking. The adequacy of enforcement
machinery cannot be judged when the demand for coal is especially
strong. It was the Commission's opinion that "ample means" were
122 The interior Department Appropriation Bill for1943,Hearings before
U.S. House subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., 1942, Part i, p. 843.
123Thid.,pp. 825-26.
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"afforded by the Act to the Commission to enforce the regulatory
measures."124
k. Revision of minimum price schedules. The provisions of the
Act with respect to the revision of minimum price schedules and
their limitations were presented in an earlier section. This discus-
sion will be limited to the procedure followed by the Bituminous
Coal Division in its 1942 revision.
The revised minimum prices which became effective on Octo-
ber 1, 1942, were arrived at by means of a procedure designed
to carry out the Act's requirement that the Division establish new
minimum prices whenever the reported costs departed by more
than $.02 a ton from the cost basis of the prevailing minimum price
schedules.
In carrying out the revision, the Coal Division conducted pro-
ceedings to determine the new weighted average costs. It then
opened hearings on price revision at which -all interested parties
were afforded an opportunity to appear and present evidence. After
the Examiner had filed his report, the Acting Director heard oral
arguments, entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Opinion, and announced the new prices. The prices as announced
were affirmed, after due consideration and review, by the Secretary
of the Interior. The procedure followed by the Coal Division is
referred to as Docket No. 21.
The Act did not specifically prescribe the method to be used in
revising minimum prices. The Coal Division, in dealing with all-
rail coals, chose to express the price changes in terms of large
groups of market areas, combining into nine large groups the 193
market areas on the basis of their economic likeness and their pat-
tern of coal distribution. A general description of the area groups
and the increases in minimum prices granted to each are presented
in Table It will be noted that increases ranged from $.05-.30.
For the industry as a whole, they averaged $.15 a ton.126
The Coal Division pointed out that the increases needed to
equalize costs and average realization based on minimum prices
varied from one minimum price area to another and that the appli-
124 Second Annual Report of the National Bituminous Coal Commission,
November 15, 1938, p. 14.
125 The price increases were announced in the Order of August 28, 1942,
published in the Federal Register, September 3, 1942, pp. 6943-48, and
the description of the areas is based on that reported in Coal Age, October,
1942, p. 63. For a more complete description of these areas see Chapter IX.
126 For reasons stated in Chapter IX, District 14, Arkansas-Oklahoma,
was not included in the grouping of market areas.APPRAiSAL
cation of varying amounts to the minimum prices of different mini-
mum price areas would affect the established coordination of such
prices between competing districts.
In order to resolve this problem, the Coal Division applied what
it called the "weighted average adjustment Under this
method, coals moving into selected groups of consuming market
areas were given uniform price adjustments. The amount of the
TABLE 87
Increases in Prices for All-Rail Coals, by Market Area Group,
Effective October 1, 1942
(dollars per net ton, f.o.b. mine)
Market Area Group Increasea
AThe eastern seaboard .20
BAlabama, eastern Tennessee, eastern Mississippi, Florida,
and part of Georgia .30
CChicago, Louisville, western Tennessee, western Mississippi,
Arkansas, Louisiana, most of Missouri, most of Indiana, and
western Kentucky .10
DIowa, Illinois (except Chicago), part of Indiana, and part of
Missouri .05
EMontana, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, most of
South Dakota, and the upper Michigan peninsula .15
FNebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and most of Texas .10
GColorado, Arizona, New Mexico, and part of Texas .15
HWyoming, Utah, Idaho, Oregon, Nevada, California, and
part of South Dakota .05
IWashington, Alaska, and western Canada .25
aNotapplicable to coals from District 14. Increases to be added to mini-
mum price schedules, effective October 1, 1940.
Source: Coal Age, October 1942, p. 63.
weighted average increase was determined "by weighting the reali-
zation increases needed by the combined tonnages of the coal sold
in selected groups of consuming areas."
The combining of minimum price areas and the "weighted aver-
age adjustment method" appear not to have been necessary in re-
vising the minimum prices for railroad and vessel fuels or for coal
shipped by truck. The increases, while they varied from one mini-
mum price area to another, were uniform within a given minimum
price area. For railroad fuel they ranged from $.00-.40, for vessel
fuel from $.20-.30, and for truck shipments from $.05-.30.
In revising minimum price schedules the Bituminous Coal Divi-
sion could choose among several possibilities. It could have estab-
121AnnualReport of the Secretary of the Interior,... June30, 1943,
p. 103.
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lished new minimum prices for each minimum price area or group
of areas (1) that merely reflected the changes in costs as determined
under Docket 21, (2) that preserved the price relationships between
competing coals in common markets. that were established in the
initial coordination process, or (3) that constituted some com-
promise of these two courses of action.
The Consumers' Counsel urged that the first course of action be
taken on a minimum price area basis. He argued that the second
arrangement would fail to encourage efficiency and cost reduction,
and called attention to the need for a minimum price structure that
would permit producing fields "the same opportunity to expand
their markets that they would have had under free competition
when their relative costs of production He warned
that any attempt to preserve the price relationships established by
the initial coordination process "would freeze a distribution pat-
tern now five years old by permitting wide variations in f.o.b. mine
prices so that delivered [price] relationships would not be altered."2°
The producers' boards, on the other hand, insisted that the
destination price relationships between coals from different price
areas in common markets remain the same. Such an arrangement,
while it penalized the more efficient operations, served to protect
the competitive position of the producing fields.
The producers' position was adopted by the Coal Division. From
the administrative point of view, the second approach is preferable,
in that the existence of competition in a given market area can be
established by an appeal to statistics of coal shipments to the area
from particular fields; and this evidence carries much weight in the
hearing room and in the courtroom. To base coordination upon fair
competitive opportunities that have not yet been realized, as the
Consumers' Counsel advocated, is to invite considerable opposition
which might delay the administrative process unduly or lead to an
adverse decision by the court.13°
The use of the method adopted by the Coal Division, as pointed
out by the Consumers' Counsel, led to many increases "in the mini-
mum prices for the midwest producing field, even though no sig-
nificant net increase in production costs had occurred there. On the
128AnnualReport, United States Office of the Bituminous Coal Consumers'
Counsel, ... December81, 1942, p. 11.
129CoalAge, September 1942, p. 42.
130OnOctober 27, 1942, Associated Industries of New York petitioned the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for a review of the orders
that established the new minimum prices. The Coal Act expired before a
legal decision was reached in this case. (Coal Age, December 1942, p. 135.)
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other hand, the prices of the eastern coals were increased by a lesser
figure, in many markets, than they would have been by a straight
application of the cost
The controversy over the method to be used in revising minimum
prices was heightened by the following statement of the Director
of the Coal Division: "By applying these techniques [weighted
average adjustment method] in future general price' revision pro-
ceedings it would have been possible to have made a general revi-
sion of minimum prices generally subject almost to mathematical
determination
Somepersons objected to the use of this procedure on the
grounds that it apparently did not take existing inequities into ac-
count. They also feared that all future adjustments might be made
by the same method.
Presumably, however, a much more limited use of the method
was contemplated. The Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes,
on approving the new minimum prices, acknowledged that the Con-
sumers' Counsel had raised "grave questions of policy." In setting
forth the reasons for approving the method used in Docket 21, he
said:
"Approval of its use in this proceeding is not, as the Director's
opinion itself indicates, an approval of its use as a permanent
petrification of the marketing arrangements reflected in General
Docket No. 15.
"The Acting Director has had a difficult task to perform. As
far as I can see, he has performed it wisely and with due regard
to orderly procedure. There was no need for him to make it more
complicated than it already was by undertaking a general inquiry
under section 4-JIb which might have grown into the proportions
reached by Docket 15. To have done so might well have slowed
down all revision of minimum prices by months. The Acting Di-
rector has, in his opinion, issued an invitation to the parties to this
proceeding to undertake 4-lid proceedings wherever necessary. The
invitation will, I hope, be accepted shortly. If it is not, the Division
may wish itself to initiate general or particularized proceedings un-
der section 4-JIb."133
The implications of this statement appear to be (1) that the
problem created by the freezing of a pattern of coal distribution
131.AnnualReport United States Office of the Bituminous Coal Consumers'
Counsel,. .. December31, 1942, pp. 10-11.
AnnualReport of the Secretary of the Interior,... June30, 1943,
p. 104.
FederalRegister, October 3, 1942, pp. 7861-62.
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had not become very serious in the autumn of 1942, but that it
might become serious at a later time, and (2) that inequities
resulting from weighted average adjustment method in Docket 21
proceedings could be effectively dealt with through hearings pro-
vided for under Section 4-lId of the Act.
The reader will see that in this first revision of minimum prices,
the Bituminous Coal Division, seeking conscientiously to make the
Act function, decided to choose a course somewhere between two
extremes: a hasty decision on the one hand, and a protracted under-
taking that would unduly delay the setting of new minimum prices.
In this proceeding the Division used a kind of short-cut method,
but immediately set about to correct inequities in the minimum
price schedules by calling for 4-lid hearings at which all persons
who were dissatisfied with the new prices could state their objec-
tions and, where these proved justified, obtain relief.
The source of the conflict between the positions of the Consum-
ers' Counsel and the Bituminous Coal Division appears to be cen-
tered in the requirement of the Act (Sec. 4-JIb) that the coordina-
tion of minimum prices "shall preserve as nearly as may be existing
fair competitive opportunities."
The Coal Division consistently emphasized the maintenance of
existing competitive relationships. The adjustment of minimum
price schedules for each minimum price area by a method which
merely reflected changes in costs would have disrupted the mini-
mum price relationships which presumably prevailed at the time
of the initial minimum price determination. This, the Coal Divi-
sion apparently was unwilling to do.
The Consumers' Counsel, on the other hand, said that a distri-
bution pattern in effect five years earlier should not be frozen;
that the Coal Division instead should preserve fair competitive
conditions so that efficient operations would have an opportunity
to expand their markets at the expense of less efficient producers.
The issue raised by the Consumers' Counsel is a serious one not
dealt with adequately in the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937. It may
be argued that the Act was designed to operate for only four years
and that, therefore, the preservation of pre-existing patterns of
competition was not a serious matter. Legislation of this kind is
frequently extended to cover a much longer period. Perhaps the
legislators should have faced the problem boldly by providing an
adequate arrangement which would authorize the administrative
agency to establish patterns of minimum prices to take into con-
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sideration and reflect changing competitive conditions and clearly
established trends.
In appraising the work of the administering agencies as distinct
from the provisions of the Act, it is important to recognize the
tremendous difficulties confronting the agencies because of the
nature of the industry and product, the limitations of the Act, the
delaying tactics of some producers and consumers, and the limited
supply of competent personnel.
The Commission may be criticized for failure to engage in any
preliminary education of producers and consumers regarding the
nature and purpose of minimum price fixing, the fundamental re-
quirements of the Act, and some of the problems and procedures
involved in attaining its objectives. The criticism is especially ap-
plicable to the second attempt to fix prices at which time the Com-
mission was very cautious in specifying procedures for classifica-
tion and in its application of standards. The Coal Division (1)
hesitated to specify standard policies and procedures, (2) was un-
willing to make basic changes in the existing price structure, and
(3) laid considerable stress upon the maintenance of existing fair
competitive opportunities. Such action may be explained, at least in
part, by the ambiguity and conflict of the criteria and standards
established in the Act.
This experiment in minimum price fixing has shown that the
use of a base cost, plus adjustments, in price fixing has definite
limitations. Because of the difficulty of estimating the impact of
technological developments and current economic forces, other than
wages, hours, and related contract provisions, on present and future
costs, substantial differences developed in certain fields between
determined costs and actual costs as later reported. The result was
that minimum prices did not always reflect with great realism the
average cost level.
Experience under the Act has demonstrated a need for a standard
classification of accounts and a systematic and adequate spot check-
ing procedure for auditing cost reports to the companies' records.
It also has shown that the method adopted by the Commission of
using total ascertainable tonnage as the divisor in computing sell-
ing cost per ton was inadequate, since it understated the selling
costs of commercial mines. Unfortunately, the price-fixing agencies
had no alternative in view of the wording of the Act. The use of
actual selling costs as the best indication of "reasonable" selling
cost would seem to be unwise unless these costs are carefully ex-
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amined to ensure inclusion only of items properly charged to sell-
ing. Because this practice invites higher selling expenditures and
consequently higher minimum prices, the price-fixing agencies
should have developed criteria of reasonableness for the guidance
of the operator and established adequate checking procedures to
see that they were followed.
It is to be regretted that the Act did not provide clear and work-
able criteria and that the administrative agency failed to establish
standards and general procedures to guide district boards in clas-
sifying and pricing their coals. As a result there were wide di-
vergences in the procedures used, and the final classifications
exhibited little uniformity in terminology, size groups, factors
considered in appraising coals, or quality classes recommended.
The fact that a completely scientific classification was not feasible
did not justify the failure by the Commission (1) to specify and
define the factors to be considered in determining uncoordinated
minimum and (2) to require that use be made of analyses
of physical characteristics and other available standards.
The coordinating process did not make use of formulae or stand-
ards yardsticks, but was based. on judgment, negotiation, and com-
promise. This approach was probably inevitable in the light of the
many factors influencing coal prices, the rigorous competition in
the industry and the resulting conflicts of interest, and the likeli-
hood that application of any systematic procedure would have led
to prices that would disturb competitive relationships.
Our analysis of costs per ton and estimated realizations per ton
reveals that district realizations departed in varying degrees from
average "determined" costs for the minimum price area as a whole
and in some districts deviated considerably from their own de-
termined costs. It is not surprising, therefore, that an analysis of
limited available data suggests that minimum price schedules had a
rather substantial influence upon the existing pattern of prices.
Although the Coal Division was of the opinion that the Act's
provision for modifying minimum prices to handle the problem of
distress coal was adequate, there is some doubt as to whether the
procedure could have dealt effectively with the problem over an
extended period of time. Experience under the Act also disclosed a
need for clarification and amplification of the provision relative to
distributors' discounts, for taking account in cost determination of
the substantial variations in the costs of surface and deep mining,
and for the pricing of coals shipped on company barges and sold
from company-owned docks.
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The authors have definite reservations concerning the adequacy
of the enforcement powers provided by the Act. It is doubtful
whether the compliance machinery established by the Division was
very effective in dealing with violations when the market for coal
was strong. The task would have been much more difficult in a
falling market. The Coal Division would have been in a more ad-
vantageous position had Congress authorized it to make formal
complaints against producers on its own initiative and granted it
authority to obtain the necessary evidence.
Finally, because the Act failed to specify the method to be used
in revising minimum prices when cost changes occurred, the choice
of the method to be used was left to the price-fixing agency. Such
an arrangement is unsatisfactory, as it might have tempted those re-
sponsible for price revision to select a method that was administra-
tively simple and easy to justify. A better course of action would
have been for Congress to provide a procedure for revision which
would ensure price patterns that reflected changing competitive
conditions and established trends.
It would be unfair to conclude this appraisal of the policies and
procedures used in establishing, enforcing, and revising minimum
prices without emphasizing the fact that the administrators and
their staff were confronted with many exceedingly complex prob-
lems and that these problems had to be dealt with within the frame-
work of an Act which we have seen had definite limitations. The
establishment and enforcement of these price schedules under the
circumstances was a notable accomplishment and stands as a tribute
to outstanding competence, persistence, and public service.
3. MINIMUM PRICE FIXING AS A MECHANISM FOR ATTAINING
STABILIZATION, EFFICIENCY, AND EQUITIES
The long-run objective of Congress in enacting the Coal Act
was a stabilize4 industry. It wanted to minimize as far as possible
recurring overdevelopment, intensive competition, successive price
wars, and disturbed industrial relations. Assuming adequate legis-
lation and wise and competent administration, could this goal be
attained?
The Director of the Bituminous Coal Division believed not only
that it could be done but that it had been done: "The establishment
of minimum prices and marketing rules ...hasbrought...stabil-
ity to the coal industry and order to the Nation's coal markets for
the first time in nearly 20years."134Others were less optimistic.
AnnualReport of the Secretary of the Interior,... June30, 1941,
p. 177.
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What may be said of the claims of those who believed the Act to
be an effective instrument for stabilization and the counter claims
of others who viewed with scepticism the contention that this goal
can be attained through the machinery of minimum prices?
a. Conditions essential for stabilization, efficiency, and equities.
Before examining the arguments advanced for and against mini-
mum price fixing it may be helpful to examine the conditions that
should be met if the industry is to be stabilized and operated not
only efficiently but equitably with respect to the benefits to be ob-
tamed by those associated with the In the authors' opin-
ion they are:
—A relationship between the capacity to produce and the demand
for bituminous coal that will more nearly approximate full-time
operation and still afford the flexibility in output required by
the economy.
—Price schedules that will minimize the intensive competition
and excessive price cutting that have characterized this industry
for long periods of time.
—Fair labor standards, that is, compensatiOn, hours of work,
working conditions, fringe benefits, and employment opportunity
comparable to those prevailing in other basic industries.
—Cost-price relationships that will afford investors the oppor-
tunity to makeprofits commensurate with those in other indus-
tries faced with similar risks.
—Protection of consumers against (1) excessive coal prices,
(2) wasteful methods of coal mining, (3) ,uneconomic distribu-
tion and consumption of coal, and (4) frequent and prolonged
work stoppages which impair the functioning of the economy.
This statement of conditions essential to stability supplies a
framework into which to fit the arguments of the proponents and
opponents of minimum price fixing.
b. Impact of minimum price fixing on overdevelopment. We have
seen that rigorous competition and in the opinion of most students
of bituminous coal, overdevelopment have plagued this industry
throughout much of its history, particularly from 1924 until the
outbreak of World War JJ135 It is recognized, of course, that some
excess capacity is necessary in an extractive and highly seasonal
industry such as bituminous coal, but it would be difficult to jus-
See discussion of overdevelopment in Chapter I. See also statements of
government officials quoted in this chapter, section B2.
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tify an overdevelopment which allowed coal mines to operate, on
an average, only 188 days a year in the decade of the twenties,
175 days in the thirties, and 229 days in the forties.136 A full-time
working year (50five-dayweeks) would equal 250 days. This
standard the industry could not approximate even in the decade
of the forties, except in the years 1943 to 1945 inclusive when
the nation's industries were straining to meet the requirements of
World War II. The highest figure for any one of these years was
278, with the average for the three years 268 or 18 days above a
full-time working year of 50five-dayweeks.
The following analysis will concentrate on the basic, persistent
factors and conditions affecting (1) the capacity to produce and
(2) the demand for bituminous coal.
1) Analysis of factors affecting mine capacity. The factors and.
conditions affecting mine capacity are:
(a) The abundance of coal deposits and the relative ease with
which mines may be opened or reopened.
(b) The urge to open or expand coal mines in the face of re-
curring taxes, interest on money invested in coal lands, and
high prices.
(c) The difficulty of ridding the industry of submarginal mines
because of the practice of reopening such mines under new
• management at greatly reduced capital values as the result
of bankruptcy proceedings.
(d) The diffusion of ownership and wide geographic distribu-
tion of producing units which preclude voluntary action
by operators to control capacity.
(e) The specialized nature of the fixed capital invested in bi-
tuminous coal mining which deprives operators of the pos-
sibility of using it for other purposes or selling it in hard
times for any reasonable price, and leaves only the pos-
sibility of operating the mine to produce an income which
may amount to little more than out-of-pocket costs.
(f)The long period of time (three years or more) required
to open up a new mine, which frequently brings new
capacity into operation after the demand that led to its
inception has disappeared.
(g) Low ton-mile freight rates for long hauls, which encourage
the owners of coal lands in outlying areas to open up and
to compete in the markets of older fields.
BituminousCoal and Lignite in 1949, Mineral Market Report, No.
1923, U.S. Bureau of Mines, pp. 20-21.
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(h) New technological developments and improved mine man-
agement.
(i)Periodic prolonged labor disturbances, which cut off the
supply of coal, conceal excess capacity, and prevent needed
adjustments.
What impact will minimum price fixing have upon these nine
factors and conditions that influence capacity? It is apparent, of
course, that minimum price fixing means higher prices of coal
than would otherwise prevail in normal or depressed years. There
would be no purpose to such price fixing unless it did so. The
question, therefore, to be examined is what bearing if any would
prices of coal have upon these nine factors?
Obviously a higher price can have no substantial effect upon
(a) the abundance of coal deposits or the ease with which they
may be developed since these deposits are plentiful and well known,
(c) the difficulty of ridding the industry of submarginal mines
which reopen at lower capital values as the result of bankruptcy
proceedings, (e) the specialized nature of fixed capital in bitumi-
nous coal mining which has no other utility and requires operation,
often at less than total cost, to recover investment, (f) the long
period of time required by technical considerations to bring a new
mine into full operation, and (g) lower ton-mile freight rates for
long hauls. What about the four remaining factors? Will minimum
price fixing serve to lessen their impact upon capacity and keep
it in better balance with effective demand?
a) Effect of higher prices on retention of high-cost mines anI
development of new mines. The urge to open up new mines or to
expand existing mining properties is always present. Many people
who hold. coal lands want income from such land, and recurring
taxes and interest on money tied up in them serve as an additional
incentive to utilize them. The rate at which such properties are
opened and closed depends upon the price of coal. During the years
1923 to 1932, when the average value of a ton of coal dropped
from $2.68 to $1.31, the number of mines producing 1,000 or
more tons of coal a year fell by 3,904 (from 9,331 to 5,427), and
in the period 1938 to 1948 when the average value rose from $1.95
to $4.99, the number of mines increased by 3,302 (from 5,777
to 9,079).187
Loc.cit. The number of underground mines grew from 5,283 in 1939
to 7,108 in 1948. Strip mines, although fewer, increased at a faster rate,
from 537 at the beginning of the period to 1,971 at the end.
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Critics of the Act warned the public that minimum price regula-
tion would protect existing high-cost mines and bring in new
mines, many of which would be marginal; as a consequence excess
capacity would be increased and running time reduced. The Act's
proponents, however, contended that this need not be so in the long
run, and argued that because minimum prices were related to aver-
age costs and because producers would be obliged to cut their costs
through mechanization and better mine management in order to
continue to hold their share of the market and to make a profit,
minimum prices would be revised downward and marginal mines
will gradually be forced out of the industry.138 This reasoning over-
looked two important factors. First, it disregarded the strong pres-
sures at work to raise prices, namely, that of the operators to mini-
mize their losses and maximize profits, as well as the insistent de-
mand of a powerful union for higher wages, shorter hours, and
greater fringe benefits—demands which are easier to obtain when
operators know that they can pass their cost on in higher prices.
Secondly, it failed to recognize the impact that a decline in coal
consumption, growing out of (1) more efficient coal utilization
and (2) the inroads of competing fuels of higher prices,
would have on costs. As running time and output decline, costs
and therefore prices rise.
Critics warned the public that the Act exempted from its regula-
tory provisions mines whose output was almost entirely consumed
by the owner and that this exemption would encourage large con-
sumers to open up captive mines, thereby adding to the pre-
vailing overdevelopment. In commenting upon the request of the
Ohio District Board for a revision of recommended prices be-
cause of the need to discourage the opening of captive mines in
Ohio, the Director of the Bituminous Coal Division pointed out
that "the evidence that captive mining will inevitably follow the
establishment of the recommended level of prices . .isspeculative
and not Actually, the effect of an increase in the
number of captive mines upon capacity would depend upon whether
these mines were new mines or purchased from other producers.
If the former, they would add to excess capacity. If the latter,
the transaction might take out of competition more unused capac-
ity than the average prevailing in the industry, depending upon
138Seethe discussion of the argument as set forth by Frank G. Smith:
"The Attempted Stabilization of the Bituminous Coal Industry," Harvard
Business Review, 1939, pp. 177-88, and Ralph Hillis Baker, The National
Bituminous Coal Commission (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941), p. 296.
189Findingsof Fact, ... andOrder of the Director, ... p.A-120.
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whether the captive mine had a very steady demand for coal and
could be operated at full capacity or whether the mine was subject
to substantial fluctuations growing out of changes in business con-
ditions.14° In the judgment of Donald H. Wallace, "increasing pur-
chase or leasing of coal mines by large consumers such as electric
companies, in order to avoid the higher prices, will
probably exercise little, if any, influence on weighted average cost
as long as the regulatory agency continues to interpret the act to
call for computation of the average cost of all coal produced by
both commercial and 'captive mines.' "i'
Itis impossible to determine what the impact of the 1937 Act
was upon the acquisition of captive mines. Even if data were avail-
able, they would have limited value. The period in which minimum
price schedules were in effect was very short. Moreover, prices
higher than the minimum prevailed throughout much of this pe-
riod. Finally, there was no assurance that the Act would be ex-
tended.
It is the authors' opinion that minimum prices would not reduce
but would add to excess capacity by keeping high-cost mines in
operation and by bringing new coal lands into production at a rate.
faster than that which would otherwise prevail.
b) Effect of higher prices on decentralization of ownership. It
was sometimes asserted that "with regulated prices, the big com-
panies in the industry will have a tremendous advantage over the
small companies and will gradually absorb all of the potential
business and force the small companies to close Among
the claimed advantages of the large companies are a variety of con-
nections with big consumers, reciprocal purchasing agreements,
larger expenditures on advertising, intensive selling effort, and the
greater feeling of security that they afford buyers because of their
size. It was maintained that smaller companies would no longer be
able to offset these advantages by cutting their prices.
This criticism assumes that small mines are in a position to
undercut the prices of their low-cost competitors. A study made in
192 9143ofthe operating performance of large and small companies
showed that, except for the largest class of companies (1,000,000
tons and over), the average output per man per day and the average
number of days worked increased while the average sales realization
140Seethediscussionof Michie, op.cit., p. 35.
141Op.cit.,p. 470.
142Michie,op.cit., p. 35.
143MineralResources of the United States, 1929, U.S. Bureau of Mines,
Part ii, p. 720.
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decreased with the size of the company. For example, companies
producing from 500,000 to 1,000,000 tons a year reported an
average output per man-day of 5.3 tons and an average working
time of 230 days while the reported average output per man-day
of mines producing 10,000 to 50,000 was only 3.4 tons and the
average days worked 163. Moreover, the average sales realization
of this group of larger companies was $1.66 and that of the smaller
companies $1.92. How can small companies with less efficient
management, far less mechanization, and higher idle-day costs
undercut the prices of the larger low-cost companies? Moreover,
would it be possible for small companies to exist if they did not,
as in 1929, have a higher average sales realization? Is it not more
likely that the closing of 3,904 mines during the years 1923 to
1932 was the result of the price cutting on the part of companies
in, a relatively favorable competitive position? If this reasoning is
correct, then minimum price regulation does set a price floor which
protects existing high-cost mines and encourages the opening up
of others.
Finally, there can be little danger of monopoly for many years
in an industry (1) in which in 1951 the largest commercial cor-
porate organization did not account for "5 per cent of the total
output," (2) in which there were "only 13 groups of companies
under single managements that 'produced' as much as 1 per cent
each," and (3) in which 8,000 mines were operated by upwards
of 5,000
c) Effect of price fixing on mechanization and management.'
Messrs. Gordon and Webb wrote: "It is our belief that the incentive
to reduce producing costs will be stronger under the minimum price
regulation of this act than under free competition. The incentive
under free competition was to minimize losses as far as possible
while meeting destructive price competition; there was little chance
for profit. Under price regulation, the incentive will be to increase
the margin of individual mine realization above individual mine
cost. It would seem that once this margin is established, it should
last longer than it would under open competition. Under the act of
1937 the minimum prices are to be reduced only after a showing of
a reduction of weighted average cost in a price area. Under open
1951Bituminous Coal Annual, Bituminous Coal Institute, p. 13. Ac-
cording to Mineral Resources of the United States, 1929, as cited (p. 718)
the first 17 largest companies produced about 20 per cent of the country's
commercial tonnage; the next 70 companies produced approximately 23 per
cent; and the next 131 companies 17 per cent. Thus, about 60 per cent of
the annual output was produced by 218 companies in 1929.
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competition prices can be reduced by the action of relatively few
Proponents of the Act point out that mechanization and im-
provement in mine management are not confined to years when
operations are making a profit. It is just as important to cut costs
when prices are falling as when they are rising or stationary. The
urge to survive is a powerful incentive.
An examination of technological trends in this industry estab-
lishes the fact that mechanization takes place in both good and bad
years. The pertinent question is—what happens to the rate of
mechanization in prosperous and depressed periods. A study of
the percentage increase in mechanical loading in periods of falling
and rising prices should throw some light on this question. During
1923 to 1931 inclusive, when prices dropped on an average about
$.14 a year, the percentage of mechanically loaded coal increased
at an annual rate of 1.6 points. In the period 1939 to 1948, when
prices rose on the average $.35 a year, the percentage of mechani-
cally loaded coal increased at a rate of approximately 3.7 points. A
similar comparison between mechanization and profits and losses
shows that in the period 1928 to 1939 inclusive, when the industry
suffered losses (after federal taxes) that on the average equaled
$26.2 millions annually, the percentage of mechanically loaded
coal increased at the annual rate of 2.4 points, while in the period
1940to 1947 inclusive, when annual profits (after federal taxes)
averaged about $51.4 millions, the percentage of mechanically
loaded coal increased at an annual rate of 3.6 points.'46
The two sets of data substantiate the contention of those who
argue that established minimum prices will tend to increase mechan-
ization. To the extent that they do they will undoubtedly increase
mine capacity.
d) Effect of higher prices on labor disputes. Prolonged labor
disputes tend to conceal the disparity between consumption and
capacity and, insofar as they do, preclude adjustments which, in
all likelihood, would otherwise be made. They are, therefore, an
aggravating factor but hardly a major cause of overdevelopment.
Congress presumably expected the 1937 Act to minimize labor
Op.cit., p. 314. See also Wallace, op.cit., p. 470, and Michie, op.cit.,
p. 27.
This analysis is based on price and mechanization data published by
the U.S. Bureau of Mines in Bituminous Coal and Lignite in 1949, pp. 20-
21; and on tax data of the U.S. Bureau of Internal Revenue, Statistics of
Income, Part 2, reprinted in 1950 Bituminous Coal Annual, Bituminous Coal
Institute, p. 188.
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strife. In fact, one of the stated reasons for its refusal to extend
the Act was that it failed to prevent labor disputes in the industry.
Undoubtedly, established minimum prices would prevent one
type of strike—that which is called because of price and wage slash-
ing. Other types of strikes, however, might not be affected or
might even be encouraged by the Act. A later section will develop
the point that minimum price fixing improves the bargaining posi-
tion of the union and weakens the resistance of the operators to
union demands. We might expect, therefore, fewer labor disputes
under established minimum prices. It is interesting to note that
during the period 1923 to 1931 inclusive, when prices fell about
$14 a year, the number of days lost per man on strike averaged
52 per year, while during 1939 to 1948 inclusive, when prices
rose about $.35 a year, the days lost per man on strike averaged
only 15 per year.i4? When the war years are omitted, the average
number of days lost per man rose to 19 as compared with 52 dur-
ing the years of falling prices. The much lower rate in the period
of rising prices may be explained in part by the fact that union
recognition had been achieved throughout most of the industry by
1934, removing thereby one of the major causes of industrial dis-
putes.'48 This factor presumably did not fully account for the very
substantial differences. It should be noted, however, that while
the public may benefit from fewer or less severe work stoppages
under minimum price fixing, this benefit would be paid for in higher
coal prices as the result of higher wages passed on, at least in part,
to the consumers of coal.
2) Analysis of factors influencing demand. Our concern with
the demand for bituminous coal at this time is limited to the impact
of guaranteed minimum prices on the basic factors which determine
that demand. In this category fall:
—Shifts to other forms of energy
—More effective utilization of coal
147 This analysis is based on U.S. Bureau of Mines data, Bituminous Coal
and Lignite in 1949, pp. 20-21.
148 A study of man-days lost on account of labor disputes as a per èent of
man-days worked in this industry for the years 1899 to 1927 disclosed
that the rate of days lost in the three important states of Illinois, Indiana,
and Ohio which together with Western Pennsylvania comprised the highly
unionized Central Competitive Field was 12.7 while the comparable figure
for all other areas, many of which were unorganized, was 4.2. (Based on
data compiled by the 'U.S. Bureau of Mines and published in its annual
reports. The man-days worked were obtained by multiplying the average
number of men employed by the average number of days worked by the
mines.)
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—Alternating periods of depression and prosperity, especially
national emergencies
—The nature of the demand for coal
—Growth or decline of important coal-consuming industries
—The dumping of "distress coal"
—Pronounced seasonal variations
a) Effect of higher prices on inroads by competitive fuels. Be-
cause minimum price fixing undertakes to raise the prices of coal
above those prevailing in normal or depressed years, opponents of
the Act contended that these higher prices would cause coal copsum-
ers to turn to other fuels, notably oil and gas and to a lesser extent
to hydroelectric power. The reduced demand for coal, they main-
tained, would give rise to higher costs which would necessitate still
higher prices—a never ending spiral. Those who supported the Act
argued that the spiral would be downward because the average
reported cost formula would drive out the high-cost mines which
would lead to lower prices follswed by lower costs and then again
by lower prices and so on until some reasonable balance between
capacity and demand would have been achieved. The limitations
of this assertion have been presented in the analysis of factors af-
fecting mine capacity.
Still others believed, as pointed out by Walton H. Hamilton,
that "the demand for coal is of a secondary character; sales depend,
not upon price, but upon the general vitality of business activ-
ity."49 In explanation of his position Mr. Hamilton wrote:
"It does not follow...thatif a decrease in coal prices does not
stimulate demand, an increase in prices results in a shift to com-
petitive fuels. One must differentiate between short and longtime
results. An essential in determining the character of the fuel used
—irrespective of price—is burning equipment. Only a relatively few
plants in the country, largely the utilities, have pulverizer equip-
ment and cañ• shift instantaneously from coal to oil or gas. Com-
petition among fuels is sharp when replacements are to be made
in equipment, but th.is is of course only occasional. Then decisions
are made on the basis of guesswork about longtime trends in price.
A temporary drop in price would be irrelevant."
No one disputes the fact that bituminous coal has suffered sharp
competition from oil and gas in numerous centers of production
for many years. A casual examination of available data disclosed
that these competing fuels have encroached upon coal in years of
both excellent and depressed business activity. Our concern is—
Op.cit.,p. 597, note 2.
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what impact do price changes have upon the rate at which con-
sumers shift to the use of competing fuel?
An analysis of data on the consumption of bituminous coal and
of competing petroleum products and natural gas over a period of
years throws some light on this problem. The data studied exclude
gasoline, diesel oils used in trucks, tractors, etc., oil applied to road
maintenance and lubricants, as well as natural gas consumed in
the manufacture of carbon black.'5° The upper section of Table 88
shows the average annual percentage change in the proportion of
the total fuel supplied by bituminous coal, petroleum products, and
natural gas during the period 1923 to 1931 inclusive when bi-
tuminous coal prices fell on an average about $.14 a year and
TABLE 88
Average Annual Percentage Change in Relative Consumption of
Competing Fuels during Periods of Rising and Falling Prices
Periodof Period of
Fuel Falling Price.sa Rising Pricesa
A. Average Annual Percentage Change in the Proportion Each Fuel Con-
tributed to Total Consumptionb
Bituminous coal —1.3 —0.1
Petroleum products +4.8 +2.2
Natural gas +9.4 +3.5
B. Average Annual Percentage Change in the Proportion Each Fuel Con-
tributed to Total Railway Locomotive Fuelc
Bituminous coal —0.5 —1.8
Fuel oil +3.8 +1.1
C. Average Annual Percentage Change in the Proportion Each Fuel Con-
tributed to Consumption by the Cement Industryc
Bituminous coal —1.4 —0.3
Fuel oil —7.0 +3.7
Natural gas + 19.8 +0.7
aTheperiod of falling prices was 1923 to 1931 for Sections A and B and
1927 to 193]. for Section C. The period of rising prices was 1939 to 1948
for Section A and 1939 to 1946 for Sections B and C.
bBasedon data in 1951 Bituminous Coal Annual, Bituminous Coal Insti-
tute, p. 94. These in turn are based upon published data of the U.S. Bureau
of Mines and the Federal Power Commission, and should not be confused with
the U.S. Bureau of Mines figures on annual supply of energy from mineral fuel
and water power in the United States. The latter data include the omissions
listed in the text and, therefore, oil and gas not in direct competition with
bituminous coal.
CBasedon data compiled by the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the U.S. Bureau of Mines and published in Bituminous Coal—Facts and
Figures, 1948 Edition, Bituminous Coal Institute, pp. 71 and 74. Railway
locomotive data are for Class I Line-Haul.
1951Bituminous Coal Annual, as cited, p. 95.
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the period 1939 to 1948 inclusive when they rose approximately
$.35 a year. It will be observed that the percentage contributed
by bituminous coal fell less in the period of rising prices than it
did in the period of falling prices. The consumption of both oil
and gas increased more rapidly in the period when coal prices were
falling.
A study of the changes in the consumption of bituminous coal
and selected competing fuels for particular uses (see middle and
lower sections of Table 88) shows conflicting trends.'5' Certainly
it is difficult to discover any consistent relationship between price
movements and changes in the relative contribution of bituminous
coal to consumption for these industrial uses. Only one fact be-
comes clear, the percentage of the total fuel supplied by bituminous
coal in these competitive situations declined in both periods.
We must conclude that forces other than the price of bituminous
coal are more important in determining the rate at which the various
types of energy are utilized by consumers. We would expect the
prices of competing fuels to be well up on the list of such factors
and conditions. To ascertain their impact upon each other, data
have been brought together on prices and consumption of gas, fuel
oil, and bituminous coal used for heating purposes. The upper sec-
tion of Chart 18 presents for the period 1932 to 1951 inclusive the
index numbers of retail prices (on a 1935-39 base) of natural gas
for range use (10.6 Therms), fuel oil No. 2, and all sizes of bi-
tuminous coal sold at retail. The lower section gives the trends,
on the same base, for natural gas utility sales for residential use,
distillate fuel oil consumed, and retail deliveries of bituminous coal
for residential and commercial purposes.
A study of this chart discloses that the prices of bituminous coal
and fuel oil No. 2 moved together through 1948. Thereafter, coal
forged upward and oil after a slight decline rose at a slower pace.
The price of natural gas, however, except for a small rise in 1939,
moved to a decidedly lower level during the Whole period. The
consumption of coal, which was falling in the years 1934 to 1938,
151 The periods for which the comparisons were made and the average
annual price changes in bituminous coal are:
Period of Falling Prices Period of Rising Prices
Annual Annual
Average Change Average Change
Industry Tears (dollars) rears (dollars)
Locomotive fuel1923-1931 —.14 1939-1946 +.23









rose sharply through 1944 and then, as its price continued to rise,
fell almost as rapidly. Distillate fuel oil consumption rose through
1942, moved to slightly lower levels during 1943 and 1944, and
began a substantial upward climb after 1944 despite increasing
RetailPrices and Consumption of Competing Fuels Used for
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prices. The consumption of natural gas for residential use dropped
in 1933 and 1934 but surged upward thereafter with increasing
momentum as its price decreased.
Table 89 compresses the annual changes in prices and consump-
tion shown in Chart 18 into three averages representing the pre-
war, war, and postwar years. From 1935 to 1939, when the aver-
age annual percentage change in the prices of all three fuels was
insignificant, the change in consumption varied noticeably, coal
declining and gas and oil rising.
TABLE 89
Average Annual Percentage Change in Consumption and Price of




Bituminous coal retail deliveries —3.6 +7.0 —3.6
Total distillate fuel oil +16.4 +1.1 + 12.8
Natural gas, residentiala +7.2 +6.7 + 17.2
Price
Bituminous coal, all sizes, retail +1.0 +11.2
Distillate fuel oil #2, retail +1.6 + 10.6
Natural gas, retail, 10.6 therms +0.3 —1.8 —1.2
a Doesnot include the volume of natural gas consumed. in the form of
"mixed gas."
Source: Compiled from Appendix F.
During the war years the prices of bituminous coal and distillate
fuel oil rose at an average annual rate of about 4.3 per cent while
that for natural gas declined at the rate of 1.8 per cent. Distillate
fuel oil, subjected to rationing, did not show any perceptible in-
crease in consumption. Retail deliveries of bituminous èoal increased
at the rate of 7.0 per cent and consumption of natural gas 6.7
per cent.
From 1946 through 1950, the prices of oil and coal rose sharply,
at average annual rates of 10.6 and 11.2 per cent, respectively,
but that of natural gas moved to still lower levels. The rate of
annual increase in the consumption of natural gas averaged 17.2
per cent, that of distillate fuel oil 12.8, while retail deliveries of
bituminous coal declined at the rate of 3.6 per cent.
If the prices and consumption data of these competing fuels in
1950 are compared with their respective averages in the base pe-
riod, 1935 to 1939 inclusive, we find that the retail prices of bi-
tuminous coal had risen 100.2 per cent and consumption only 11.5
415/
APPRAiSAL
per cent. The prices of natural gas for residential use, on the other
hand, declined 15.4percent while consumption rose 255.2per
cent. Fuel oil No. 2 prices rose 80.7 per cent and consumption of
distillate fuel oil 101.9 per cent.
Levels of average prices and average volume of consumption are
shown in Table 90 for all three fuels for both the war years and
the postwar period. It is apparent that during the war years the
consumption of all three fuels increased considerably, fuel oil
TABLE 90
Percentage Change in Average Consumption and Average Price
from the Prewar Period, 1935-1950








from basefrom base from
Item period) period) 1940-1945)
Consumption
Bituminous coal retail deliveries+41.5 +20.1 —15.1
Total distillate fuel oil +52.7 +142.0 +58.5
Natural gas, residentiala +48.0 +167.4 +80.7
Prices
Bituminous coal, all sizes, retail+15.3 +73.7 +50.7
Distillate fuel oil #2, retail + 17.4 +64.1 +39.8
Natural gas, retail, 10.6 therms —9.7 —10.8 —1.2
a Doesnot include the volume of natural gas that is consumed in the form
of "mixed
Source: Compiled from Appendix F.
showing the greatest improvement despite the largest percentage
rise in price. In the postwar years, natural gas, with declining
prices, made the greatest inroads into the residential fuel markets.
In the face of mounting coal prices and the discontinuance of ra-
tioning of fuel oil, the consumption of bituminous coal declined
sharply but not to the level of the base period. Notwithstanding
price increases which were not far below those reported for coal,
fuel oil consumption rose very substantially.
It is very doubtful whether for residential uses bituminous coal
can compete on a price basis with fuel oil, and natural gas. This
would be especially true during a price war. Both of these com-
peting fuels have been relatively free from prolonged stoppages
which shut off supply. Both have advantages in house heating
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such as cleanliness, ease of firing and control, absence of ashes,
etc. which coal cannot meet. Moreover, the producers of fuel oil
and natural gas have greater opportunities to adjust the prices of
their products to meet competitive conditions. The proportions of
labor costs to total costs in oil and gas are very low, which gives
these employers a decided advantage over coal with its very much
higher labor costs. It was probably the recognition of these short-
comings of bituminous coal that led Secretary of Interior Ickes to
observe that the objectives of the Coal Act cannot be attained with-
out Federal regulation of oil and gas prices.152
A second factor that affects shifts in consumption is the period
of time covered by changes in the prices of competing fuels. Tem-
porary price changes in bituminous coal apparently have little im-
pact on shifts in consumer demand to other fuels. Power and heat
are items in consumption that cannot be dispensed with, and shifts
to substitute fuels take time. Equipment used to burn coal is too
costly to discard, and in many instances the expense of adapting it
to the use of other sources of energy is considerable. In addition,
because mine prices constitute roughly 60 per cent of the delivered
prices to large industrial consumers and less than 30 per cent of
the retail price, only substantial adjustments in mine prices ma-
terially modify delivered prices. Sooner or later, however, equip-
ment must be changed. Relatively higher coal prices over an ex-
tended period of time may cause a loss of business to competing
sources of fuel at a faster rate tiian might otherwise occur.
A third factor to be considered is the advantage of fuel oil and
natural gas in relation to the smoke-control ordinances of some cit-
ies. Although bituminous coal can be burned without producing
much smoke, good burning equipment and close control of com-
bustion are imperative.
b) Effect of higher prices on better utilization of coal by con-
sumers. Increasing efficiency in the use of coal has been one of the
major causes of a decline in its demand. More heat and power per
pound of coal can be obtained by paying attention to small econo-
mies and the general application of improved practices in fuel
utilization—insulation, more efficient radiation, automatic heat con-
trols, improved standards of furnace construction, and more ef-
ficient firing methods. Critics of the Coal Act asserted that con-
sumers of coal would offset higher prices by economies in the use
of coal. Is there any support for this contention?
152 Address before the National Coal Association on October 25, 1939,
The Black Diamond, November 4, 1939, p.11.
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Table 91, showing efficiency in the utilization of fuel per ton
of coal for specified uses during periods of falling and rising prices,
does not substantiate this claim. On the contrary, it would appear
that improvement in coal utilization increases in periods of falling
prices and decreases or increases at a slower rate in periods of ris-
ing prices. Of the five uses for which data are presented, in only
one, by-product coke, did efficiency in coal utilization occur at a
faster rate in the period of rising prices. It is possible that wartime
TABLE 91
Efficiency in Utilization of Fuel in Four Industries during Periods of Falling
and Rising Prices






ton-miles train (pounds (pounds hours








1924 13,402 118 b 1,379 910
1925 14,292 124 1,398 1,433 1,000
1926 14,649 126 1,394 1,470 1,052
1927 15,321 130 1,388 1,448 1,098
1928 15,787 133 1,378 1,467 1,156
1929 16,007 136 1,392 1,502 1,204
1930 16,497 139 1,380 1,504 1,250
1931 16,740 138 1,382 1,532 1,316
Average Annual
Percentage








1940 17,839 133 1,410 1,574 1,492
1941 18,085 133 1,416 1,584 1,492
1942 18,069 133 1,416. 1,536 1,538
1943 17,574 133 1,416 1,527 1,538
1944 17,469 135 1,420 1,528 1,550
1945 17,219 134 1,418 1,506 .1,538
1946 17,298 183 1,412 1,478 1,550
1947 17,505 125 b b 1,530
Average Annual
Percentage
Change —0.2 —0.9 +0.1 —0.8 +0.7
a Includeslocomotives and tenders.
b Data not available.
Source: Based on data compiled by the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Power
Commission, and the U.S. Bureau of Mines and published in Bituminous Coal—Facts and
Figures, 1948 edition, Bituminous Coal Institute, P. 76.
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conditions interfered with the continued introduction of economies
in the use of fuel, and that the period subsequent to 1939 is a poor
choice for our purposes.
The authors are inclined to believe that the price of coal is only
one factor influencing the rate of change in coal utilization. In addi-
tion to national emergencies, mention may be made of the rela-
tively small proportion that coal constitutes of the consumer's total
expenses, the highly specialized nature of coal-burning equipment
and its length of life, the availability of equipment needed for better
utilization, the development of new methods and equipment for
economizing coal which effect substantial savings in costs, and the
extent to which currently known practices and equipment have a!-
ready been introduced by consumers.
The importance of the last two factors is illustrated by the very
rapid shift on the railroads from coal-burning steam locomotives
to the diesel-electric type. In 1941 diesel locomotives hauled less
than one per cent of the freight service and 8 per cent of the pas-
senger service. In 1949 they accounted for 35 per cent of the former
and 49 per cent of the How much of this conversion was
due to higher prices is not known. It is an established fact, however,
that substantial savings in total operating costs are effected by diesel
locomotives. Under the circumstances the widespread introduction
of the diesel engine might well have occurred even at a considerably
lower level of coal prices because savings in costs would warrant
such action.
c) Impact of established minimum prices on demand when busi-
ness conditions change subs tantiàlly. It is contended that established
minimum prices will interfere with the ability of the industry to
adjust itself to changes in demand growing out of major fluctua-
tions in business and as a result will restrict still further the exist-
ing markets for bituminous
Under minimum price-fixing arrangements which relate mini-
mum prices to costs of production, there tends to be a lag between
changes in demand for coal and the revision of prices to meet such
changes. Because overhead costs fall with increased output, total
reported costs should decline in periods of active business. Un-
doubtedly, the failure to adjust minimum prices pending the de-
termination of new costs could cause consumers as a whole a sub-
stantial money loss. How much of a loss would depend upon off-
Business Bulletin, The Cleveland Trust Company, June 15, 1950, p. 4.
154Thisproblem was discussed in relation to the provisions of the 1937
Coal Act in the section on the revision of minimum price schedules (pp.
335-38 of this chapter).
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setting factors. One would expect that any substantial and sustained
increase in demand would send coal prices above the minimum.
Moreover, on the basis of past experience, much saving in costs
would in all likelihood be passed on to the workers in higher wages
and improved conditions of employment unless union policies and
practices changed drastically.
Much more important, however, is the probable impact of estab-
lished minimum prices upon the demand for coal in a prolonged
industrial depression. With a decline in coal production—the in-
dustry being highly sensitive to changes in business activity—
mines would operate fewer days per year than before, with the
result that operating costs per ton would increase unless wages
or the costs of the other items fell drastically—unlikely eventuali-
ties. Higher costs would necessitate higher prices. If this condition
prevailed for a considerable period of time and the prices of com-
peting fuels remained stationary—particularly if they were reduced
—consumers might be encouraged (1) to shift to other fuels or (2)
to resort to additional economies in the use of coal. Incidentally,
higher minimum prices and the possibility of additional increases
might well lead to the reentry of idle high-cost mines and the open-
ing up of new mines. Moreover, higher minimum prices in the face
of a declining demand would increase the temptation, for some
operators, to evade the law.
It would be possible, of course, to develop a minimum price-
fixing mechanism which would provide for flexibility in the estab-
lishment of minimum prices during periods of declining demand
and thus to minimize the upward spiral of costs and prices which
many believe will arise when minimum prices are tied to production
costs. Such a mechanism was not provided for, however, in the
Coal Act of 1937.
Donald H. Wallace pointed out that coal consumption may not
be much affected by price increases during a short depression or
during the first two or three years of a long depression. In a long
cyclical depression or in a secular depression, however, "consump-
tion may become much more responsive to current and previous
price increases, with the result that total consumer expenditure on
coal would become smaller at higher prices than it would be if
coal prices had not been raised." From the standpoint of employ-
ment of the resources of the economy as a whole, there would be
"little adverse effect" to the extent that expenditure would be
"merely shifted from coal to oil or gas." If, on the other hand,
because of a relatively inelastic demand, coal consumption were
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not to fall off as the result of price increases in an extended depres-
sion, "consumers as a whole will spend larger sums per year on coal,
and have less to spend on all other things, than if coal prices re-
mained stable or were reduced." This reduction in consumer ex-
penditures and the consequent lowering of the "level of use of
resources in the whole economy" could be avoided only if (1) the
additional funds spent on coal would not otherwise have been put
to use or (2) the coal industry spent, out of funds which would not
otherwise have been put to use, amounts equal to the extra expendi-
tures on coal. Mr. Wallace doubted that the first possibility would
apply to all industrial consumers of coal or many domestic con-
sumers, and he discounted the second possibility in the event of a
long depression.155
It may be concluded that a price-fixing mechanism which results
in price rises in the face of declining demand poses grave problems
with respect to (1) future demand conditions for the industry and
(2) economy in the use of resources in general.
d) Established minimum prices and inelastic demand for coal.
It is sometimes asserted that the maintenance of a floor for coal
prices would not have any important bearing on the demand for
bituminous coal because the demand is definitely inelastic. The
factors making for inelasticity of demand have been described in
an earlier analysis.
Undoubtedly, the demand for bituminous coal in the short run
is not likely to be substantially modified by price changes. Over a
period of years, however, equipment must be replaced. Prolonged
high prices, especially when accompanied by periodic strikes, may
well cause shifts to other fuels, encourage greater care in firing,
improvements in the design of fuel-burning equipment, and other
economies in the use of coal. These may alter appreciably the de-
mand for coal. Developments in this industry over the last 30 years
have demonstrated that the demand for coal in the long run is sur-
prisingly elastic.
e) Effect of higher prices on decline in rate of growth of impor-
tant coal-consuming industries. Some changes in the demand for
coal have been largely independent of price changes. As F. G.
Tryon pointed out, the virtual completion of the railroad net of
North America, the shift in manufacturing from crude, heavy prod-
ucts to lighter products requiring less fuel, and the great increase
in the volume of secondary metals returned by industry in the form
of scrap have definitely retarded the growth of virgin pig iron con-
155Qp.cjt., pp. 505-6.
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As the iron and steel industry has been the second
largest single consumer of bituminous coal, these changes helped
to check the growth in demand that characterized the industry
prior to 1919. The substitution of fuel oil for coal as a source of
energy on steamships has been another large loss to coal.
It is questionable whether established minimum prices would
affect materially the decline in coal consumption due to the falling
of the rate of growth of major coal-consuming industries. It is quite
possible, however, depending upon the prices of other fuels and
their suitability for the uses to which they are to be applied, that
pegged minimum prices might have an impact upon the demand
for bituminous coal in new centers of production now being created
by great regional shifts in industry and population and in new in-
clustries in which coal could be utilized as a raw material, namely,
nylon, gasoline, and rubber.
f) Effect of higher prices on seasonality. Coal production and
shipments show substantial fluctuations from month to month. For
the industry as a whole, production drops materially in April and
continues at a level considerably below the average of the year
until September. The extent of seasonal fluctuations is disclosed by
the behavior of monthly production in 1936, 1938, and 1940,
three years in which coal operations were not seriously interrupted
by labor disputes. The average January output was 13 per cent
above the average monthly production in these three years, while
the average output in April, May, and June was only about 83
per cent of the average monthly production. On the other hand,
the average production in December was 21 per cent above the
average monthly production for the three years. Seasonal fluctua-
tions vary from field to field and in some fields are rather wide.
In Arkansas and Oklahoma, for example, the January production
was 83 per cent above and April and May 77 and 76 per cent below
the average of the three years.'57
Since bituminous coal does not readily lend itself to storage, pro-
ductive capacity tends to approach the volume needed to meet the
peak demand. It is difficult to see how established minimum prices
in themselves would alter the relation between seasonality and ca-
pacity. Any material reduction in seasonal fluctuations must be ac-
complished by other measures, such as improved storage practices
156 The Trend of Coal Demand (Ohio State University Press, 1929), pp.
6 and 7, and Carter v. Carter, in Equity No. 59374. In the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia, December 10, 1935, pp. 36 and 37.
157 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior,... June20, 1942,
pp. 110-11.
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and facilities, a change in the buying habits of consumers, or the
development of new uses for bituminous coal in the off season.
Established minimum prices supplemented, where necessary, with
a realistic schedule of seasonal discounts, however, should help to
prevent the price slashing which has been so common throughout
the life of this industry.
How may we summarize this analysis of the impact of established
minimum prices upon the factors and conditions affecting both
capacity to produce and the demand for bituminous coal?
Our findings lead us to conclude that minimum price fixing
might be a factor in discouraging prolonged strikes, particularly
those growing out of price cutting, and, to the extent that it did,
it would be a force working for less overdevelopment. This tend-
ency, however, would most likely be offset many times by the ad-
verse influence of minimum prices on (1) the retention of high-
cost mines, (2) the opening up of new marginal mines, and (3)
increasedmechanization and better mine management.
As far as demand is concerned, it would appear that such a pric-
ing arrangement would not have an appreciable effect in the short
run. Certainly there is no evidence to justify the claim that higher
coal prices would materially affect the rate at which competing fuels
would encroach upon the markets for coal. The demand for coal is
quite inelastic; an increase in price does not immediately reduce the
quantity purchased. Moreover, factors other than prices seem to be
far more important in bringing about better utilization of coal by
consumers.
Over an extended period of time, especially during prolonged de-
pressions, higher prices resulting from the upward spiral of coal
costs and prices might well encourage the consumers of coal to
shift to other fuels or to speed up economy in its use.. These con-
sumer practices, it would seem, could alter appreciably the demand
for coal.
We see then that minimum price fixing would not materially
affect short-run demand but would tend to increase short-run sup-
ply. This being so, the establishment of minimum prices would, in
a relatively short time, begin to modify substantially any pre-exist-
ing state of equilibrium. Over the long pull, for the reasons stated
above, that equilibrium, unless countervailing factors were at work,
would undoubtedly be drastically altered.
C. Impact of minimum price fixing on level of coal prices. One of
the benefits claimed for established minimum prices is that theypre-
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vent price and wage slashing. When general business undergoes
a substantial decline, coal producers keep their mines running as
many days as possible, since producing costs of coal rise, at a
steadily increasing rate as the number of days worked by the mine
approaches zero (see Chart 14). Overhead costs remain about the
same regardless of how much coal is mined. To keep their mines in
operation, producers generally will cut coal prices and, when con-
ditions permit, the wages of the miners. These practices are en-
gaged in as long as the operators can minimize their losses and
there is any hope that they can outlast the prevailing emergency.
A floor under prices would halt the downward spiral of prices and
therefore wages in periods when the markets of coal are seriously
curtailed provided, of course, that the price schedules could be
maintained. The difficulty of enforcing prices and marketing rules
and regulations, however, should not be underestimated. Experi-
ence under the NRACoalCode disclosed the seriousness of this
problem. On the other hand, severe penalties should serve as a
positive restraint to persons seriously considering violation.
As pointed out above, although minimum price fixing might
preclude the slashing of prices and wages in the short run, this
gain could be offset by a reduction in consumer spending on other
goods necessitated by the relatively higher prices that must be paid
for coal under this arrangement. Also, there is a considerable likeli-
hood that in any prolonged cyclical or secular depression, such a
policy would adversely affect the demand for coal and the effective
utilization of human and probably of other resources unless the
expenditures for coal are merely shifted to oil or gas and no addi-
tional expenditures on equipment are required.
d. Effect of minimum price fixing on labor standards. The term
labor standards as here used includes compensation, hours of work,
working conditions, fringe benefits, and employment opportunity.
What would the impact of established minimum prices be upon
such standards? Would pegged minimum prices serve to maintain
them at a level comparable to those prevailing in other basic in-
dustries or would they undermine them?
We have seen that under unregulated competition price slashing
has been a common practice. Under such pricing conditions labor
standards are hard to maintain unless the prevailing system of col-
lective bargaining is, for practical purposes, industry-wide in scope.
Undoubtedly, the pressure to reduce hours and rates of pay, ignore
working conditions, or refuse fringe benefits that are granted to
workers in less competitive industries would be greatly diminished
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by established minimum prices. Whether this price-fixing arrange-
ment would provide equally high annual earnings or comparable
employment opportunity is another matter.
Minimum price fixing strengthens the bargaining position of the
union, because under it the cost of union demands can be more
easily passed on to the public. Competition with substitute products
and economies in the use of fuel, of course, would be restraining
factors, but their impact is not immediate and their influence is
minimized at the bargaining table by short-run considerations
which are always more pressing. Unless the terms and conditions
of employment are closely supervised by the federal government,
minimum price fixing places a heavy responsibility upon the rep-
resentatives of labor and management. If both parties assume their
responsibilities to each other and the public, relate their demands
to the realities of economic life, and share the gains of progress not
only among themselves but with consumers, minimum price fixing
might well protect and could gradually improve labor standards.
If the employers lack the courage to resist uneconomic and un-
reasonable demands of the union, then the system would operate
at the expense of the consumers and ultimately of both workers and
the employers. If labor leaders insist upon getting all the traffic
will bear and disregard the needs and rights of the employers and
the consumers, including the right to share in scientific discoveries
and technological improvements, minimum price fixing would not
function in the interest of society as a whole, and the workers would
temporarily gain at the expense of the public and probably the em-
ployers. The resulting higher costs and prices, sooner or later,
would bring compensating forces into play—greatly intensified
mechanization, product substitution, and better utilization of coal—
which would exact their toll in the form of a reduction in demand,
fewer jobs, and reduced working time.
Since the minimum price schedules influenced the actual prices
of bituminous coal for only a very brief period of time owing to
the strong demand for coal occasioned by World War II, it is im-
possible to measure directly the impact of the schedules on labor
standards. The data in Table 92, however, on wages, employment,
mechanization, and related factors may throw some light on this
problem.
The table shows changes that occurred between 1932 and 1951,
the latest year for which some of the data were available. The year
1932 was selected because it was the last year in which prices and
wages were left to the determination of the free play of market
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forces in this industry. In that year production was lower than in
any year since 1905. The once-powerful United Mine Workers had
become a mere skeleton of its former self. Its wage contracts could
not have covered much more than 20 per cent of the total soft coal
production. Price regulation appeared the following year with pas-
sage of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The coal code estab-
lished under this Act provided for minimum prices. It also guar-
anteed collective bargaining rights to the miners and served as the
impetus to an organizing drive which, in a surprisingly short time,
brought the great majority of mine workers in the industry into the
union.
As a result of the membership strength of the union and the im-
portance of labor in the industry's costs, coal prices have to a con-
siderable extent been regulated through collective bargaining in the
past 20 years.
In the years subsequent to 1932, from 60 to 65 per cent of the
per ton cost of coal and from 55 to 65 per cent of the per ton sales
realization have been determined through collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining has set a floor for wage rates, and because
labor costs constitute so large a proportion of total costs, they have
served in turn as a floor for prices. Because of the powerful bargain-
ing position of the mine workers' union, the wage-cost floor rose
from $.63 per ton in May 1933 (data for 1932 are not available)
to $1.76 in 1945, the last year for which per ton costs were com-
piled for this industry.
A comparison, then, of labor standards in 1932 with those ex-
isting after two decades of regulatory influences exerted by gov-
ernment and a strong union seems pertinent to a discussion of
probable effects of price fixing on labor.
The experience with collective bargaining since 1932 does not
provide any grounds for optimism that decisions with respect to
labor standards under minimum price fixing would be based on
economic statesmanship. Having brought the great majority of
the miners into their union, its leaders pressed union demands pre-
sumably to satisfy the current goals of the miners as well as those
of the leaders and the union as an institution. Apparently little con-
sideration was given to the cost of these demands to the consumers
or their long-run impact upon the industry or even the employees.
Table 92 seems to substantiate this observation. The data show
that the coal miners made very substantial gains in compensation,
for hourly earnings rose 325 per cent and annual earnings 431 per
cent. In 1951 the hourly earnings of miners averaged $2.21 and
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the annual earnings per full-time employee $3,841. Comparable
figures for manufacturing industries as a whole were $1.59 and
$3,611. The annual earnings of the miners surpassed those of
manufacturing employees notwithstanding the fact that coal mines
TABLE 92
Wages; Mechanization; Productivity, Costs, and Prices; and Employment
in the Bituminous Coal Industry, 1932 and 1951
Percentage
item 1932 1951 Change
Wages
Hourly earnings (dollars) .52 2.21 +325
Annual earnings (dollars) 723.00 3,841.00 +431
Mechanization
Mechanical loading, deep mines
(millions of tons) 35.8 304.3 +750
Mechanical cleaning, deep and stripa
(millions of tons) 30.3 240.0 +692
Surface mining (millions of tons) 19.6 117.6 +500
Productivity, Costs, and Prices
Output per man per day (tons) 5.2 7.0
Output per man hour (tons) .571 .866 +52
Unit labor costs (index: 1932=100) 100.0 350.6 +251
Retail pricesb (dollars) 7.71 16.87 +119
'Wholesale prices (freight included)
Prepared sizes (dollars) 3.68 9.59 +161
Mine run (dollars) 3.64 8.93 +145
Screenings (dollars) 2.90 7.54 +160
Average value per ton, f.o.b. mined (dollars) 1.31 4.92 +276
Employment
Average days worked by mine 146 203 +39
No. of wage earners (thousands) 406 400 —2
No. of wage earners (thousands) per
million tons produced 1.31 .70 —4.7
No. of man days (thousands) per
million tons produced 191.6 141.8 —26
Not separately available for 1932.
bTheaverage price paid by domestic consumers to retailers in 21 cities.
CIncludestransportation charges. These prices are the averages paid to wholesalers by
retailers and consumers purchasing directly from wholesalers.
d The average per ton received by mine operators for all coal used or sold at the mine.
Source: Hourly earnings and retail and wholesale prices are published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and annual earnings of full-time employees by the Department of Commerce.
Data on employment, mechanization, production, and output per man day were taken from
the annual reports of the U.S. Bureau of Mines. The index of unit labor costs was obtained
by dividing an index of the payrolls of wage earners by an index of production. The weekly
average payroll for 1932 was published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and that for 1951
was computed by multiplying the number of wage earners employed in coal mines by
average weekly earnings. Manhour productivity data are from 1952 Bituminous Coal An-
nual, Bituminous Coal Institute, p. 155.
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operated only 203 days, the equivalent of about 41 forty-hour
weeks. In November 1952, the miners earned $2.43 per hour and
$86.16 for a work week of 35.4 hours.
The miners have enhanced their economic status in other ways.
Union contracts have given them greater protection on the job,
improved their working conditions, and provided them with paid
vacations and greater safety. In addition, they have a pension and
health fund supported by a royalty of $.40 on every ton of coal
produced under union contracts. These are truly impressive gains.
Faced with rising labor costs—the unit labor cost increased 251
per cent—the operators made heavy investments in mechanized
mining equipment even in years when the industry as a whole after
paying income taxes showed a deficit.158 Mechanical loading in deep
mines increased more than sevenfold, mechanical cleaning in deep
and strip mines almost sevenfold, and surface mining fivefold. As
a result output per man per hour increased 52 per cent and output
per man per day 34 per cent. The industry as a whole began to
report profits in 1940, and, except during 1944 and 1945, their
volume increased steadily until 1949. In 1932, the average loss
per corporation reporting income and taxes to the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue was $27,867. In 1950, the last year for which
data are available, such corporations reported a profit after federal
taxes that averaged about $47,165 per reporting
Thus the economic position of the operators improved slowly if
somewhat irregularly until 1939; thereafter, through 1950, the in-
dustry as a whole reported profits after taxes in each year.
But the gains of the mine workers and operators were not ob-
tained without a price. Notwithstanding extraordinary technologi-
cal changes in mining and preparation techniques, the prices of
bituminous coal rose substantially. The average value per ton in-
creased 276 per cent, wholesale prices for mine-run and sized coal
from 145 to 161 per cent, and retail prices 119 per cent. The
mine workers also felt the impact of increased mechanization, more
effective utilization of coal, and the inroads of competing fuels. Em-
ployment opportunity was substantially impaired. Notwithstanding
an increase in annual production of about 72 per cent, the number
of men employed declined 1.5 per cent. Moreover, the number of
workers per million tons of coal produced declined 47 per cent
158 See Fisher, op.cit., Pp. 31-36.
159 Theprofitdata arethosepublished in Statistics of Income, Part 2, U.s.
Bureau of Internal Revenue; those for years prior to 1948 were reprinted
in the 1950 Bituminous Coal Annual, as cited, p. 188.
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and the number of man-days per millions of tons produced 26
per cent.
It should be noted that this analysis covers a period in the in-
dustry's history in which the union represented the great majority
of the wage earners engaged in mining. Through its control of the
supply of labor, the union's aggressive leadership was in a posi-
tion not only to prevent wage slashing but to exert a dominant in-
fluence on labor costs. Throughout most of this period, the pro-
ducers—presumably anxious to exploit a strong demand for bitumi-
nous coal—showed little willingness to resist steadily mounting
union demands. It would seem that a strong union in control of
the labor supply can protect its members without the assistance of
minimum price schedules.
e. Effect of minimum price fixing on profits. It would be difficult
to determine whether cost-price relationships under minimum
prices would permit investors to make profits commensurate with
those earned in other industries faced with similar risks. It is to be
expected, however, that the margin between costs and sales per ton
would be higher under minimum price fixing than under unregu-
lated prices in periods of declining business. A floor under prices
would presumably preclude successive price reductions that would
send average value per ton to unprofitable levels.
Table 93 presents for periods of falling and rising prices data
on (1) average value per ton, f.o.b. mines, (2) the percentage
that income was of sales, (3) profit or loss after Federal taxes per
corporation reporting such data to the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and (4) corporate income after taxes as per cent of corporate sales.
For the period of falling prices, 1923 to 1932 inclusive, average
value per ton declined in every year except 1926 when it increased
$.02 a ton. The average annual percentage decline was 7.5. For
the years 1923 to 1928, the figures showing the percentage rela-
tionship of income to sales moved irregularly. In 1924, the per-
centage dropped to 8.2, about 53 per cent of the 1923 level. It
moved to higher levels, but not to that of 1923, in the next two
years and then dropped to about 11 and 10 per cent in 1927 and
1928, respectively. While the percentages of income to sales fluc-
tuated, the trend was downward. The average annual percentage
decline for this six-year period was 3.1. For the years for which
data are available, losses per corporation after federal taxes in-
creased each year except in 1929. The average annual percentage
increase in losses for the years 1928 to 1932 was 52.5. Corporate
income after taxes amounted to one per cent of corporate sales in
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TABLE 93
Average Value per Ton, Ratio of Income to Sales, and Profit or Loss
per Corporation in the Bituminous Coal Industry in Periods of
Falling and Rising Prices
Ratio of Corpo-
Average Ratio of Average Profitrate income
Valuea income or Loss per to Corp o-
(dollars to Salesb Corp orationc rate Salesd
Tear per net ton) (per cent) (dollars) (per cent)
A.Periodof FallingPrices, 1923-1932
1923 2.68 15.5 e e
1924 2.20 8.2 C e
1925 2.04 11.4 —7,365 e
1926 2.06 13.4 e e
1927 1.99 10.8 e e
1928 1.86 10.2 —10,333 e
1929 1.78 e —6,408 1.0
1930 1.70 e —19,968
1931 1.54 e —23,286
1932 1.31 e —27,867 7•9f
B.Periodof RisingPrices, 1939-1948
1939 1.84 C —4,952 .6
1940 1.91 e 4,444 3.2
1941 2.19 e 13,697 4.6
1942 2.36 e 19,646 5.2
1943 2.69 e 28,905 6.1
1944 2.92 e 27,658 5.9
1945 3.06 e 23,109. 5.0
1946 3.44 e 30,830 5.3'
1947 4.16 e 91,690 9.7
1948 4.99 e 90,887g 10.3
BituminousCoal and Lignite in 1949, Mineral Market Report, No. 1923,
U.S. Bureau of Mines, p. 20.
b Data are for 33 large identical corporations. From Ralph C. Epstein,
industrial Profits in the United States (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 1934), p. 333.
cAfterfederal taxes. Computed from Statistics of income, Part 2, U.S.
Bureau of Internal Revenue; data through 1947 are reproduced in 1950
Bituminous Coal Annual, Bituminous Coal Institute, p. 188; those for 1948
were in a preliminary report of Statistics of Income. In computing these -data,
the profit or loss was divided by the total number of corporations reporting
net income or no net income, rather than by the total number of returns
(which includes inactive corporations).
d After federal taxes. Computed from National income 1951 Edition, a
supplement to Survey of Current Business, U.S. Department of Commerce,
pp. 170-11 and 190-91. For national income tax purposes, depletion charges
are not deducted in arriving at corporate income.
eDatanot available.
Loss as per cent of sales.
g Preliminary.
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1929. Thereafter, corporate losses exceeded income; these losses
were substantial in both 1931 and 1932.
What happened in a period of rising prices—such as 1939 to
1948? In these years the average annual percentage increase in
value per ton was 11.9. Losses per corporation after federal taxes
occurred only in 1939. Corporation profits increased sharply dur-
ing the first four years of the forties, declined somewhat in 1944
and 1945, and advanced substantially in 1946 and drastically in
the final two years. The average annual percentage increase during
the forties was 63.5.Corporateprofits, after taxes, as a per cent of
sales rose from .6 to 6.1 during the period 1939 to 1943. They
declined somewhat during 1944 and 1945 and thereafter began to
rise again. In 1948 these profits were 10.3 per cent of corporate
sales as compared with .6 in 1939. The average annual percentage
increase for the 10-year period was 64.9.
What impact did minimum price schedules have upon the profit
position of the industry? Unfortunately, data are not available for
individual companies. Comparisons, however, can be made for
producing districts. Such comparisons have limited value; first, be-
cause the cost and sales realization data are on an annual basis and
price schedules were established on October 1, 1940, and second,
because of the substantial increase in the demand for bituminous
coal caused by World War II which sent prices above the estab-
lished minima. The following discussion should be read in the
light of these limitations.
Table 94 shows that for Minimum Price Area 1 as a whole,
margins changed from a loss of $.09 a ton in 1939 to a loss of
TABLE 94
Profit and Loss Margins, by Producing District, Minimum Price Area 1,
1939-1941
(dollars per net ton, f.o.b. mine)
Producing District 1939 1940 1941
1Eastern Pennsylvania —.10 —.05 +.02
2Western Pennsylvania —.05 +.03 +.03
3Northern West Virginia —.14 —.02 +.07
4Ohio —.07 .00 +.10
5Michigan —.07 —.02 +.25
6Panhandle (West Virginia) +.04 +.02 .00
7Southern Numbered 1 —.12 —.05 +.06
8Southern Numbered 2 —.10 —.03 +.07
—.09 —.02 +.05 Total Minimum Price Area
Source: Derived from Tables 11 and13.
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$.02 in 1940 and a profit of $.05 in 1941. The upward tendency
thus revealed for the area is also characteristic of all the com-
ponent districts except No. 6, for which a decline was reported.
The seven districts that showed improvement after 1939 did not
improve their positions at the same rate or to the same extent.
Thus District 2 moved from a $.05 loss in 1939 to a $.03 profit in
1940 but showed no improvement the next year. District 5, on the
contrary, showed a small improvement between 1939 and 1940
and a much greater improvement the following year. The other
districts shifted their positions between 1939 and 1941, although
less spectacularly than the three discussed above. Thus District 3,
which had made the poorest showing in 1939, outranked all but
three districts in profitability in 1941. District 7 changed its rank
from the penultimate in 1939 to fifth place in 1941.
Since the changes reflect in large part the growing demand for
coal that followed the outbreak of war in Europe, it is not possible,
on the basis of this experience, to say whether the setting of mini-
mum prices in other circumstances would produce a similar pat-
tern of margins between sales realization and reported costs.
This analysis supports the contention that, unless offsetting fac-
tors are present, profits in this industry have a definite tendency
to decrease as the price of coal declines. A floor under prices, there-
fore, should tend to minimize losses. With higher and relatively
stable prices for their coal, operators would have an increased in-
centive to mechanize and improve efficiency. The better-managed
and more profitable companies would strive to increase their sales
and to improve their competitive position in the industry. Reduced
costs would give these operators differential gains since their lower
costs would not reduce district costs proportionately.
There is also a possibility that the price-fixing agency would be
liberal in its concepts of costs. By allowing excessive depreciation,
depletion, and royalties and inflated sales commissions and salaries
of executives, it would be approving costs with an appreciable hid-
den profit. Moreover, estimating the weighted average costs by
taking the costs of a given year and adjusting them for changes that
have occurred involves the making of many judgments. It would
be human for those who make those judgments to err on the side
of overstating rather than understating the average production costs
of the minimum prices area or areas.
f. Impact of minimum price fixing on consumers of coal. What
effect would established minimum prices have upon the consumers
of coall' Would the cost of this experiment be passed on to them
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in the form of (1) excessive coal prices, (2) wasteful methods of
coal mining, (3) uneconomic consumption and distribution of coal,
and (4) frequent and prolonged work stoppages? Any appraisal
of minimum price fixing must examine these aspects of the over-all
problem.
1) Coal prices to consumers. It is generally acknowledged that
any minimum price-fixing arrangement would increase prices be-
yond those that would otherwise prevail except in periods of marked
business activity. A difference of opinion exists, however, as to the
extent of the increase and the burden it would place upon the con-
sumer.
How much did the introductjon of minimum price schedules in
1940 add to prevailing prices? The answer to this question does
not throw much light on our problem because the minimum prices
were put into effect at a time when the demand for coal was strong
enough to send coal prices on many markets above the established
minima. Obviously the amount that minimum price schedules would
add to prevailing prices would depend upon prevailing market
conditions and the relationship of prices to costs at the time. This
observation is borne out by the data in Table 95, which shows for
1938 to 1940 inclusive the increases that would have been neces-
sary to equalize average sales realization per ton and actual average
costs per ton in the various minimum price areas.16°
TABLE 95
Increases Necessary to Have Raised Average Realizations to Reported
Costs as Defined in Bituminous Coal Act of 1937,
by Minimum Price Area, 1938-1940
(dollars per net ton, f.o.b. mine)



















Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio, Virginia, West
Virginia, and eastern Kentucky
Western Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa
Alabama, Tennessee, and Georgia
Arkansas and Oklahoma
Kansas, Texas, and Missouri
Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and California
Wyoming and Utah
Montana
Washington, Oregon, and Alaska
Source: Derived from Tables 11 and 13.
100Thetable has been prepared from the actual cost and realization data
published by the Bituminous Coal Division. In those years and areas in
which realization was below the recorded cost the difference has been shown
as the amount by which prices would have been raised. 'Where realization
exceeded cost no increase in prices would have occurred as a result of
minimum price fixing.
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It will be observed that if minimum prices had been established
in 1938 on the basis of actual per ton realization and costs per ton
at the mine for that year, increases which ranged from $.O1-.27
would have been made in four of the minimum price areas. In Mini-
mum Price Area 4, the increase of $.27 a ton would have raised the
average realization per ton from $3.14 to $3.41 f.o.b. mine or
8.6 per cent, and in Minimum Price Area 1 the addition of $.17
a ton would have increased the per ton realization from $1.96 to
$2.13 or 8.7 per cent. In 1939 increases would have been necessary
in only three minimum price areas and would have ranged from
$.06-.09. In 1940, the year that minimum prices were actually
established, increases would have been required in only two mini-
mum price areas, and they would not have exceeded $.04 a ton.
In the last two years of this three-year period, the markets for
coal improved materially and the deficit margins between sales
realization per ton and average costs per ton declined or disap-
peared. By 1940 per ton sales realization exceeded average cost per
ton by something over $.005 per ton for the industry as a whole.
The increases required to equalize costs and sales realization in the.
bottom of a major depression, such as in the early thirties, would
undoubtedly have been far greater.
But this analysis does not give a true picture of what happens
under actual conditions. The price-fixing agency cannot have the
actual cost and realization data at its disposal. It must estimate the
average costsproduction. Under the 1937 Act those computing
determined costs were required to take the 1936 costs and adjust
them for changes that had taken place in subsequent years. What
these changes were and how much they added in dollars per ton
involved the making of many judgments. As a result, the determined
costs for a given year tended to differ substantially from the actual
costs. For example, the estimated determined cost announced by
the Coal Division in the summer of 1938 for Minimum Price Area
4 was $3.6166 per net ton, while the actual weighted costs were
later found to be $3.41. Comparable figures for 1939 were $3.608
and $3.33 respectively. If minimum prices had been established on
these cost estimates the increase in prices to consumers of coal
produced in Arkansas and. Oklahoma would have amounted to 15
per cent in 1938 and 10 per cent in 1939. Although subsequent
corrections would undoubtedly have been made by the Coal Divi-
sion, the consumers would not have received refunds in the amount
of the error. It should be pointed out that the "determined costs"
were closer to the actual average costs in most of the ten minimum
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price areas and that these increases in dollars per ton were expressed
as percentages of the f.o.b. mine price and not of the much higher
retail price.
It is apparent that the initial increase in the cost of coal to the
consumers as the result of the Coal Act of 1937 would not have in-
creased actual average realization per ton at the mine by more than
10 per cent, and these increases would have constituted a much
lower percentage of the wholesale and retail prices of coal.
It may be useful to point out that in the history of this industry
under unregulated competition consumers have benefited at the ex-
pense of both the miners and operators during periods in which
competition was unduly severe and that they were required to foot
the bill in years when the demand for coal exceeded the supply, or
when labor unions were in a very favorable bargaining position. If
we take the period 1922 to 1932 inclusive, years characterized by
sharp competition especially between union and non-union opera-
tions, we find that the consumers of coal were the beneficiaries.
Average value per ton at the mine dropped almost steadily from
$3.02 in 1922 to $1.31 in 1932. During these years average hourly
earnings of coal miners fell from a high of $.845 in 1923 to $.52
in 1932. The operators' profit position was also greatly impaired.
In fact, the industry as a whole reported deficits in 1925, 1928,
and subsequent years. Data for 1924, 1926, and 1927 are not
available. The 1922 margin of $.36 per ton presumably was re-
placed in 1925 by a deficit margin. The data for 1928 and later
years show that, except for 1929, this deficit increased in size each
year until 1932.
In the period 1933 to 1945 inclusive, the consumers were given
little consideration. The forces of recovery, unionization of most of
the coal fields, and later World War II changed the entire picture.
Average value per ton at the mine rose from $1.34 to $3.06 and
average retail prices in 21 cities (unweighted average) from $7.65
to $10.49. The economic position of the operators showed some
improvement in the earlier years, but the industry as a whole con-
tinued to report deficits to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and on
their cost forms to other government agencies until 1940. During
World War II, the industry moved out of the red and reported.
substantial profits. Compared with 1922 and World War I, how-
ever, the industry was in a decidedly less profitable position. As
shown in an earlier section, the mine workers made a remarkable
advance in their standard of living during these years. This ad-
vance was especially notable during the war years because of full
employment.
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The effect of minimum price fixing on the consumers' coal bill
cannot be measured by the initial increase in prices alone. What
happens in subsequent years, particularly in years of severe de-
pression when the cost-price spiral referred to earlier becomes opera-
tive, has an important bearing on this issue. The presence of a
powerful union whose membership is practically industry wide
in scope and whose bargaining power would be enhanced by mini-
mum price fixing cannot be ignored. Consideration must also be
given to the fact that the will to resist union demands on the part
of the operators is weakened under such an arrangement, since in-
creased costs can more easily be passed onthe public. The im-
pact of these factors on consumer prices cannot be measured.
2) Wasteful methods of mining. The practice of mining the
better and more accessible coals and of leaving poor-quality and
high-cost coals for second and third mining when conditions make
such mining profitable has long been a problem in this industry.
The United States Coal Commission of 1922 estimated that in
1921 avoidable wastes were almost 20 per cent of the potentially
marketable bituminous coal underground.16' The report of. the
Energy Resources Committee to the National Resources Committee
stated that "progress since that time, because of depressed condi-
tions in the industry, appears to be slight, if not actually nega-
In 1938, the office of the Consumers' Counsel stated in its
annual report that "price competition has resulted according to
estimates in the waste of one ton of coal for every two tons of coal
produced."63
Although the Coal Act of 1937 directed the Coal Commission to
study the problem, it did not set up any price with re-
spect to conservation. Better mining methods under the Act would
have had to come by indirection. It is sometimes argued that mini-
mum prices insofar as they would raise the rate of return to capital
would encourage operators to use better mining methods. Donald
H. Wallace stated "in general, it is true that the lower the prices
the more coal is left in the mines, because prices fail to cover the
out-of-pocket costs of getting it out." He added that "it is highly
doubtful that price fixing alone can aid much in conservation of
coal" and points out that "prices high enough to increase the amount
of extraction from most mines would be above the level of prices
appropriate to maximum economic consumption ...andmuch
above prices that would eliminate unemployment among coal mm-
161 Report of the United States Coal Commission, 1925,Partp.188.
182Energy Resources and National Policy, 1939,p.10.
Op.cit., p. 8.
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Eleanor Poland took the position that there is "no reason
to believe that a rise in coal prices will have any effect on the ad-
vantages of mining the best veins first. The choice of veins to be
mined is a matter of the alternative prospects of gain in the use of
capital within the coal industry, and this is not affected by the ab-
solute level of coal Eugene V. Rostow also rejected the
assumption that higher prices and presumably profits will encour-
age better mining methods. "Higher profits," he maintained, "mean
higher managerial salaries and, perhaps, higher dividends; they
make no obvious contribution to the conservation
Miss Poland argued that "in any case, the conservation argument
for special regulation of bituminous coal at this time appears to be
of dubious merit...theknown reserves have an estimated life of
a minimum of hundreds of years, even if the upward trend of con-
sumption is resumed. In these circumstances, there appears little
justification for requiring methods of recovery more expensive than
those which are dictated by the self-interest of owners.'°7 The case
for restricting the output of coal appears all the weaker when it is
realized that this is likely to increase the consumption of other fuels
(particularly oil), the known supplies of which are far more urn-
It would seem that if better mining practices are deemed ad-
visable in order to conserve a nonrenewable natural resource, a
more direct approach would yield better results. Mr. Rostow sug-
gested that the Federal Government "prescribe and enforce ap-
propriate mining regulations." Others have suggested subsidies or
allocation of mine output.
3) Uneconomic consumption and distribution. 1)SThat impact
did established minimum prices have upon the consumption and
distribution of bituminous coal? Were higher prices for coal offset
by more economic consumption and distribution?
The factors and problems involved in maximizing economic con-
Op.cit.,p. 510. Op.cit.,p. 985.
1613Op.cit.,p. 588.
Theauthors would like to point out that the Mineral Policy Planning
Committee reported in 1934 (1) that the famous smokeless beds in south-
em West Virginia would probably not last longer than 85 years at the 1929
rate of production, (2) that the highest grade gas and metallurgical coals
in Kentucky were 11 per cent exhausted, and those in West Virginia and
Virginia about 22 per cent exhausted and (3) that the life of the Pittsburgh
bed in Pennsylvania would not exceed 100 years. These coals, the Corn.
mittee reminded us, "are the foundation of the American steel industry and
their depletion will handicap not only steel itself but all industries depending




sumption and the possibility of attaining it under the Coal Act
have been discussed earlier in this appraisal and need no elabora-
tion. Neither the Act nor its administration would warrant optimism
that more economic consumption would result from minimum price
fixing. The distribution of coal was not a major concern of the
framers of the Act. There was nothing in the Act that dealt directly
with the reduction of crosshauls or other wasteful practices in
distribution. The Act did enumerate 13 unfair methods of com-
petition which it declared constituted violations of the Coal Code,
and some of these methods affected distribution indirectly. It also
exempted from the antitrust laws marketing or centralized selling
agencies similar to the Appalachian Coals Corporation which was
organized in the Southern high-volatile field prior to NIRA, pro-
vided that they were certified by the Commission. Such agencies
place the responsibility of controlling minimum prices upon the
operators. These marketing arrangements are easier to administer
and enforce and since they would probably lead to less rigidity of
price relationships than a system of minimum price control, they
might make for more economic distribution and consumption.
There seems to be little support for the contention that estab-
lished minimum prices as required under the Act of 1937 would
maximize the consumption or distribution of coal. Relating mini-
mum prices to average production costs would undoubtedly lead to
higher prices when the consumption of coal declined. Over a period
of years, higher prices would probably provoke a further drop in
coal consumption and this decline would increase costs and lead to
still higher prices. Presumably there would be no limit to this
"bootstrapping process." In the meantime, an increasing number of
coal consumers would turn to oil and gas and raise the rate of
consumption of these fuels. From the standpoint of over-all fuel con-
sumption, the enhanced depletion of these more limited sources
of energy would not be in the interest of the nation.
Moreover, because the price-fixing agencies, in the absence of
more specific instructions, deemed it advisable to make the preserva-
tion of existing competitive opportunities their primary criterion,
emphasis upon the maintenance of existing relationships between
prices for various kinds, qualities, and sizes of coal was logical.
Such a policy, however, tends to eliminate price competition be-
tween producers and may encourage operators who desire to im-
prove their market position to divert available funds to advertising
and increased sales efforts. These practices would not make for
economic distribution or consumption.
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Lastly, the "status quo" with respect to competitive opportunities
or price relationships is not a satisfactory basis for industrial poi-
icy. It ignores the constantly changing forces at work in the in-
dustry and the nation. To obtain economic distribution and con-
sumption the price structure must reflect new and cheaper methods
of mining and transportation, improved, types of mining and burn-
ing equipment, alterations in the wage structure, important regional
shifts in production and population, new industries and new uses
for coal, and basic changes in the competitive fuel situation.
Even if the Act had provided for definite standards for establish-
ing minimum price schedules in terms of relative mine efficiency
and economic consumption and distribution, there are grave doubts
as to whether the Commission could have applied them. The no-
tion of preserving fair competitive opportunities is deeply rooted
in American business thinking and any agency that disregarded
this concept would meet such resistance that the task of enforce-
ment in this multi-unit and widely decentralized industry would be
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.
4) Frequent and prolonged strikes. The impact of higher prices
upon labor disputes and the bearing of these disputes upon mine
capacity were discussed earlier in this appraisal of the Act. We are
now concerned with the effect of minimum price fixing on the con-
sumer and are examining the bearing of such prices upon the in-
cidence of work Do minimum price schedules encour-
age or discourage frequent and prolonged labor disputes?
Our earlier analysis disclosed that work stoppages in this in-
dustry were much less pronounced during the years 1939 to 1948
inclusive, when prices rose sharply, than they were in the period
1923 to 1931 inclusive, when prices fell substantially. A lower in-
cidence of strikes was true of the period of rising prices even
when the war years are omitted. Obviously pegged prices in periods
of falling demand would eliminate strikes that would otherwise be
called to halt wage slashing. Because the bargaining position of
the mine workers is improved and that of the operators is weak-
ened under minimum price schedules, the consumers would likely
be less subject to labor disputes.
To summarize, in appraising minimum price fixing as a mechan-
ism for attaining stabilization—the long-run objective of Congress—
we must consider its impact on (1) the overdevelopment that has
characterized this industry for many years and the consequent mal-
adjustment between productive capacity and demand for coal, (2)
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the equally characteristic practice of drastic price cutting, (3)la-
bor standards, (4) profits, and (5)theinterests of consumers.
It is the opinion of the authors that minimum price fixing would,
in general, tend to:
—widen the gap between capacity and demand;
—protect consumers (1) by reducing the number of prolonged
labor disputes, particularly those resulting from threatened wage
cuts and (2) by providing them with a better grade of coal,
but these advantages would be offset by higher prices especially
in periods of prolonged depressions;
—diminish the practice of price cutting and maintain higher
wages, shorter hours and, in some instances, better working
conditions than would prevail under competitive pricing, but in
doing so it would aggravate forces and conditions inherent in
the industry that would, in the long run, lead to instability;
—improve the profit position 'of investors in the industry.
The conclusion with respect to the maladjustment of capacity to
demand is based on the probable effects of price regulation on both
the capacity to produce and the demand for coal. It seems unlikely
that higher prices existing under minimum price fixing would have
very substantial effects on demand in the short run. Available data
show no tendency for the demand for coal to respond appreciably
to changes in its price, and the classic result of substitution among
competing fuels is not clear-cut even from a consideration of rela-
tive movements of their prices. It would appear that, even with low
prices, bituminous coal could not compete with other fuels which
have more desirable characteristics and more flexible prices. There
is evidence moreover that high prices in the short run constitute a
relativelyminor spur, if any, to improved utilization of coal by
consumers, being only one of a number of factors affecting the
introduction of economies. On the other hand, high prices may well
prevent the use of coal in new production centers and industries,
and demand for coal (although inelastic in the short run) has
proven to be elastic over long periods, during which substitution of
other fuels and economies in the use of coal become practicable.
The impact of minimum prices on demand would be particularly
great in an extended depression, when reduced operation of mines
would result in higher costs and so in still higher prices.
At the same time that it is exerting its adverse influences on de-
•mand for coal over long periods, the guarantee of minimum prices
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would likely be stimulating further overdevelopment of mine capac-
ity. It would seem that price regulation would protect existing high-
cost mines and encourage the opening of new marginal mines, with-
out any counterbalancing tendency to concentrate mine ownership
to enable operators to control capacity voluntarily. Available data,
moreover, suggest that mechanization is stimulated by higher
prices, so that price fixing might be expected to encourage mechani-
zation and thereby increase mine capacity. Minimum price fixing
would tend to discourage those prolonged strikes that have accom-
panied price and wage slashing and to reduce the incentive for stop-
pages because operators' resistance to union demands would be
weaker. This effect would operate in the direction of decreased over-
development, since prolonged strikes in the past have tended to
conceal the gap between demand and capacity and so have pre-
vented adjustment. This offsetting fortunate influence on excess
capacity, however, would be far outweighed by factors stimulating
overdevelopment.
It would appear then that established minimum prices would
have little impact upon short-run demand but would materially in-
crease short-run supply. In the long run, unless offsetting factors
were present, they would substantially decrease the demand for
coal and increase the capacity of the industry to produce it.
It is difficult to estimate what protection would be afforded the
consumer's nterest in reasonable prices. Analysis of costs and prices
suggests that the initial increase in price to consumers as a result
of the Act could not have been particularly burdensome, but effects
could be more substantial over a period of time in view of the
strengthened bargaining position of the union, weakened resist-
ance of employers to union demands, and probable higher prices
during depressions. The consumer could expect little in the way
of less wasteful methods of mining or more economic consumption
and distribution of coal. In fact, the "bootstrapping process" would
tend to encourage further use of fuels which are in more limited
supply, and the preservation of existing competitive opportunities
would disregard the dynamic forces in the industry and might en-
courage operators to increase their share of the market through
advertising instead of through more efficient mining and selling.
Minimum price fixing would, however, tend to relieve the consumer
of the burden of those frequent and prolonged strikes that grow out
of attempts to reduce wages.
If enforced rigidly, minimum price fixing would probably pre-
vent drastic price cutting. As has been pointed out, however, higher
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prices over a long period may result in reduced demand for coal,
and in a long depression they may well result in less effective utili-
zation of the resources of the economy.
With the union in a stronger bargaining position under regulated
prices, labor can be expected to improve still further its terms and
conditions of employment, although there is considerable evidence
that gains can be substantial even in the absence of minimum price
legislation when a strong union is in control of the labor supply.
The danger presented by this method of improving labor standards
is that the union might exploit its bargaining advantage, and the
employers fail to resist, with the result that consumers would have
to pay higher and higher prices. The end result would be lessened
demand and reduced employment opportunity. The events of the
last two decades suggest that this is a very real danger.
It cannot be said whether cost-price relationships under minimum
price fixing would be such as to enable investors to make profits
equivalent to those in other industries of like risks. It is clear,
however, that in depressed periods margins will be greater under
regulated prices than they would otherwise have been particularly
in the light of a likely tendency for costs to be overestimated in
setting prices.
In the authors' opinion, established minimum price schedules
would not further the long-range objective sought by Congress in
enacting such legislation. It Is true that price fixing tends to dimin-
ish price cutting, bolster profits and labor standards, and reduce
labor disturbances that result from wage reductions. These gains,
however, are likely to be illusory over the long run because price
regulation may well aggravate basic causes of instability. Most
important in this respect is the probability that it will encourage
even further overdevelopment while it reduces long-run demand
for coal. The adverse effect on demand could become more serious
if operators, cushioned by ability to pass on rising costs in higher
prices, failed to resist any unreasonable demands a union might
make.
We have pointed out the tremendous difficulties confronting
those who determine and enforce minimum prices—difficulties
growing out of the nature of the industry and its product, the
limitations of any legislation no matter how carefully designed,
conflicts of interests between producers and consumers, and the
innumerable variables that affect, and must be dealt with in price
determination. But the difficulties do not end there. Adjusting
minimum prices to changes over time in a continuous dynamic
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economy is an even more difficult task. How does one take into ac-
count in an, orderly and timely fashion (1) new and cheaper meth-
ods of mining and transportation, (2) changes in demand resulting
from fluctuations in business activities, the encroachment of com-
peting fuels on the markets of coal, economies in the utilization of
coal, and the development of new production centers and industries,
and (3) changes in competitive relationships among producers?
The above are illustrative of the host of changes that occur in the
working out of supply and demand in an economy. Is there any
likelihood that any price-fixing agency could adjust minimum prices
to future changes in a way that would encourage economic distribu-
tion and consumption of bituminous coal and ensure that our lim-
ited fuel resources would be wisely used? This experiment in price
fixing does not provide a basis for optimism.
Unfortunately, some of the forces and. conditions that made for
instability in this industry during the thirties have reappeared since
1951. Coal sales have fallen away and production and employment
have been sharply curtailed. The intensified competition among
coal producers has brought down prices, even though wages and
fringe benefits have been increased—a development made possible
by the utilization of more efficient machinery. Domestic oil and gas
continue to make inroads in the coal markets. More recently, im-
ports of foreign residual oil have aggravated the situation. Even as
we conclude this appraisal, government data for 1952 show that
production has fallen about 13 per cent and number of production
workers employed 11 per cent below their respective 1951 figures.
One hundred and thirty-three mines have shut down, coal is said
to be selling below cost of production in the majority of commercial
mines, and oil has replaced coal as the nation's chief fuel. In addi-
tion, 20 per cent of the soft coal is produced by mines not under
union contract.'69
It is possible, of course, that the union can obtain and enforce
adequate labor standards even in the face of forces encouraging a
return to price slashing. The union's task of maintaining control
over labor standards will be made more difficult by the fact that
even in a period of prosperity employment opportunities in the in-
dustry are falling, so that a cyclical decline will be superimposed
on a secular decline in labor needs. Should the union be unable to
169Dataon production of coal and the competitive position of coal and
oil are from weekly reports of the U.S. Bureau of Mines. Data are prelimi-
nary.Thenumber of production workers employed is from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Other data in the paragraph are from an article by A. H.
Raskin in the New Tork Times, July 19, 1953, p. 48.
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withstand downward pressures on labor standards, undoubtedly
minimum price fixing will again suggest itself as a remedy. In view
of the long-run unstabilizing influence of this procedure, it would
be wise to consider carefully other emergency measures to deal
with any downward spiral of prices and wages. Otherwise Congress
might place itself in the position of curing the symptoms while
weakening the patient's ability to rally from his fundamental dis-
ease.
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